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Abstract
More and more parts of our lives are controlled by software systems that
are usually not recognised as such. This is due to the fact that they are em-
bedded in non-computer systems, like washing machines or cars. A modern
car, for example, is controlled by up to 80 electronic control units (ECU).
Most of these ECUs do not just have to fulﬁl functional correctness re-
quirements but also have to execute a control action within a given time
bound. An airbag, for example, does not work correctly if it is triggered
a single second too late. These so-called real-time properties have to be
veriﬁed for safety-critical systems as well as for non-safety-critical real-
time systems. The growing distribution of functions over several ECUs
increases the amount of complex dependencies in the entire automotive
system. Therefore, an integrated approach for timing veriﬁcation on all
development levels (System, ECU, Software, etc.) and in all development
phases is necessary.
Today's most often used timing analysis method - the timing measurement
of a system under test - is insuﬃcient in many respects. First of all, it is
very unlikely to ﬁnd the actual worst-case response times this way. Fur-
thermore, only the consequences of time consumption can thus be detected
but not the potentially very complex causes for the consumption itself. The
complexity of timing behaviour is one reason for the often late and thus
expensive detection of timing problems in the development process.
In contrast to measurement with the mentioned drawbacks, there is the
static timing veriﬁcation which exists since many years and is applica-
ble with commercial tools. This thesis studies the current problems of
industrial applicability of the static timing analysis (eﬀort, imprecision,
over-estimation, etc.) and solves them by process integration and the de-
velopment of new analysis methods.
In order to show the real beneﬁt of the proposed methods, the approach
will be demonstrated using an industrial example at every development
stage.

Kurzfassung
Unser tägliches Leben wird immer stärker von Software-Systemen durch-
drungen, die oftmals nicht als solche wahrgenommen werden, da sie in
Nicht-Computer-Systeme (Waschmaschinen, Autos, usw.) eingebettet
sind. So arbeiten in einem aktuellen PKW bis zu 80 Steuergeräte.
Diese müssen in vielen Fällen nicht nur funktional korrekt arbeiten, sondern
eine geforderte Berechnung auch innerhalb vorgegebener Zeitschranken
ausführen. Ein Airbag erfüllt seine Aufgabe beispielsweise nicht, wenn er
auch nur eine Sekunde zu spät ausgelöst wird. Die so genannten Echtzeit-
eigenschaften müssen für sicherheitskritische Anwendungen und soweit wie
möglich auch für alle anderen Echtzeitsysteme, abgesichert werden.
Insbesondere sorgt die steigende Verteilung von Funktionen über mehrere
Steuergeräte hinweg zunehmend für komplexe Abhängigkeiten im gesamten
Fahrzeugsystem. Dies macht eine im Entwicklungsprozess und auf allen
Abstraktionsebenen der Entwicklung (System, Steuergeräte, Software, usw.)
durchgängige Methodik der Zeitveriﬁkation notwendig.
Das heute übliche Verfahren der Zeitmessung von Systemen während der
Testdurchführung ist in vielerlei Hinsicht ungenügend. Zum einen wer-
den die tatsächlichen Grenzwerte nur mit sehr geringer Wahrscheinlichkeit
erreicht. Zum anderen werden auf diese Weise nur die Auswirkungen
von Zeitverbräuchen gemessen, nicht aber deren Ursachen analysiert, die
möglicherweise sehr komplex sein können. Dies führt auch dazu, dass Prob-
leme erst spät im Entwicklungsprozess erkannt und folglich nur mit hohen
Kosten behoben werden können.
Neben den Zeitmessungen mit den genannten Nachteilen gibt es die statis-
che Zeitveriﬁkation. Diese ist bereits seit vielen Jahren bekannt und auch
über entsprechende Werkzeuge einsetzbar. In der vorliegenden Disserta-
tion werden die Probleme der industriellen Anwendbarkeit der statischen
Zeitveriﬁkation (Aufwand, Ungenauigkeit, Überschätzung, usw.) unter-
sucht und mit einer durchgängigen Prozessintegration sowie der Entwick-
lung neuer Analyse-Methoden gelöst.
Der hier vorgestellte Ansatz wird deshalb in jedem Schritt mit einem
Beispiel aus der Industrie dargestellt und geprüft.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Real-Time Requirements
The current decrease in deadly traﬃc accidents [Fed17] reﬂects the increas-
ing number of active electronic safety systems in today's cars since they
were ﬁrst introduced with the ABS (antilock braking system).
Such systems do not only have to decide correctly whether or not to inter-
fere in the braking process but have to do so within strictly deﬁned time
bounds. If the intervention is triggered too late, it may cost lives.
In general, adherence to real-time properties (cf. Section 2.1.2) is crucial
when it comes to safety-critical systems. But they are also highly relevant
to other automotive systems, like engine control, as injections have to be
precisely timed with the engine's current rotation speed.
But there is also a tremendous amount of real-time systems outside of
the automotive domain (e.g. multimedia, aerospace or medical devices),
that can also beneﬁt from the results of an integrated timing veriﬁcation
approach as introduced in this thesis.
Figure 1.1: The diﬀerence between measurement and static analysis meth-
ods (adapted from [Abs17]).
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1.1.2 Timing Veriﬁcation Instead of Measurement
Today's most used timing analysis technique is measurement, which means
that the response time of a system's tasks (cf. Section 5.3) are proﬁled
while it is executed. However, due to the strong dependency on the execu-
tion state of the processor architecture, the same execution path may lead
to diﬀerent measurement results when executed twice. So you might miss
the worst-case even if you have a full path coverage. In addition, due to
most systems' complexity and the resulting high amount of possible execu-
tion paths, it is highly unlikely that the measurement of the response time
actually hits the worst possible case (cf. Figure 1.1).
Therefore, a safety margin is added to the measured values. For example,
the Daimler development standard allows a maximum of 80% CPU usage
at the start of production. However, nobody can guarantee that the cho-
sen safety margin is always suﬃcient. That is why almost all ECUs use a
watchdog to dynamically supervise the correct task execution as well.
A watchdog however, can only reset or shut oﬀ a system and will thus
reduce the availability of fail safe functions like the airbag. While the au-
tomotive industry seems to agree that this is acceptable for systems like
the airbag as they are just systems that reduce the impact of an already
occurred accident, it will not be suﬃcient for fail operational functions like
autonomous driving.
Thus, the timing requirements of fail operational functions have to be for-
mally veriﬁed in order to ensure safety. Additionally, timing veriﬁcation is
desirable for all safety functions as it will improve their availability.
But there are also economical beneﬁts of static timing veriﬁcation over
measurement. As they deliver results early in the development the result-
ing changes can be made similarly early and thus, often with lower costs.
Furthermore, static timing veriﬁcation delivers detailed results and rea-
sons for a particular timing behaviour, thus allowing for better decisions
to optimise the timing behaviour.
1.1.3 Process Integration
One of the biggest challenges of static timing veriﬁcation compared to
measurement is that it requires detailed system and software architecture
knowledge as well as some implementation knowledge for each and every
software function in the system.
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While a measurement only requires the execution of the system as part of
a test, static timing veriﬁcation requires the collection of precise function
Worst-Case Execution Times (WCETs) as well as the correct calculation
of task and system response times based on those WCETs. The simple
problem in a distributed development environment is that there is usually
not a single person that has such detailed and broad knowledge.
That is why this thesis claims that, in addition to technical improvements
of the static timing veriﬁcation methods, an integrated approach for tim-
ing veriﬁcation is key to the industrial application of the technology. Such
an integrated approach requires a common understanding of timing con-
cepts and deﬁnitions. Beginning with the deﬁnition of timing properties
of system and software architectures, covering development and analysis
tool-chains and leading into a development process that deﬁnes the neces-
sary tasks for diﬀerent development roles (and typically people) in order
to achieve a timing veriﬁcation of the entire system.
1.2 Basics and Deﬁnitions
In electronic control units (and other electronic systems), time consump-
tion results from hardware resource access operations. Such operations are
triggered by an action (e.g. hardware trigger, code instruction, software
function, operating system task) which itself is triggered by input events.
In turn, actions result in output events as depicted in Figure 1.2.
Moreover, speciﬁc actions have speciﬁc execution properties. Tasks, for
example, can be preemptive, have a periodicity and a worst-case response
time (i.e. the worst-case time consumption between input event and out-
put event).
The functional behaviour of an embedded real-time system can be depicted
as an action or a sequence of actions that fulﬁl a high-level function. For
the end user, the most relevant time span is the one between such a func-
tion's input event(s) (e.g. collision sensor impact) and the desired output
event (e.g. airbag release). We call this time span the end-to-end response
time (E2ERT).
But in order to understand this duration and its dynamics it is neces-
sary to study the execution times of software functions as given by the
worst-case execution time (WCET and the best and average case execu-
tion times (BCET and ACET) respectively (cf. Figure 1.1). Based on the
3
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Figure 1.2: Real-time computational actions (adapted from [HGP+06])
execution times, diﬀerent levels of worst-case response times (WCRTs) can
be estimated based on the execution properties of tasks, interrupts and
communication messages (cf. Figure 1.3).
1.3 Structure and Overview
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), we are going to discuss the current state-
of-the-art in embedded real-time system (ERTS) development. There, we
will discuss diﬀerent approaches to software architecture design in order to
identify the necessary concepts for improving timing predictability. Fur-
thermore, we will introduce system and software development processes in
general and the automotive V-model in particular. The speciﬁc character-
istics of the automotive domain will be in focus throughout this thesis and
will be emphasised in this chapter to highlight the potential diﬀerences to
other domains.
Based on the current development of real-time systems, Chapter 3 will in-
troduce the current challenges as we see them. These goals will later be
used to evaluate existing approaches and to compare them to the results
of this thesis.
As a thesis with industrial background, we will use several real world ex-
amples from the Daimler development throughout this work. Moreover,
4
Figure 1.3: Schematic representation of timing analysis on task level.
in order to highlight the beneﬁts of a continuous integration of the tim-
ing veriﬁcation, we will use a central example, which will be introduced in
Chapter 4.
In addition to the current state-of-the-art ERTS development, Chapter 5
introduces the state-of-the-art in timing analysis. Methods for the diﬀerent
levels of timing analysis (WCET, WCRT, E2E) will be introduced and dis-
cussed. This includes existing approaches for system-level timing deﬁnition
and analysis, which we see as a key to an integrated approach.
Chapter 6 introduces the TOAD (Timing-Oriented Application Develop-
ment) approach that represents the proposed solution of this thesis. In this
chapter we argue that an integrated approach requires a deﬁned software
architecture, methods and tools as well as a process to be applied in an
industrial context.
The TOAD approach overview is followed by our proposal for a TOAD
architecture (TOAD-A in Chapter 7) and the TOAD tool suite (TOAD-T
in Chapter 8). The architecture and tools form the infrastructure for an
5
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integrated timing analysis that is used by the TOAD process (TOAD-P)
which is described in Chapter 9.
Finally, we will sum up our results and compare them to existing ap-
proaches (cf. Chapter 10), followed by a discussion on the possible lim-
itations of our approach (cf. Chapter 11).
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2 Embedded Real-Time System Development
2.1 Introduction and Deﬁnition
Embedded Real-Time Systems (ERTS) represent the majority of automo-
tive electronic systems. Within a car, which represents the embedding
system, they perform speciﬁc tasks like powertrain, brake or airbag con-
trol.
ERTSs are embedded systems which have to meet real-time requirements
in order to operate correctly. Hence, they represent the target domain for
an integrated timing veriﬁcation.
A common understanding of embedded systems and real-time systems as
well as their architectures is established in the following sections. Fur-
thermore, as an integrated timing analysis includes the integration into a
development process, the current system development in the automotive
domain is discussed with regard to its special characteristics.
2.1.1 Embedded Systems
An embedded system is a special-purpose hardware and software system,
rather than a general-purpose computer (e.g. PC, smartphone). As its
overall system design is focused on a small set of tasks such that these
devices could be produced at a comparatively low cost in mass production.
Embedded systems are usually not single devices but are rather built into
an embedding system like a car, mobile phone or washing machine. Hence,
people do not usually see the embedded systems, but rely on their correct
behaviour. Only in error cases are people reminded of the complex elec-
tronic system which controls the device they use.
With the continuously increasing use of embedded systems that ease our
lives and the simultaneous increase in the systems' complexity (e.g. by con-
necting single embedded systems to distributed systems), the amount of
errors originating from embedded systems tends to increase. For example,
the share of electronic-related car breakdowns from the overall breakdowns
has increased from 35% in 2005 to 48% in 2015 (cf. Figure 2.1).
7
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Figure 2.1: ADAC car breakdown statistic for Germany in 2015 [ADA16].
2.1.2 Real-Time Systems
Embedded systems use sensors to approximate the current state of the
embedding system. Actions such as the acceleration towards a deﬁned
value are performed according to the current state (e.g. current speed)
using actuators. As the state of the embedding system may change during
the computation in the embedded system1, the computation time has a
direct inﬂuence on the correctness of the result.
H. Kopetz deﬁnes a real-time system as follows [Kop97]:
A real-time (computer) system is a (computer) system in which
the correctness of the system behaviour depends not only on
the logical results of the computations, but also on the physical
instant at which these results are produced.
The logical result of a computation originates from the functional require-
ments whereas the deﬁnition of the timing behaviour is a non-functional
requirement that accompanies the functional requirements. A real-time
1I.e. the state may change before an appropriate action is computed.
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system is not necessarily a system that reacts fast, but rather a system
that complies with the deﬁned non-functional timing constraints.
The often referred to airbag system, for example, also has lower time
bounds on some requirements. For example, the crash detection condi-
tions have to be present for a deﬁned duration before a crash can be safely
detected as such. Thus, an early airbag release would result in a potential
release without the actual occurrence of a crash. This is regarded as an
even worse scenario than that of the occurrence of a crash and the non-
release of the airbag. This is because for the former scenario, the early
airbag release could very well be the cause of occurrence of a crash.
Hard and Soft Real-Time Systems
Soft real-time systems are real-time systems where only the quality of the
result is aﬀected by deadline misses. Hence, deadline violations do not nec-
essarily lead to system failures but can be tolerated within deﬁned ranges.
An example for a soft real-time system is a video player. A limited amount
of skipped video frames due to deadline violations can be tolerated.
Hard real-time systems however, do not allow the violation of deadlines.
Thus, most of them have to perform exception handling operations like
entering fail-safe states as soon as a single deadline is missed. A fail-safe
state is, for example, the deactivation of the airbag functionality and an
appropriate indication of the deactivation in the driver's instrument clus-
ter.
Most automotive ECUs contain some kind of hard real-time functionality.
Most of them do so because they have to communicate in a deﬁned fre-
quency which is usually standardised and thus, easy to implement. But
roughly half of them also have more complex safety-relevant functionalities
that are time-dependent in almost all cases.
In opposite to fail-safe systems, there are fail-operational systems. Such
systems have no fall-back fail-safe states for exception handling. Thus, sys-
tems like the Curiosity Mars-lander and upcoming autonomous cars make
use of a redundant simpliﬁed functionality in case of exceptions like dead-
line misses. And those functionalities need guarantees on the deﬁned time
bounds.
Hence, the timing veriﬁcation as it is presented in this thesis is crucial for
fail-operational hard real-time systems. But it is also highly recommended
9
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for all hard real-time systems and may even be helpful to ensure the quality
and availability of soft real-time systems.
Event and Time-Triggered Systems
Every computer system is triggered by input events from external sensors
and devices like buttons, radar sensors, clocks etc. The event of a clock
tick is used for the so called time-triggered activations to start tasks or
polled events periodically and thus, occur in a time deterministic manner.
Event-triggered activations are therefore understood to be all non time-
triggered activations. Such triggers are typically hardware interrupts that
execute speciﬁc software-functions (i.e. interrupt service routines) in re-
sponse to acyclic external events.
Most embedded systems today use event- and time-triggered functionalities
together. The main part of the software functionality is often executed pe-
riodically in a time-triggered manner while concurrent functions (network
communication, sensor information, etc.) result in interrupt events that
deliver new input for the next main function cycle.
This mixture delivers the ﬂexibility to react on non-deterministic inputs
from the embedding system while the output events remain time deter-
ministic.
The development of distributed time-triggered systems [Rus02] introduced
globally-synchronised clocks (e.g. in the FlexRay network communication
protocol [Fle07]) that allow time-determinism over several ECU-nodes with
low latency as well as live-knowledge of the current E2E duration. This is
very helpful for sensor-fusion functionalities, where all sensor inputs have
to be synchronised in software. However, like watchdogs on ECU level, the
knowledge of E2E violations can only result in an handling of such excep-
tions but cannot prevent them from happening. The latter is the intention
of the proposed method in this thesis.
2.1.3 Architectures
Diﬀerent Architectures are used on diﬀerent development levels in order
to structure the design and distribution of development work. Here, we
consider the system-, hardware- and software-level. On each one of these
levels, architectures are used to deﬁne basic rules and structures of inter-
action for lower level subsystems. Thus, they also deﬁne the necessary
10
Figure 2.2: An example of a software architecture (left: architecture of
Integrated Safety Systems (ISS), cf. [LHO+06]) and a hardware
architecture (right: A system on-a-chip (SoC) for ARM).
collaboration of the teams developing these subsystems. And with regard
to timing, it is the structure used to budget timing requirements and deﬁne
scheduling rules.
The top level system in the automotive domain is the car itself, which
consists of the physical system (e.g. mechanics and chemistry) and the
embedded E/E system. The E/E system architecture (in the following
only referred to as system architecture) deﬁnes the interplay of sensors,
ECUs and actuators using communication connections.
System Architecture
The Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) deﬁnes a system architecture in
[Car07] as
a representation of a system in which there is a mapping of func-
tionality onto hardware and software components, a mapping of
the software architecture onto the hardware architecture, and
human interaction with these components.
11
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Figure 2.3: An example of an E/E system architecture (FS - Functional
Software Component, GW - Gateway, cf. [LHO+06]).
For our use in the embedded real-time systems domain we adapt this deﬁ-
nition to
a representation of a system in which there is a mapping of func-
tionality onto hardware and software components, a mapping of
the software architecture onto the hardware architecture, and
external interfaces that allow the interaction with these com-
ponents.
In the phase of hardware/software co-design, functional requirements are
assigned to hardware or software elements. Performance, ﬂexibility and
changeability are major aspects in this early decision process. The high-
est performance is usually gained by hardware implementations while the
highest ﬂexibility is given by software implementations.
Depending on the chosen software architecture, a late (re-)deployment of
software components is possible. Such a deployment is depicted in the sys-
tem architecture in Figure 2.3.
Timing requirements are derived from the physical system and assigned to
12
the system architecture ﬁrst. Hence, timing veriﬁcation needs to start on
the system level as well.
Hardware Architecture
A hardware architecture deﬁnes the electrical interfaces and the layout of
the diﬀerent hardware components (see an example in Figure 2.2 on the
right hand side). The following levels of hardware architectures are relevant
in this thesis:
• Network topology: The structural topology of sensors, actuators and
ECUs as well as the communication channels between them.
• ECU architecture: The structural organisation of memories, inter-
faces and CPUs on a physical controller.
• Processor architecture: The logic design or implementation of a spe-
ciﬁc instruction set architecture.
Successful timing veriﬁcation is based on predictable processor architec-
tures. As the automotive industry has abandoned the idea of developing
automotive speciﬁc processor architectures that could focus on predictabil-
ity (presumably due to the high costs), the commercially available processor
architectures with increasingly elaborate caches tend to become less pre-
dictable with regard to timing. Therefore, those processor architectures
may be used, but the lack of predictability limits their full potential.
Software Architecture
Similar to predictable processor architectures, software architectures can
be more or less predictable with regard to timing.
Clements et al. deﬁne a software architecture in [BCK03] as:
The set of structures needed to reason about the system, which
comprises software elements, relations among them, and prop-
erties of both.
Hence, if we want to reason about the timing properties of a software
architecture, we need to document structures, concepts and relationships
that impact the timing behaviour. These are, for example, the scheduling
strategy or component communication concepts.
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2.2 Software Architecture Patterns
In this section, a short overview on common software architectural styles
(cf. [SG96, CKK02, BCK03]) is given and evaluated with regard to their
timing predictability and general usage in embedded real-time develop-
ment.
According to [CKK02], an architectural style
• Describes a class of architectures or signiﬁcant architecture pieces.
• Is found repeatedly in practice.
• Is a coherent package of design decisions.
• Has known properties that permit reuse.
Some of the most common software architectural styles are introduced in
the following sections.
2.2.1 Event-Based Architectures
Event-based software architectures (also known as call and return archi-
tectures) are understood to be systems where functions are executed on
demand instead of regularly in time. Representatives of this architectural
style such as communicating processes or client server architectures are
typically used to distribute systems on network nodes with a low compu-
tational overhead.
However, such systems tend to be unpredictable with regard to timing as
there are no limits on the maximum frequency of possible requests (oth-
erwise, one could choose a periodical execution accordingly). Hence, a
timing veriﬁcation is impossible until minimum distances between single
event occurrences are deﬁned (cf. Section 2.1.2).
2.2.2 Data-Flow Architectures
A data-ﬂow oriented execution, as it is used for example in pipes and ﬁlter
architectures or batch sequential architectures, assumes the execution of
processing components (e.g. ﬁlters) to be triggered by the availability of
new input data. Although this concept seems to be most eﬃcient, it be-
comes challenging if there are concurrent executions on a single CPU. In
such cases, scheduling and synchronisation concepts are required in order to
achieve consistency among dependent data streams. Similar to event-based
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architectures, unlimited arrival rates of new data makes predictability im-
possible.
For example, an Emergency Brake Assist (EBA, cf. Section 4.3) that ad-
justs the target speed (which is controlled by a Cruise Controller) according
to obstacles in front of the vehicle and triggers the brakes in emergency sit-
uations requires a higher priority than the cruise controller, due to its safety
relevance.
Thus, the data-ﬂow orientation is only meaningful when it is used on a
single consistent data stream. In this case, a timing veriﬁcation can be
performed if the data arrival rate is limited. That is why data-ﬂow archi-
tectures can often be found as part of more complex architectures (e.g. a
single component of a component architecture follows the data-ﬂow pat-
tern).
2.2.3 Blackboard Architectures
Blackboard architectures manage a central data-structure that contains the
interface data of all processes and notiﬁes processes of the arrival of new
data according to predeﬁned rules. Hence, the execution order depends not
only on temporal distribution of input data, but also on potentially very
complex rules.
The very high ﬂexibility of this software architecture pattern results in a
low and very diﬃcult predictability.
2.2.4 Software Component Architectures
Software Component architectures (cf. Figure 2.4) focus on the deﬁnition
of atomic units of execution, the components. These components can be
triggered by data, events, requests or time. However, a time-deterministic
software component architecture has to restrict the possible execution trig-
gers, preferably to the periodic time trigger.
Software component architectures are usually built using a so-called run-
time environment (RTE, also called middle-ware) which can be imple-
mented as interpreter 2 or platform-dependent frameworks3. The use of
interpreters usually leads to a lower performance than the use of platform-
dependent frameworks. This is due to the fact that target speciﬁc hardware
2In this case, the code-instructions are executed without a target speciﬁc compilation.
3In this case, the components are compiled for the target hardware architecture.
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Figure 2.4: A common component architecture.
features cannot be used for the component execution by interpreters. On
the other hand, interpreters are more ﬂexible in case the support of a wide
range of diﬀerent hardware is a requirement. As embedded systems typi-
cally have higher performance and power-consumption requirements than
ﬂexibility requirements, most embedded systems' component frameworks
are platform-dependent.
Nevertheless, software component architectures allow for a certain degree
of hardware-platform independence as the RTE is used to abstract from
low-level drivers and services. Such components are only aware of their
formal interfaces. There is no hard link to where data inputs or function
calls originated from. This is done by the software-architect who deﬁnes
the RTE-conﬁguration.
The high level of standardisation within a component framework allows
for an easy deployment of components in a pre-existing system architec-
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ture. But it also delivers a suitable infrastructure for system-level timing
veriﬁcation. The deﬁned types and concepts allow the assignment of ad-
ditional timing properties on an abstract level as well as the tracking of
measurements and calculations on the implementation level.
2.3 Development Processes
A development process deﬁnes the activities, methods and pro-
cedures that are necessary for the development and veriﬁcation
of a (software) system.
Translation from [Bal98].
With regard to our timing veriﬁcation approach, a domain independent
process is required to deﬁne when and how diﬀerent methods are to be
applied to diﬀerent work-products of a software development process (e.g.
architecture, speciﬁcation, code, etc.).
As explained earlier, we see one of the biggest challenges of timing veriﬁca-
tion in the fact that it cannot be assigned to a speciﬁc development step,
but requires diﬀerent actions on multiple development levels.
There are several standard process models for the software and system
development (e.g. waterfall model, V-model, prototype model, etc.; cf.
[Bal98]) whereas all of them describe the same three activities:
1. Requirements: The deﬁnition of the problem that the system/software(-
component) should solve.
2. Speciﬁcation/Implementation: The structure of the solution to a
given problem, which may deliver sub-problems that are deﬁned as
requirements on the next reﬁnement-level.
3. Test/Veriﬁcation: Ensuring, that the solution actually solves the
problem. Or, on the top level, the validation of the initial problem
description.
With regard to timing veriﬁcation, functional problem deﬁnitions on the
top level are extended by timing requirements (i.e. latest, earliest or never
deﬁnitions). All functional requirements that require an action to take
place need a mandatory timing requirement. While earliest-requirements
can be assigned to speciﬁc components that potentially delay an action,
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latest-requirements need to be budgeted on all contributing sub-problems
in the speciﬁcation/implementation phases.
Actually, this is one of the biggest challenges of the timing veriﬁcation. At
this point, estimations are required that may turn out to be wrong. Or
they may even lead to unbalanced eﬀorts between diﬀerent parts of the so-
lution (e.g. component A struggles to achieve a timing requirement while
component B has an additional budget available). The result is that archi-
tects avoid budgeting and hope for a good outcome in the late veriﬁcation
phases. This, however, has the negative side-eﬀect that without budget-
requirements, every component and every ECU tries to be just fast. In
doing so, CPU resources are wasted and cannot be retrieved easily in late
phases.
Further questions arise in the context of speciﬁc domains. The follow-
ing analysis of the automotive software development process aims at the
identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc challenges in the automotive domain.
2.4 Automotive Software Development
The development of electric and electronic systems (E/E systems) in the
automotive industry generally adopts the V-model for system development
[SZ03] which distinguishes between system and hardware/software devel-
opment (cf. Figure 2.5). This model speciﬁcally understands the hardware-
and software-development to be parallel and rather independent activities.
It is assumed that the system-level is able to decide which problem is to
be solved in hardware and which in software. This is actually the case
only to a certain extent. Because there are interdependencies between the
two, especially when it comes to timing requirements, such system-level re-
quirements cannot be assigned to either of them independently. This is an
additional reason, why budgeting from the system to the implementation
level is often not considered to be meaningful.
In the following sections, the phases of the V-model are discussed from an
automotive OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) point of view.
2.4.1 Analysis of the user/system requirements and speciﬁcation of
the logical architecture
The system requirements are speciﬁed as system functions with their re-
spective timing requirements.
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Figure 2.5: The standard process of an automotive development according
to [SZ03].
2.4.2 Analysis of the logical architecture and speciﬁcation of the
technical architecture
The speciﬁcation of the logical and technical architecture are typically not
separated. Hence, the OEM reﬁnes and assigns the functions to the ECU
level in one step. By doing so, sensors, actuators and communication inter-
faces between the ECUs are deﬁned. If timing requirements were not ex-
plicitly deﬁned, the communication interface indirectly deﬁnes them. The
update rate of messages is assumed to correlate with the update rate of
the actual calculated values to be sent.
In most cases, the system development on ECU, sensor and actuator level
is performed by one or more suppliers. Especially in the case of multiple
suppliers, budgeting of timing requirements is necessary in order to avoid
legal disputes. However, this is not always done due to the same reasons
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as mentioned before.
The supplier deﬁnes the ECU architecture as well as the underlying hard-
ware and software architecture(s). In doing so, he deﬁnes whether functions
are implemented in hardware, software or a mix of both. Often, the sup-
plier is additionally responsible for sensors or actuators and thus, for an
end-to-end timing of a speciﬁc function.
Today, the choice of a speciﬁc hardware platform is mainly driven by the
knowledge gained in previous projects, costs and market availability. As
innovative projects lack the knowledge of previous projects, they sometimes
require costly hardware changes towards the end of the project.
This may be prevented with a more structured estimation of the required
and available resources.
2.4.3 Analysis of the software requirements and speciﬁcation of the
software architecture
As the functionality of the software and the deployment on diﬀerent hard-
ware nodes has been deﬁned at the previous stage, the sub-functions are
now structured into software components with their respective interfaces
on diﬀerent software layers (e.g. hardware abstraction, basic-services and
application4).
While the distribution of functionality into diﬀerent software components
can be found in most projects, they often lack the deﬁnition of system
states with diﬀerent functional and timing behaviour (e.g. initialisation,
normal mode, error mode, etc.)5. Also, the deﬁnition of sequences for time
and safety critical functions is not available in most projects. And in the
few projects that specify system states or sequences we can almost never
ﬁnd reﬁned timing requirements or budgeting.
The issue at hand is that functional partitioning in the course of software
design is a well understood discipline. The budgeting of timing require-
ments is not. The time partitioning has to follow the functional parti-
tioning. But unlike the functional partitioning it is based on uncertain
assumptions, that the software architect has to make. These assumptions
are based on existing code, assumed eﬀects of hardware changes and best
guesses for new functions.
4An application is understood as the set of system or project speciﬁc software functions.
5The statements here are based on the author's experiences in software architecture
reviews for more than 30 projects.
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Based on today's timing speciﬁcation gap, it is obvious that it will be dif-
ﬁcult to perform a module-based timing veriﬁcation in later phases of the
development.
2.4.4 Speciﬁcation, Design and Implementation of Software
Components
On the level of software components, interfaces and functionalities are
speciﬁed according to the software architecture, further reﬁned and im-
plemented (often in a single model or a C-ﬁle). In the majority of the
cases where the speciﬁcation of the software architecture already missed
the reﬁnement of timing requirements, the software component design can
not make up for that. So, we have actually never seen a single project that
deﬁned execution time limits on the software component level.
Such time limits are necessary, for example, if a task is shared by com-
ponents from diﬀerent development parties. In such cases a simple ratio
of allowed time consumption can already be helpful in early stages. If a
10ms task is allowed to execute components for 2.5ms (as deducted from
the software architecture's other tasks and functions) a split of 1ms and
1.5ms can be estimated by the software architect, based on measurements
and static timing veriﬁcation for existing code or assumptions based on the
functionality.
2.4.5 Integration, Test and Veriﬁcation
Depending on the project, the integration, test and veriﬁcation steps can
be found on diﬀerent levels. These are typically the software, the ECU and
one or more system levels (with the car as the top level system). Testing
and (timing) veriﬁcation however, are not necessarily performed on all lev-
els. As timing requirements are usually not reﬁned or budgeted in today's
system development, timing veriﬁcation can usually be performed only on
a higher level of abstraction. The ﬁrst one being the task level of an inte-
grated software system.
Due to the most often missing low level timing requirements, intrinsic tim-
ing requirements are used instead. These are given by the fact that the
response times of tasks shall usually not exceed the task's period. And due
to today's mostly used dynamic timing veriﬁcation, an integrated ECU is
usually the ﬁrst level for timing veriﬁcation. There are several issues that
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arise here. On one hand, such a level of abstraction makes it diﬃcult to
achieve worst-case timing scenarios (due to the already high level of com-
plexity) and makes debugging of potentially found timing violations more
diﬃcult. On the other hand, meeting task deadlines does not necessarily
result in meeting end-to-end deadlines. This can only be achieved by a
combined functional and temporal reasoning.
In conclusion, we can see that because of various reasons, timing require-
ments are not reﬁned to a level where they can easily be handled or veriﬁed.
This thesis targets the elimination of the identiﬁed root causes for that is-
sue.
2.5 Automotive Characteristics and Challenges
There are some speciﬁc characteristics of the automotive industry that
make the timing veriﬁcation issue more challenging. We have shown this
in [MGL06b] for the static WCET veriﬁcation with the tool aiT [Abs17].
2.5.1 Scalability
A main characteristic is the complexity of today's automotive systems.
Although the lines of code do not form the most meaningful metric for
software complexity, it is clear that an increase from some 10,000 lines
of code in the last century to around 100 million lines of code per car
in 2017 implies an immense increase in software and systems complexity.
Especially software-centric functions like multimedia, navigation or driver
assistance require new forms of software architectures to cope with the in-
creasing complexity.
As the complexity tends to increase exponentially, so does the amount
of system states and possible execution paths. Thus, timing veriﬁcation
has to rely on abstractions while remaining sound and precise, in order
to scale with the complexity. For example, as most systems are not built
from scratch, existing timing veriﬁcation results (like loop-bounds or path
constraint deﬁnitions) can be reused as well as the software components
themselves. This, however, requires either abstract requirements on the
possible execution contexts or a variant management detailed as detailed
as the source code (e.g. parametrisable amount of gears for a gearbox soft-
ware) which can be incorporated in the timing veriﬁcation.
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This requires in turn some level of standardisation on the software archi-
tecture and operating system level.
2.5.2 Distributed Development
Distributed development in the automotive domain does not only imply
multiple development locations but also diﬀerent development companies,
mainly suppliers and sub-suppliers. This mainly cost-driven automotive
characteristic is a de-facto standard for every bigger OEM.
The integrated timing veriﬁcation is aﬀected by the following aspects of
the distributed development:
1. Closed source development: The OEM has usually no access to
the supplier's source code. Hence, suppliers have to deliver partial
timing veriﬁcation results that can be integrated similar to their com-
ponents and systems.
2. Development scope: There are systems that are completely devel-
oped by OEMs and there are systems that are completely developed
by suppliers. And there are all shades of development scopes in be-
tween (cf. Figure 2.6). The partial timing veriﬁcation results are
required on every development level and need to be supplied from
the OEM to the supplier in some special cases (e.g. OEM software
component development and ECU integration on supplier side).
In general, code and veriﬁcation results have to be reusable not only in
diﬀerent systems but also on diﬀerent development levels with diﬀerent
levels of conﬁdentiality.
Figure 2.6: Several possible distributed development approaches.
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Figure 2.7: Distributed car functions that are activated at an imminent
collision. Source: Daimler AG
2.5.3 Distributed Systems
As ECUs were developed similarly to mechanical components over a long
period of time (i.e. independently by one supplier per ECU) the amount
of ECUs has increased continuously to around 80. This high amount of
separate controllers is not necessarily a functional requirement but more
a reﬂection of historical mechanics centred development processes and re-
sponsibilities. Historically, there was no need for much communication
between diﬀerent development departments so that an ECU was typically
developed by a single department. In turn, the ECU communication net-
work can be seen as a reﬂection of the required communication between
diﬀerent OEM development departments.
However, the majority of today's innovative functions require increased
communication in a network of diﬀerent ECUs from diﬀerent domains of
the car (cf. Figure 2.7).
Therefore, it can be assumed, that the amount of distributed automo-
tive systems will further increase in the future. The integrated timing
veriﬁcation approach has to support concepts for the timing analysis and
veriﬁcation of distributed systems. For safety-critical systems, the veriﬁ-
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cation of worst-case communication delay guarantee is required.
This requirement excludes non-time-deterministic distributed protocols,
like TCP/IP, from the timing veriﬁcation for safety-critical systems.
2.5.4 Hardware Variants and Conﬁgurations
Most vehicles are highly customisable products. The richness of the result-
ing hardware variants is directly reﬂected by the software. As the resulting
software parameter conﬁgurations result in constraints on the possible ex-
ecution paths, they also vary in their possible worst-case execution time.
On the one hand this leads to the necessity of static timing analysis as
measurements cannot be carried out on all possible parameter combina-
tions. Not to mention that correct guessing of worst-case variants is highly
unlikely.
On the other hand, the timing veriﬁcation of highly variant systems is cur-
rently not integrated into WCET analysis tools and requires formal variant
descriptions which are not available for most projects.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduced embedded real-time systems and their develop-
ment processes in the way they are understood as a basis for this thesis.
Various concepts for embedded systems are furthermore classiﬁed with re-
gard to their timing behaviour and execution concepts. The technical foun-
dation is further given by deﬁnitions and examples of software-, hardware-
and system-architectures. As a conclusion, all development levels impact
the integrated timing veriﬁcation approach and will be considered accord-
ingly in this thesis.
Automotive characteristics and challenges are introduced in order to high-
light some requirements that seem to be unknown to the timing veriﬁcation
community so far. The solution of these speciﬁc challenges will increase
the acceptance of the static timing veriﬁcation in the automotive domain
and could thus lead to a wider range of application of the methodology.
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3 Challenges and Goals
3.1 Introduction and Deﬁnition
This chapter describes the identiﬁed challenges and deﬁnes resulting goals
that are to be tackled in this thesis. These goals will be the basis for a later
evaluation of the achievements of this thesis in comparison with existing
approaches (cf. Section 5.4).
3.2 Main Goals
The main goal of this thesis is to deﬁne a timing veriﬁcation process
that is industrially applicable. As stated in previous chapters (cf. Sec-
tion 2.3 and 2.4) we see the overall integration of timing aspects into the
entire development process as a key to that.
Furthermore, as all electric/electronic (EE) development projects try to
ﬁnd a balance between product quality (e.g. functionality, safety etc.), de-
velopment time (i.e. short time to market) and costs (i.e. development
and production costs), these aspects are similarly relevant for our inte-
grated timing veriﬁcation approach. We believe that underestimating time
and costs often prevents otherwise helpful approaches from being industri-
ally applied.
In addition to the goal of the general industrial applicability, the second
main goal is the consideration of automotive speciﬁc requirements
(cf. Section 2.5 and [MGL06b]). The consideration of speciﬁc automotive
industry related challenges aims at an industrial domain that is currently
not as concerned with safety as the aeronautics and space domains. But
the future of the automotive domain will lift it to a similar safety level
as there won't be even a human driver on board anymore. The speciﬁc
requirements are going to be considered speciﬁcally in Chapter 4.
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3.3 Sub-Goals
3.3.1 Precision
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2 our goal is a timing veriﬁcation that guaran-
tees safe upper bounds for the timing estimations it produces. Furthermore,
potential underestimations through wrong use of the analysis tools need to
be indicated to the developer.
The method of choice for guaranteed upper time bounds is the static timing
veriﬁcation which faces the challenge of overestimation. So in order to be
industrially applicable, our goal is to decrease the inherent overestimation.
With regard to the speciﬁc automotive industry we see one major factor for
an increased overestimation is the high amount of software and hardware
variants. As the variants bear constraints on the possible execution paths,
it is necessary to incorporate the potentially very complex constraint in-
formation which is often not explicitly given in the software.
Today's approaches to this problem are either to live with the overestima-
tion or whenever that is not possible, to guess a worst-case variant and
calculate its timing behaviour. The latter however, bears a high potential
for underestimation. Hence, in order to achieve sound results, a variant-
aware timing analysis is needed.
3.3.2 Generality and Flexibility
Using static analysis for timing veriﬁcation is always limited by the sup-
ported hardware and software. And while our approach cannot support
future hardware architectures out of the box, it can be generic and ex-
tendible to support these architectures.
Software architectures and operating systems are less diverse in the auto-
motive industry. For real-time systems, the vast majority uses AUTOSAR
[AUT07] nowadays which follows a component architecture approach (cf.
Section 2.2). In the rare cases that AUTOSAR is not used, either a vari-
ant of OSEK is used or no dedicated operating system (OS) is used at all.
Hence, this thesis will focus on AUTOSAR/OSEK systems only.
3.3.3 Usability and Automation
The academic background of automotive software developers is most often
rather in mechanical engineering than in computer science. Thus, current
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methods of formal speciﬁcation or veriﬁcation are very diﬃcult to be ap-
plied without suﬃcient abstraction and automation on the user interface
level. The tooling also needs to be integrated into existing development
tools in order to increase the acceptance rate (e.g. into software architec-
ture development tools).
Finally, also the analysis computation duration itself needs to be in ac-
ceptable ranges (rather hours than days) so that the development process
is not unnecessarily aﬀected.
3.4 Challenges
3.4.1 State Explosion
While the undecidability of the halting problem is a theoretical problem
for the timing veriﬁcation, the complexity of today's automotive embedded
software is a practical one (cf. Section 2.5.1).
The analysis of a distributed real-time system in all its details (from source
code to network communication) is not feasible today due to the state
space explosion problem (cf. [MNL06]). The high amount of continuously
changing input parameters that directly or indirectly inﬂuence the execu-
tion paths and thus, the timing behaviour, makes it nearly impossible to
estimate safe time bounds in a reasonable time.
Hence, abstractions are necessary on many levels in order to reduce the
number of relevant states considered in the timing veriﬁcation. Every ab-
straction however, potentially reduces the precision of the analysis.
3.5 Limitations
3.5.1 Hardware Correctness
The real-time behaviour of a software can only be computed for a given
hardware which executes it. As hardware operates in the physical environ-
ment, there is always a certain probability for hardware faults and defects.
This is the case no matter how safe and redundant a hardware architecture
is deﬁned.
The guaranteed bounds resulting from timing veriﬁcation always assume
non-faulty hardware. For example, the CPU clock rate has to be assumed
to be exact or at least to stay within speciﬁed borders.
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In contrast to inﬂuences from the physical environment to the hardware,
the correctness of hardware logic itself can and should be veriﬁed in similar
ways as software correctness.
3.5.2 Software Correctness
Software and hardware logic follow semantics that are formally deﬁned by
the programming language (e.g. VHDL for hardware, ANSI C for software).
External assumptions, like input contraints, are part of the speciﬁcation.
Thus, the semantics of the execution are well known, so that the correct-
ness of the logic can be formally veriﬁed.
However, programming languages also bear undecidable properties as
shown by Turing's proof on the halting problem in [Tur36].
The bottom line of the undecidability is that one cannot generally prove
that an arbitrary algorithm will halt, though it is possible to prove it for
speciﬁc subsets of algorithms.
Fortunately, most real world code can be veriﬁed to halt if it features spe-
ciﬁc properties. For example, ﬁxed loop iteration bounds as well as pro-
hibited use of recursions and function pointers can prevent straightforward
termination issues. In addition, run-time error veriﬁcation (e.g. pointer
out of bounds write) and stack overﬂow protection prevent side eﬀects that
can lead to indirect termination issues.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the main goals and challenges of this thesis. Those
are:
1. The general industrial applicability goal of our approach requires
an integration into current development processes and tools that are
easy to use, precise and still able to guarantee time bounds.
2. The goal to tackle speciﬁc automotive industry related challenges
requires the approach to take highly variant systems and their im-
plications into consideration. Furthermore, the approach needs to
be ﬂexible and extendible in order to support the high amount of
diﬀerent hardware.
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In addition to the aforementioned goals, the challenges of system complex-
ity were discussed in this chapter.
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4 Automotive Case Study
4.1 Motivation for an Example
PhD theses are meant to advance the current theoretical knowledge. Ad-
ditionally showing the beneﬁt of the gained knowledge in real world use is
usually not a requirement. However, as this thesis focuses on the applica-
bility of the developed approach, it is required to give a realistic proof of
concept in order to explain the beneﬁts for the industrial use-case.
4.2 Finding Suitable Case Studies
Not every example system is suitable to show what we want to achieve. As
there are around 80 ECUs per car there will be some that do not exhibit
the diﬃculties that most of the others do. Other ECUs may simplify the
actual problems.
The following requirements can be derived from the main objectives of the
TOAD approach (cf. Section 3.2).
• The system requirements have to include real-time properties.
• The system should be safety-relevant to necessitate a safe veriﬁcation.
• The system should be non-trivial so that a manual veriﬁcation is
hardly possible.
• The system should cover the typical requirements of an automotive
software system (mainly variability and distributed computing).
4.3 The Emergency Brake Assist (EBA)
A system which fulﬁls the identiﬁed requirements is the Emergency Brake
Assist (EBA, cf. Figure 4.1) which is similar to an Active Brake Assist
(ABA) in the Mercedes Benz Actros truck (cf. [JS06]). Such a system can
be seen as an advanced adaptive cruise control (CC) with the special ability
to detect and react to the emergency situations of impending unavoidable
collisions.
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The EBA uses a radar to detect obstacles in front of the vehicle and adjusts
the vehicle's speed accordingly.
Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of the radar lobes of the EBA system.
The logical architecture of an EBA system (cf. Figure 4.2) typically
consists of six main components:
1. Radar - The radar processes the information of the various radar
sensors (e.g. two close range and three long range radars) and trans-
forms it into corresponding distances for particular angles according
to each sensor.
2. Obstacle Tracker - The obstacle tracker uses the radar distance in-
formation to calculate the direction and relative speed of obstacles
around the car (in our example the obstacles in front of the vehicle).
3. ACC - The Adaptive Cruise Controller evaluates the current situa-
tion in order to adjust the maximum allowed speed accordingly. In
emergency situations it triggers the brake by requesting up to 100%
brake pressure.
4. CC - The cruise controller takes the target speeds deﬁned by the
user and ACC and calculates the necessary torque on the powertrain
(allows a limited deceleration compared to the brake).
5. Powertrain Controller - The powertrain component adjusts the torque
on the engine according to the CC and opens the clutch in emergency
brake situations.
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Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram of an ACC system with additional emer-
gency brake functionality (EBA).
6. Brakes - The brakes translate the ACC's brake commands into brake
actuator commands and executes them on the mechanics. For ex-
ample, it contains the ABS functionality that prevents wheels from
locking.
The potential deployment on diﬀerent ECU nodes is mainly constrained
by timing requirements. Thus, the radar preprocessing is either done di-
rectly within the radar sensor or on an ECU that is directly connected to
the radar sensor. This saves bandwidth and thus reduces delays on the
communication buses. Similarly, the powertrain and brakes software com-
ponents are usually deployed on ECUs with direct access to the engine or
the brakes respectively.
The obstacle tracker, CC and ACC software components on the other hand
have rather limited data interfaces. The deployment decision can thus be
made depending rather on the available CPU resources of the respective
ECUs.
Today's adaptive cruise control systems are able to slow down the car
in a speciﬁed range of deceleration by using the engine brake. Thus, no
emergency braking is performed. This is mainly due to safety concerns
as potentially faulty emergency brake interventions can lead to accidents
instead of preventing them.
However, current developments in automotive system design are heading
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towards a stronger interference in the cruising process as many accidents
can only be prevented this way. An example of such a stronger interference
is the Brake Assist PLUS in the actual Mercedes-Benz S-Class.
Such a system detects emergency situations with the radar sensors and in-
creases the amount of brake pressure to the required level if needed as soon
as the driver presses the brake pedal. Thus, the driver is still in charge of
the trigger while the intensity of braking is controlled by the ECU.
The next step is a brake assist that is allowed to execute emergency braking
independently of a driver's command. The Emergency Brake Assist (EBA)
used for the demonstration of our methodologies is supposed to fulﬁl this
requirement. Obviously, such an system requires a wide range of safety-
speciﬁc development steps in addition to the timing veriﬁcation.
Like most new automotive systems, the EBA is based on legacy software
components and ECUs. In the case of the EBA these are the ACC ECU,
which uses radar information to calculate obstacles and their distances, and
the brake ECU, which calculates the necessary brake pressure depending
on the current situation (e.g. diﬀerent weight on each wheel) and a given
deceleration value (by driver, ACC, etc.).
The new Emergency Brake Assist (EBA) represents an enhancement to
the ACC controller as it adds an interface to the brake ECU. Hence, the
existing brake ECU becomes part of the EBA system as it takes commands
from the enhanced ACC component in addition to the driver's commands.
The EBA example features the typical elements of an automotive software
system as it is distributed (and potentially further distributable) and con-
tains several variant parameters.
Parameters that are relevant for the system timing are ECU hardware pa-
rameters like the CPU type, the clock rate of this CPU, the memory layout
etc. The communication bus is usually the same for all system variants.
Recent developments using laser and camera sensors however, lead to ad-
ditional variant parameters for the used communication buses (e.g. type,
protocol, bit rate).
Additional system parameters are the car or truck type that is meant to
use the system (e.g. diﬀerent maximum speed and weight) as well as the
amount of radar sensors to be processed, the resolution of the obstacle
detection lobe, etc.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the need for an automotive case study with a suit-
able example. Requirements for such an example are given and the Emer-
gency Brake Assist (EBA) is introduced as one such system that fulﬁls
those requirements. The complexity of the system (in the sense of timing
veriﬁcation) can be seen in the distribution over several hardware compo-
nents and the potentially high amount of system variants.
A detailed component speciﬁcation for the EBA-system can be found in
Chapter 8.
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5 State of the Art in Timing Analysis
This chapter describes the current state-of-the-art by introduction and clas-
siﬁcation of timing analyses methods.
5.1 Introduction and Deﬁnition
Following the development of embedded real-time systems, timing veriﬁca-
tion methods are performed on the diﬀerent development levels. Diﬀerent
veriﬁcation approaches are applied for system, task and implementation
level where the lower levels verify the assumptions made by the speciﬁca-
tions of the higher levels (e.g. message response time veriﬁcations verify
system level communication protocol speciﬁcations).
Starting on the system level, timing requirements are distributed using
system architecture level models (c.f. Section 5.4). A veriﬁcation on this
level can already ensure, that the speciﬁed communication and ECU level
computation times are consistent with the system requirements. The com-
munication and ECU level computation times are then veriﬁed by WCRT
analyses for the respective task or communication scheduling algorithm.
The central input for the task response time is the WCET which repre-
sents an upper bound for the uninterrupted execution time of a machine
code function on a particular hardware architecture.
WCET and WCRT analyses are well established methods in the timing
analysis domain. Their current state and possible limitations will be dis-
cussed from Section 5.2.2 to 5.3. A less established timing veriﬁcation level
is the system architecture. While most developers assume that veriﬁed
upper bounds on task and communication schedules suﬃciently guarantee
a system's timing behaviour, they miss the fact that safe bounds on end-
to-end times require complete knowledge of all possible functional chains,
synchronisation times between the tasks and communication messages, as
well as all possible system states and system state transitions. Quite often
error-, safe-, start- and shutdown states are not considered on end-to-end
paths which results in unsafe system level timing although all single sched-
ules are safe.
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Hence, we distinguish three main classes of timing analyses: WCET Anal-
ysis, WCRT Analysis and System Architecture Level Timing Analysis.
5.2 WCET Analysis
The WCET represents an upper bound for the execution time of a speciﬁc
software function, on a speciﬁc platform with a ﬁxed set of parameters or
external execution path constraints. A software function features varying
worst-case execution times when executed on diﬀerent execution hardware,
but also for diﬀerent sets of constraints (e.g. representing software or hard-
ware variants).
Parameters or path constraints inﬂuencing the WCET are, for example,
variant constraints (e.g. features a and b cannot be conﬁgured at the same
time) or hardware constraints (e.g. the current project uses only one CAN
(Controller Area Network [ISO93]) transceiver although the software sup-
ports up to four).
5.2.1 Preliminaries
The WCET does not take into account that there are possible interrup-
tions of the software function under analysis by tasks or interrupt service
routines. The methods for the calculation of the WCET value can be static
(without executing the software on the target hardware, cf. Section 5.2.2)
or dynamic (by executing the software on the target hardware, cf. Section
5.2.3). There are also approaches that try to incorporate the beneﬁts of
both paradigms [BCP03] but remain elaborated dynamic WCET analysis
methods.
5.2.2 Static Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis
Time consumption occurs within information processing systems when
the hardware executes machine-level commands and command sequences.
That is why all static timing analyses (cf. Figure 5.1.) have models of spe-
ciﬁc hardware and use the software to be analysed as input.
A most precise timing analysis would take only executable paths into con-
sideration while neglecting infeasible ones. But as the question of whether
a path can actually be reached or not can be reduced to the halting prob-
lem, this problem is also undecidable. Safe WCET values however, are
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Figure 5.1: Workﬂow of a typical static WCET analysis exempliﬁed on the
tool aiT [Abs17].
not necessarily precise. Hence, tools like aiT (cf. [Abs17]) make use of
the abstract interpretation (cf. [CC77]) which leads to safe but potentially
overestimated sets of executable paths. Therefore, there will practically
always be paths or loop iterations that cannot be executed but are part of
the considered WCET path.
This overestimation cannot be determined as the actual WCET value is
not known. However, an estimation can be performed by deriving the nec-
essary input parameters for the calculated WCET path and executing such
a worst-case scenario on the target hardware. That means, that by man-
ually reviewing the calculated worst-case path, we can determine required
inputs. Then we try to execute this path as closely as possible. Doing so
might result in new insights on infeasible paths that can be modelled using
speciﬁc constraint languages.
In order to determine a non-inﬁnite WCET value, the upper bounds for
the number of loop iterations and the number of possible recursion itera-
tions have to be known at least. These values can be retrieved manually
or partially automatically by static analyses.
But the calculation of a precise WCET estimate requires further restric-
tions of the control-ﬂow than just the loop-bounds. It is necessary to know
not only all possible value ranges of ﬂow relevant variables but also the
execution context in which speciﬁc values will occur.
The second step in the static timing analysis is the hardware and CPU
feature analysis. There, safe overapproximations on the set of possible
execution states are calculated for each program point in order to derive
invariants for the estimation of a safe WCET with a low overestimation.
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In the end, all feasible execution paths are weighted according to their exe-
cution time so that the calculation of a worst-case path can be performed.
This is done by transforming the resulting control-ﬂow graph into an opti-
misation problem. aiT uses the Implicit Path Enumeration (IPE) [LM99]
to create an integer linear program (ILP) which can be solved with stan-
dard ILP solvers.
Successful case studies on static WCET veriﬁcation have been applied to
the automotive [MGL06b], space [HLS00, RSE+03] and avionics domains
[The04, TSH+03]. Nevertheless, most of the case studies were performed
on rather academic or small examples of code, whereas its application to
highly parametric, complex industrial code has rarely been published so
far.
5.2.3 Dynamic Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis/Proﬁling
Random Timing Measurement
Nowadays, the most often used timing analysis method is the dynamic
execution time analysis, which is also called program proﬁling. It is most
often used as it is the cheapest form of timing analysis and it is rather
intuitive for the developers. Proﬁling is often performed by measuring
the timing behaviour during functional tests that have to be performed
anyway.
The proﬁling in the embedded domain sometimes requires code changes
(i.e. instrumentation) so that the trace start and end points of tasks or
routines can be logged. Modern development hardware is able to measure
the execution time without generating additional CPU overhead.
A drawback of dynamic timing analyses is that the execution of embedded
systems usually requires the completely integrated system to be run and
hence, the execution of all tasks and interrupts. So the developers will
only get late feedback on the timing behaviour and often not on the level
of their own implementation but rather on a generalised task-level. This
circumstance prevents an early or even the general detection of ineﬃcient
coding.
But the main issue is that it is virtually impossible to ﬁnd an actual WCET
by proﬁling, as the amount of feasible software execution paths combined
with the possible amount of hardware execution states is enormously higher
than the time for testing permits to execute.
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Search-Based Timing Measurement
A more structured approach towards temporal behaviour testing is the
evolutionary testing of real-time systems (cf. [Weg01, SBW01]). This ap-
proach is based on a structured selection of input parameters in order to
maximise an optimisation function (also called ﬁtness function). The ﬁt-
ness of a WCET analysis can be represented by the execution time which
is to be maximised.
The selection of test parameter sets (individuals) can be performed by us-
ing ideas from the evolution theory [Dar59], in that parameter sets with
high ﬁtness values are selected (survive), recombined (parameter values are
exchanged) and mutated (parameter values are randomly changed).
Wegener et al. showed in a case study [SBW01] that the WCET of all
analysed tasks could be increased by an evolutionary search in comparison
to the ﬁndings of the software developers. However, the case study was
performed on rather small pieces of code (with a maximum of 119 lines of
code per task).
It can be assumed that with increasing complexity of the analysed tasks, the
determinism of the ﬁtness function is reduced (due to interrupts, caching
strategies or concurrent dependencies) and thus, the evolutionary search
would be unstable and potentially degraded to a random search.
All dynamic timing analysis methods bear two important disadvantages:
they cannot guarantee that a found WCET value is the actual worst-case
and they cannot cope with highly variant systems as each variant would
have to be tested separately in its speciﬁc environment (though pure soft-
ware variants could be represented as inputs in simulated environments).
Probabilistic Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis
The probabilistic WCET analysis (cf. [BCP03]) tries to incorporate data
from the static program structure with timing measurements. Therefore,
it uses the basic block graph and measurements for each basic block. The
execution times of the basic blocks are represented by their discrete prob-
ability density function which is estimated along the paths taken during
functional test cases.
Knowledge of the basic blocks allows the identiﬁcation of the non-executed
blocks as well as the calculation of a worst-case block combination that
has not been experienced during testing. This knowledge together with
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the tested executed paths allows an estimation of probabilities for diﬀerent
execution times.
The probabilistic analysis of the temporal behaviour results in a probability
distribution as depicted in Figure 1.1. However, as software-based systems
are no natural processes and thus don't follow Gaussian distributions, the
estimated probabilities tend to hide the fact, that the actual WCET might
be far from the mean value. Hence, the probabilistic WCET analysis is
helpful for less safety-critical systems (e.g. engine or gearbox) that have
to fulﬁl hard real-time requirements but are able to enter safe states (i.e.
fail-safe modes) in case of timing violations.
5.3 WCRT Analyses
5.3.1 Preliminaries
Scheduling of tasks and messages as well as the schedulability analysis
are classical disciplines of operations research and computer science (cf.
[LSD89, LL73]).
A schedule in this domain is a protocol that deﬁnes how computational
entities are assigned to resources like CPUs or buses. Goals of a schedula-
bility analysis are, for example, to show that these entities can fulﬁl their
timing requirements, to estimate available resources or to optimise the re-
source usage. The Worst-Case Response Time Analysis (WCRT) is the
central part of the schedulability analysis, as it delivers the response times
that are veriﬁed against the speciﬁcation.
Basic Concepts
There are several scheduling concepts which form the basis of a scheduling
protocol (cf. Figure 5.2).
• Concurrent Execution/ Preemptive Execution - If multiple
processing resources are used to execute software in parallel this
is called concurrent execution (e.g. multiple ECUs, CPUs or CPU
cores).
Otherwise, if diﬀerent software functions are executed on a single
processing resource, as tasks, their execution has to be scheduled se-
quentially. If the scheduler is able to preempt the execution of one
41
CHAPTER 5 State of the Art in Timing Analysis
Figure 5.2: The basic concepts in a ﬁxed priority preemtive task scheduling
scheme using rate-monotonic scheduling.
task to allow another task to be executed, this is called preemptive
scheduling. If the scheduler has to wait for a task to return from exe-
cution itself, this is called non-preemptive or cooperative scheduling.
In the case of preemptive and concurrent execution, shared data has
to be protected (e.g. by locks or semaphores) in order to prevent data
inconsistencies. These mechanisms inﬂuence the WCRT-behaviour
and need to be considered in WCRT-analyses.
It should be mentioned, that there are almost no pure non-preemptive
schedulers used in embedded systems, as almost all of them use in-
terrupt service routines that signal hardware events by interrupting
the current execution.
• Acyclic/ Periodic Execution - The categorisation into acyclic and
periodic tasks resembles the classiﬁcation of event and time-triggered
execution in Section 2.1.2. The input events of aperiodic actions (cf.
Section 1.2) depend on external non-clock events while the input
events of periodic actions are triggered by a clock in deﬁned and
ﬁxed intervals, the period.
• Aperiodic/Sporadic tasks - Acyclic tasks can be further divided
into sporadic and aperiodic tasks (cf. [Mar17]). In opposite to aperi-
odic tasks, sporadic tasks have a lower bound on the interval between
successive releases that we call minimum task inter-arrival time. By
this deﬁnition, aperiodic tasks can be released potentially inﬁnitely
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often at a certain point in time. Thus, they are generally not schedu-
lable in a hard real-time system.
• Interrupt - An interrupt is a hardware triggered event represent-
ing the input event of an interrupt service routine. Therefore,
interrupts are potential triggers for acyclic tasks.
• Task - A task represents an action in the model of Section 1.2.
• Deadline - A deadline is a scheduling parameter of a task which rep-
resents the time after which a task has to have ﬁnished its execution,
including potential preemptions.
• Response Time - The delay between task/message release and task
end/message arrival is called the response time.
• Priority - The priority is a task or message parameter that is used to
regulate the order of execution or transmission. Low priority values
usually indicate high priorities. The unique task priority of zero, for
example, indicates that this task is executed ﬁrst or is able to preempt
other tasks that might still be executed.
Figure 5.3: Real-Time Programming Models according to [Kir02].
Real-Time Programming Models
In [Kir02], C. Kirsch distinguishes three models of real-time programming
by comparing soft-time (discontious time consumption of the embedded
software) and real-time (continuous time ﬂow in the embedding world).
In the synchronous model, the computation of a response starts as soon as
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an input event arrives (cf. Figure 5.3). This model equals, for example,
the concept of hardware interrupts and interrupt service routines.
The scheduled model requires a response to an input event to arrive before
a given deadline has passed. This model is similar to most scheduled real-
time tasks.
A timed model is a special case of a scheduled model where the previously
computed response is not communicated before, but precisely at a given
time (e.g. the deadline). This programming model can be helpful to reduce
synchronisation overhead, as synchronisation takes only place at deﬁned
times. It can also improve the Worst-Case performance when potentially
short event inter-arrival rates impact higher frequency tasks or messages
(e.g. in CAN networks, cf. Section 8.6.3).
5.3.2 Classic Uniprocessor Schedulability Analysis
The classical approaches to scheduling analysis (e.g. [LSD89, LL73]) are
usually speciﬁc for certain scheduling algorithms.
Common Scheduling Algorithms
This Section is meant to introduce only the three most typical scheduling
algorithms for the embedded domain
Scheduling without Priorities One of the most simple scheduling algo-
rithms is the round robin scheduling. Each task is queued in a predeﬁned
order and executed preemptively in same-sized time-slots following the ﬁrst-
in ﬁrst-out (FIFO) principle.
Thus, the round-robin scheduling scheme is time deterministic but cannot
handle asynchronous tasks like interrupts as that would reduce the fair
share of CPU time.
That is why round robin is most often combined with the Fixed Priority
Preemptive Scheduling in industrial applications. In these cases, a round-
robin time-slot is executed during a single task period so that more time
is available than a single slot would actually require.
Fixed Priority Preemptive Scheduling The probably most often used
scheduling algorithm in the real-time world is the ﬁxed priority scheduling
(FPS). It has the advantage of remaining ﬂexible through priorities while
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being time deterministic. This algorithm is used, for example, by the stan-
dard automotive operating system OSEK [ISO05]. Here, a unique priority
is assigned to every task. The active task with the highest priority is se-
lected for execution as long as no higher prioritised task becomes active.
A scheduling is only possible if the tasks are released periodically or a min-
imum task inter-arrival time is known (e.g. for ISRs)1. The period or task
inter-arrival time is used in the priority assignment protocol called rate
monotonic scheduling which assigns the priorities monotonic to the rate
(period) of the task. This algorithm was proven in [LSD89] to be opti-
mal for tasks where the deadline equals their period (i.e. implicit deadline
tasks).
For tasks with deadlines that are lower than their period, the deadline
monotonic priority assignment2 (DMS) is optimal (cf. [Tin00]).
Dynamic Priority Scheduling Dynamic priorities are used by the earliest
deadline ﬁrst (EDF) scheduling algorithm (c.f. [LL73]). The scheduling
decision is made during execution by the dispatcher so that the task with
the shortest remaining deadline is executed ﬁrst. This algorithm has the
advantage, that it is able to handle tasks with explicit deadlines (deadlines
that are not equal to the task-period).
However, as this algorithm requires tasks with deadlines that are higher
than their period to be eﬃcient, it is not commonly used in industrial
embedded real-time systems.
Response Time Analyses
The determination of a task's worst-case response time (WCRT) is the core
task of a schedulability analysis. Knowing the WCRT and comparing it to
the tasks deadline tells us whether a task is schedulable or not. The WCRT-
analyses are usually very similar for the diﬀerent scheduling algorithms
(cf. [Tin00, TBW95]): The WCRT is the sum of the execution time (e.g.
WCET) and possible delay times. As the length of the possible delays
1Otherwise every task could be released inﬁnitely often at the same instance which
would lead to an inﬁnite response time.
2Priorities are assigned in order to their deadlines, starting with the highest priority
for the shortest deadline.
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depends on the WCRT itself, the solution is given by a ﬁxed-point equation
of the form:
WCRTn+1 = WCET +Delays(WCRTn) (5.1)
Examples will be given in the solution part of this thesis in Chapter 8.
5.3.3 Multiprocessor Schedulability Analysis
In recent years, multiprocessors were adapted by the automotive domain.
Most of the automotive multiprocessor systems are identical or homoge-
neous multiprocessors (cf. deﬁnitions in [Mar17]) in the form of multi-core
processors. But rather than using the diﬀerent cores for an optimal distri-
bution of existing tasks, the automotive use-cases today are independence
of diﬀerent development parties (with static assignments of cores to devel-
opment parties) or independence of safety critical and non-safety critical
functions.
Heterogeneous processor systems are used rather rarely in the automotive
industry today (except for FPGAs where the speciﬁc tasks usually allow no
task migration). Examples can only be found in infotainment and driver
assistance systems. There, the diﬀerent processors have dedicated tasks
like car-communication, 3-d graphics rendering or object recognition.
Hence, homogeneous and heterogeneous multiprocessors in today's auto-
motive systems have static task assignments so that each processor uses
single core scheduling algorithms and the respective scheduling analyses.
Nevertheless, future high performance systems will need global task sched-
ules that can balance the performance requirements between all available
cores and potentially diﬀerent processors. Then, earliest deadline ﬁrst and
rate monotonic scheduling need improvements as they are not optimal for
multiprocessors anymore (cf. [Mar17]). Adapted scheduling algorithms like
EDZL (earliest deadline until zero laxity) and RDZL (rate monotonic until
zero laxity) give high priorities to tasks with zero laxity (time between a
task's relative deadline and WCET) in order to improve the classic algo-
rithms.
Further improvements like the incorporation of precedence constraints and
support for heterogeneous processors can similarly be found in the litera-
ture.
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5.3.4 A General Algebra for Scheduling Analysis
The classical scheduling analysis (e.g. [LSD89, LL73])) is concentrated on
the analysis of concrete scheduling algorithms by describing resource usage
using algebraic equations. In contrast, real-time calculus [TCN00] formu-
lates a uniﬁed view on resource request and resource delivery to generalise
the resource-usage and timing analysis.
Based on network calculus (c.f. Figure 5.4 and [Cru91]), Thiele et al.
applied the max-plus algebra to compute the schedulability of several algo-
rithms (cf. [TCN00]). Based on this Algebra, resource delivery and request
functions need to be speciﬁed in order to analyse the design space of het-
erogeneous resource networks.
In order to deal with hard real-time bounds, the delivery curve β was in-
Figure 5.4: The basic model of network calculus [Cru91] with capacity func-
tion C, the remaining capacity function C', the request function
R and the delivered computation function R'.
troduced as a lower bound to the possibly varying capacity functions C of
a speciﬁc processor. Thus, β has to satisfy C(t)− C(s) ≥ β(t− s)∀s ≤ t.
The request curve α was similarly introduced as an upper bound for the
request function R, and thus, has to satisfy R(t)−R(s) ≤ ατ (t− s)∀s ≤ t.
Using these formulas, a schedulability analysis can be derived, for example
by proving β(t) ≥ α(t)∀t.
The beneﬁt of the real-time calculus approach is its general applicability
for all kinds of resources. Even varying processor capacity can be modelled
by this approach. However, the safe determination of delivery and request
curves is similarly diﬃcult as the analytic analysis of a speciﬁc scheduling
algorithm.
If no safe determination is required, the request and delivery functions can
be derived dynamically during tests.
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Figure 5.5: An example request function R and its request curve ατ and
a capacity function C and its delivery curve β (adapted from
[TCN00]).
5.3.5 Scheduling of Distributed and Multi-Processor Systems
Many automotive systems are distributed. So their software-components
can be located on diﬀerent ECUs. The ECUs interact with each other by
sharing sensor values (e.g. radar distances) or precalculated results (e.g.
tracked objects) via network buses. A system's response time thus depends
on the time used for the calculation on the ECUs and on the communication
delay.
A response time calculation for communication messages can be performed
similarly to the analysis of task schedules. As with task scheduling analyses,
the diﬃculty of a message response time analysis depends mainly on the
kind of network protocol.
Two major approaches to network scheduling can be found: asynchronous
and synchronous message passing.
TDMA: Time Division Multiple Access The TDMA approach to mes-
sage scheduling uses ﬁxed time slots which are pre-deﬁned for all messages
on a bus.
In contrast to the task scheduling, the message delivery delay (comparable
to the task WCET) is usually a known constant given by the bit-rate on the
bus and the message length. Hence, the message scheduling on a TDMA
protocol is deterministic by design.
Negative aspects of the TDMA approach are the high hardware costs due
to the complex clock synchronisation on each network client as well as the
ineﬃcient resource usage due to potential empty message slots and only
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partially ﬁlled messages. That is why even today the CAN bus [ISO93]
(see below) is the most commonly used bus in automotive systems.
CSMA: Carrier Sense Multiple Access CSMA is a media access proto-
col strategy where the decision for a message transmission is made by the
network nodes by waiting for an empty bus and by bus arbitration (iden-
tiﬁcation of the highest priority message that currently awaits sending on
a shared bus).
The most commonly used automotive bus protocol, the CAN bus [ISO93]
uses this kind of media access protocol to schedule prioritised messages.
The disadvantage of the CAN protocol is its low deterministic timing be-
haviour. As the CAN nodes are not synchronised, all of them could theo-
retically start sending their messages at the same time, so that only a small
number of highly prioritised messages has a non-inﬁnite WCRT. Thus, a
safe timing veriﬁcation can only be estimated for a subset of the messages.
Therefore, safety-critical systems can only be built upon the CAN protocol
if few messages are to be transmitted and if non-zero message inter-arrival
times can be guaranteed3.
An example for the message response time analysis will be introduced in
Chapter 8 and enhanced to enlarge the set of veriﬁed messages.
5.3.6 End-To-End Timing Analysis
Most system level timing requirements address end-to-end response times of
system level functions. The end-to-end ends are usually the sensor input
and the actuator output. The analysis seems straightforward as soon as
the before-mentioned response times have been estimated.
But as already stated before, end-to-end analyses may be underestimated
as complex system level states and interactions may result in more than a
single end-to-end system path. It is the task of the System Architecture
Level Timing (SALT) Analysis (cf. Section 5.4) to specify the set of possible
system paths and to analyse their Worst-Case duration.
3This can be achieved by spreading the message delivery time on each client.
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5.4 System Architecture Level Timing Analysis (SALT)
5.4.1 Preliminaries
In contrast to the timing analysis methods mentioned so far, the SALT
analysis approaches are of a more general nature. They are not limited to
speciﬁc development artefacts like messages, tasks or functions, but rather
deﬁne functional chains of actions that link the before-mentioned artefacts
on the system level.
In addition to high level timing aspects, they also cover functional and
structural aspects of embedded real-time systems.
In doing so, they are central to the system development and thus close
to this thesis' goal of an integrated timing veriﬁcation. In the following
sections, existing approaches will be introduced and compared with respect
to the goals that were deﬁned in Chapter 3.
5.4.2 AADL, EAST-EEA and MetaH
Figure 5.6: Beneﬁts of the MetaH approach in man hours compared to
traditional approaches. Diagram adopted from [Ves98].
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL, cf. [FLV03]) is
an SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) standard speciﬁcation language
for real-time component architectures. EAST-EEA (automotive AADL, cf.
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[TEH+03]) and MetaH (aeronautic AADL, cf. [KVL98] ) are closely related
approaches which were brought together in the AADL.
Unlike the diagram-oriented UML (cf. [RJB04]), AADL is rather based on
textual language-oriented deﬁnitions that make it more suitable for formal
analyses than UML. AADL allows the deﬁnition of hardware and software
elements on diﬀerent architecture levels (ECU, processor, task). Based on
these speciﬁcations, timing analyses are possible on the deﬁned architecture
levels. These analyses can be performed down to the level of tasks as it is
shown in the work of Feiler et al. [FGHL04].
According to Vestal, the application of MetaH is beneﬁcial when it comes to
development costs (cf. [Ves98] and Figure 5.6). Hence, some requirements
for industrial applicability seem to be fulﬁlled.
Like UML, AADL is generic and versatile in its application. It can be
used to design every kind of real-time embedded system. So it forms an
interesting candidate for our approach.
Figure 5.7: The AUTOSAR software component architecture (cf.
[AUT07]).
5.4.3 AUTOSAR
In contrast to AADL, the goal of the Automotive Open System Architec-
ture (AUTOSAR, [AUT07]) is not the deﬁnition of an architecture speci-
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ﬁcation language but rather the deﬁnition of a concrete template software
architecture for automotive systems. AUTOSAR is a standardisation at-
tempt of several key players in the automotive domain (e.g. Daimler AG,
Toyota, BMW etc.). Hence, it fulﬁls many automotive requirements as, for
example, the variant description, reusability etc.
AUTOSAR is basically a software component architecture (cf. Figure 5.7)
that focuses on portability by designing hardware-independent application
components. The interfaces and properties of these components are for-
mally deﬁned using XML. This way, reusability of software components be-
tween diﬀerent car lines and even OEMs is simpliﬁed. Nonetheless, timing
veriﬁcation is treated insuﬃciently by AUTOSAR, although all applica-
tions targeted by the standard bear real-time requirements. As this deﬁcit
was also realised by the AUTOSAR consortium members, the EU research
project TIMMO[TIM07] was launched in 2007, aiming at this speciﬁc goal.
The XML speciﬁcations could be extended to incorporate timing properties
and variant information. A similar approach will be followed in this thesis.
5.4.4 Geodesic
Geodesic [dNR02] is a component framework for embedded real-time sys-
tems that features a built-in timing analysis engine called TimeWiz. The
approach consists basically of an integrated design environment for the
speciﬁcation of functional and non-functional properties. An additional
tool performs classic scheduling analyses on the speciﬁed architecture mod-
els.
Geodesic is rather a tool and as such it could be used as a basis for an
integrated approach. But in order to be able to meet automotive require-
ments like distributed development and precise analysis of highly variant
systems, many adaptations would be necessary that would be similar to a
separate tool development.
5.4.5 SaveCCM
SaveCCM is a component architecture modelling language for embedded
real-time systems developed at the Märladalen University (cf. [HÅCT04,
CHP05]).
The approach uses formal methods for the veriﬁcation of real-time systems
during the development in the form of timed automata and the UPPAAL
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model-checker. This approach is already quite close to an integrated ap-
proach, as the component model resembles the AUTOSAR approach and
the veriﬁcation using timed automata is generic enough to verify the entire
event chain E2E response times.
SaveCCM features user deﬁned attributes for the components which can
be used to express variability. Furthermore, the reusability of SaveCCM
components lead to a fulﬁlment of most of the automotive requirements.
Only with regard to usability (model checkers are diﬃcult in a rather me-
chanics oriented domain) and highly complex systems do we see issues for
a wide adoption of the approach. In order to analyse the capability of
timed automata, this thesis performed a case study on the EBA system
(cf. Section 8.3).
5.4.6 SymTA/S
Figure 5.8: System speciﬁcation using the SymTA/S tool suite according
to [Sym07]
SymTA/S (cf. [HHJ+05]) is actually not a development approach but
a system analysis tool developed by the University of Braunschweig and
SymtaVision (cf. [Sym07]).
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The computation theory behind the analysis engine is closely related to the
event streams and arrival curves as they were proposed by Thiele et al. in
[TCN00] and described in Section 5.3.4.
The necessary system description is set up in a graphical user interface
as depicted in Figure 5.8. Tasks are created with their timing properties
and assigned to processing nodes. The WCET property can be variable for
diﬀerent processing nodes so that the hardware platform's inﬂuence on the
software tasks can be speciﬁed.
However, software components and their parameters cannot be modelled.
Thus, a modelling of these inﬂuences is only possible by a detour on the
deﬁnition of platforms for each possible conﬁguration. This is an intricate
task since the parameter inﬂuence has to be traced back manually, which
conﬂicts with the goal of an integrated approach.
The beneﬁts of SymTA/S can be seen in its additional ability to optimise
a system's timing behaviour with regard to deﬁned timing parameters and
in the modelling of network comminication (including several bus protocols
and gateways).
5.4.7 TDL and Giotto
The TDL (timing deﬁnition language) has been developed as a part of
the MoDECS (Model-based development of Distributed Embedded Control
Systems) project at the University of Salzburg. TDL is based on Giotto
[HHK01, PPKT04] but oﬀers a more convenient syntax, slightly changed
semantics and an improved set of programming tools, according to [Nad05].
The TDL approach aims at a shift from a platform-oriented development
towards a domain-oriented development of distributed real-time systems.
Hence, the timing requirements are set independently of any hardware plat-
form by the deﬁnition of platform-independent task execution times, the
so-called logical execution time (LET), which equals response times like a
task's period (cf. Figure 5.9).
TDL code is complied into so-called e-code in order to be platform-
independent. Before this code is compiled, the speciﬁed timing properties
are veriﬁed by a schedulability analysis based on constant WCETs, periods,
priorities, etc.
The main idea behind TDL is the platform-independent execution that
guarantees the same LETs on all supported plattforms. In order to do so,
the generated e-code (which contains the scheduling information) is exe-
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Figure 5.9: Input (e.g. sensor s) and output (e.g. actuator a) of a TDL
task. (cf. [Nad05])
cuted by a platform-dependent interpreter, the e-machine.
However, as the WCET is not platform-independent, additional veriﬁca-
tion steps are necessary. Except for the LET concept, TDL can be seen as
a tool like Geodesic (with a text-based description language rather than a
GUI) that requires many changes so that it can be seen as an integrated
approach (e.g. WCET calculation, variant awareness, bus communication).
Nevertheless, the idea and concept for platform independence of TDL is
interesting in the automotive domain. The AUTOSAR RTE can be seen
as a similar approach, but with less focus on timing than on reusability.
5.4.8 Timed Automata/Model-Checking
The theory of Timed Automata [ACD93, AD94] is an automata theoretic
framework with a dense time universe as a modelling language of real-time
systems. The speciﬁcation of real-time properties on timed automata can
be done using the timed computation tree logic (TCTL) [ACD93], which is
a timed adaptation of the computation tree logic (CTL, cf. [EC80]) from
classical model-checking.
A timed automaton is a ﬁnite automaton equipped with a ﬁnite set of
variables over the non-negative reals R+, called clocks. All clocks are syn-
55
CHAPTER 5 State of the Art in Timing Analysis
chronized, that is, they run at the same speed, and can be reset to zero.
A timed automaton is described by a ﬁnite set of locations and a ﬁnite
set of jumps between locations. Time progresses when the automaton is
at a certain location, whereas jumps are supposed to happen with no time
elapsing.
The possibility of formal veriﬁcation of real-time systems using Timed Au-
tomata has been demonstrated in several case studies. The three topics
relating best to the embedded and automotive domain are [LPY01] (veri-
ﬁcation of a gear controller in UPPAAL), [HÅCT04] (a component model
for embedded applications in vehicular systems; an adaptive simple cruise
control system is analysed as an example) and [TB94, OS01, KH04] (ver-
iﬁcation of the CAN bus system). In all these case studies the considered
applications are sub-systems of larger systems and could be veriﬁed as such,
using tools like UPPAAL (cf. [LPY97]). Hence, analyses of complete EE
system with bus communication has not been performed yet.
Timed Automata oﬀer a powerful description language for real-time sys-
tems which makes them interesting for an integrated timing analysis. But
in order to do this, timed automata have to be combined with static WCET
analyses in order to incorporate hardware platform-dependent veriﬁcations
on software function level. However, as we will show in Section 8.3, the
analysis of Timed Automata suﬀers from the state explosion problem which
currently prevents the applicability of Timed Automata for industrial level
distributed and embedded systems and thus, for the automotive domain.
5.4.9 Comparison of the State-of-the-Art Approaches
There are many other tools and approaches to the problem of timing def-
inition, analysis and veriﬁcation that cannot be discussed here. Several
of them are known to the author (e.g. VERTAF [HLS+02], TTP [HP02],
DaVinci [Wer03] and Timed Petri Nets [BD91, RGdFE99]) but were not
mentioned as the state-of-the-art in this chapter, as they do not provide
additional features to satisfy the requirements that were set up in Chapter
3.
The goals of the TOAD approach that were discussed in Chapter 3 shall
now be used for a comparison of the existing tools. The main goals of the
TOAD approach are the industrial applicability and the consideration of
the automotive speciﬁc requirements of scalability and variant awareness.
Depicted in Table 5.1 is our estimation of how the existing approaches ful-
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Approach Integrated Industrial Automotive
Process Applicability Requirements
AADL, EAST-EEA, O + −
Meta-H
AUTOSAR − + O
Geodesic − O −
SaveCCM O − +
SymTA/S − + O
TDL/Giotto − O −
Timed Automata O − −
Table 5.1: Comparison of the current state-of-the art approaches.
ﬁl our requirements using a simple −, O, + scale. And although none of
them fulﬁl all our requirements, most of them bear interesting stand-alone
concepts that will be considered by our approach.
Especially ideas from AUTOSAR, SaveCCM and SymTA/S will be re-
combined and extended with implementation level timing veriﬁcation and
variant awareness to form our TOAD approach.
5.4.10 Conclusion
This chapter introduces and evaluates several forms and levels of timing
analyses. The three main categories WCET , WCRT and SALT analyses
are introduced and examples for each of them are evaluated in detail. The
results can be summed up as follows:
WCET Analysis
The biggest advantage of static timing veriﬁcation is its ability to estimate
safe upper bounds for execution times. This approach is most suitable
for hard real-time requirements in safety-relevant systems. It is also the
only technique that can eﬃciently address highly variant systems as given
in the automotive software development. However, highly variant systems
are rarely considered in the WCET research community yet. We intro-
duced this topic in [MGL06a] and will discuss it in more detail in Chapter
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8 of this thesis.
The main disadvantage of static timing veriﬁcation that we can see is the
inherent overestimation which results in unused resources and potentially
high hardware costs.
The dynamic and hybrid approaches do not require hardware models as
they use the actual hardware. However, they require test cases that cover
all paths and states of a system to achieve safe results, which is virtually
impossible. Thus, dynamic and hybrid approaches cannot verify Worst-
Case Execution Times and neither can they cope with variability issues.
Therefore, dynamic and hybrid approaches are not considered for safety-
critical or highly variant systems as they can be found often in the automo-
tive domain. Hence, this thesis will focus on the static timing veriﬁcation.
WCRT Analysis
For the WCRT analysis, we see many similarities within the analysis of
scheduling algorithms and network access protocols. As a result, one
can use the same general method (as introduced in [TCN00]) or the
same scheme (the classic approach) to analyse worst-case response times
(WCRT).
Whether or not to use a speciﬁc analysis method shall not be restricted by
an integrated approach. Therefore, the solution part will discuss in detail,
how timing analyses on diﬀerent system levels (e.g. component, task, mes-
sage, etc.) can be used in combination without a restriction to the kind of
analysis method.
This thesis will make use of the existing approaches and show how they
can be optimised when they are integrated.
System Architecture Level Timing Analysis
The System Architecture Level Timing Analysis approaches aim to inte-
grate WCET and WCRT approaches in order to verify actual system level
timing requirements. Thus, they are most interesting for our goal of an in-
tegrated timing veriﬁcation. As none of the existing approaches is able to
meet our requirements we need a combination and extension of the existing
approaches.
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6 TOAD Approach Overview
A comparison between the state-of-the-art (cf. Chapter 5) and this thesis'
challenges and goals (cf. Chapter 3) shows a gap and thus, the need for an
integrated timing analysis. The Timing Oriented Application Development
approach (TOAD) aims to ﬁll this gap.
As the TOAD approach is supposed to integrate with the entire devel-
opment process, the single aspects of the solution spread over diﬀerent
development domains. Hence, this chapter sketches the overall idea that
will be detailed in the following chapters.
6.1 TOAD - Timing Oriented Application Development
As timing behaviour and worst-case timing prediction are closely related to
the software development process itself, the TOAD approach addresses the
individual elements of a typical automotive software development process
(cf. Section 2.4).
Thus, we are going to establish a timing oriented development process
(TOAD-P), that makes use of the technical elements of the TOAD approach
(i.e. software architecture and tools).
As depicted in Figure 6.1, the TOAD approach consists of three diﬀerent
development domains: the software architecture (TOAD-A), the tool chain
(TOAD-T) and the development process (TOAD-P).
These domains will be motivated in the following sections separately before
they will be introduced in the consecutive chapters in depth.
6.2 The TOAD Architecture (TOAD-A)
The underlying architecture TOAD-A deﬁnes the necessary artefacts of a
timing veriﬁcation, i.e. hardware and software elements that are used to
describe the system under analysis.
TOAD-A also deﬁnes common basic concepts like interface communication
(e.g. among software components) or scheduling of tasks and messages.
Using such a common architecture deﬁnition and restricting some basic
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Figure 6.1: The TOAD approach for integrated timing veriﬁcation.
concepts allows us to reuse existing veriﬁcation methods without the need
for a developer to delve into these methods himself (e.g. only a set of task
scheduling mechanisms will be supported, but they are automatically ver-
iﬁable).
So ﬁrst we will derive software architectural requirements from the chal-
lenges deﬁned in Chapter 3. Based on that, we will deﬁne an abstract
software architecture. The intermediate level of abstraction intends to al-
low the adoption of commonly existing architectures and systems to our
approach. Then, we will see in Chapter 7 how this abstraction will be
adapted to a pre-existing software architecture.
6.3 The Tools and Methods (TOAD-T)
The tools and methods comprised by TOAD-T can be split up into the
categories of development tools and methods as well as timing veriﬁcation
methods.
6.3.1 Development Tools and Methods
The development tools shall support the development of the non-functional
timing aspects in addition to the functional aspects. The main requirement
here is usability and process automation.
These tools will allow the model-based design of a software architecture
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based on TOAD-A artefacts. This model-based approach allows us to re-
strict the development to the use of deﬁned TOAD concepts as well as the
use of veriﬁed code generators that guarantee interface conformance on the
implementation level.
These development tools furthermore allow a single source concept for all
architecture-related decisions and thus allows for the traceability of tim-
ing aspects on all development levels from the system architecture to the
implementation.
6.3.2 Timing Veriﬁcation Tools and Methods
Timing veriﬁcation tools and their advancements form a central technical
achievement of this thesis. These tools are integrated into the development
tools in order to analyse the modelled systems or system elements.
Component timing properties like the WCET can be automatically veriﬁed
by using aiT [Abs17] for example, while task and message timing properties
can be veriﬁed by using diﬀerent WCRT analysis algorithms.
The central tool-chain allows us to incorporate system-level information
like variant constraints into all levels of timing veriﬁcation. Thus, we are
able to show the beneﬁts of an integrated timing analysis.
6.4 The TOAD Development Process (TOAD-P)
One of the less technical but nonetheless important aspects of an integrated
approach is the deﬁnition of a process that incorporates all the tools and
concepts as a work package description. As we stated in our motivation,
we see a main obstacle for wide adoption of timing veriﬁcation in missing
responsibility deﬁnitions, as well as missing technical competences when it
comes to system level timing veriﬁcation.
Our process deﬁnes the single activities of our integrated timing veriﬁca-
tion and how they can be distributed amongst diﬀerent developers and
potentially suppliers.
Starting with the deﬁnition of a required response time of an EE-system,
identiﬁcation of suitable hardware, design and implementation of the algo-
rithms by diﬀerent parties and veriﬁcation of the speciﬁed timing properties
are elements of this process.
Similar to TOAD-T this process will describe the abstract properties of
our process so that existing processes can be easily adapted. Furthermore,
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the automotive V-Model (cf. Chapter 2.4) shall be analysed and used as
an example to show the adaptability of the TOAD-P process.
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7 The TOAD Architecture (TOAD-A)
7.1 Introduction and Deﬁnition
The TOAD-A architecture deﬁnes abstract architecture artefacts (e.g.
ECUs, software components, tasks, functions) and concepts (e.g. com-
munication and scheduling protocols) necessary for a largely automated
timing veriﬁcation.
The formal deﬁnition also allows the description of system level constraints
that spread down to software components and functions. This could be a
variant constraint that is reﬂected by a software variable or a software
architecture conﬁguration parameter that is relevant to the timing veriﬁ-
cation only (e.g. component amount, interface property, task priority).
Hence, dependencies on timing behaviour can be made transparent pro-
actively where today's timing analysis needs to trace back constraints from
the code.
7.2 Requirements
7.2.1 Decomposition and Separation of Concerns
The abstract architecture deﬁnition of every timing relevant system concept
and parameter used for TOAD-A allows a separation of diﬀerent veriﬁca-
tion methods as well as the reuse of these methods on the same system
elements in diﬀerent architecture instances (e.g. particular schedulability
analyses for OSEK-based architectures).
The integrated approach that was presented in [MNL06] used timed au-
tomata to model the timing behaviour of tasks and messages for a complete
system. However, this approach does not only fail with regard to perfor-
mance of the veriﬁcation, but also introduces more possibilities for mistakes
by the architects. This is due to the fact that basic concepts like communi-
cation transceivers often need several instances of the same state machine
in order to describe concurrent behaviour.
Combined with the lack of computer science backgrounds in the automo-
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tive domain, we strongly advocate the use of separation of concepts and
timing analyses accordingly.
7.2.2 Explicit Timing Property Deﬁnition
In contrast to most existing architectures and programming languages, the
TOAD approach makes timing properties and parameters relevant for tim-
ing behaviour on system, hardware and software level explicit.
As real-time consumption is a combined hardware-software property, con-
stant execution times can only be deﬁned for a particular hardware conﬁg-
uration. Parameters that inﬂuence timing behaviour like path constraints
however are mostly hardware-independent. If there is a hardware depen-
dency like an algorithm that iterates over the amount of available radar
sensors, this dependency can be formally deﬁned.
For ﬂexibility reasons, the TOAD timing deﬁnition shall allow timing de-
scriptions ranging from constant real-time values to parametric timing for-
mulas that allow variant system components to be analysed.
7.2.3 Extensibility and Reusability
In addition to the ﬂexible timing property deﬁnitions, TOAD-A and the
derived architectures shall be extensible and oﬀer a certain level of reusabil-
ity. The TOAD-A architecture shall be portable to the majority of to-
day's hardware and software architectures. This requires, for example, the
hardware-independent deﬁnition of basic system types (e.g. uint8, sint16)
and basic system functions (e.g. ﬂoat multiplication).
This requirement should not be underestimated. A system that cannot be
veriﬁed to fulﬁl its timing requirements on the current hardware and which
is too expensive to be ported to higher performance hardware is at a dead
end of its development. This worst-case situation might be one of the rea-
sons that prevent today's developers from using static timing veriﬁcation
with its inherent overestimation.
7.2.4 Predictability and Accuracy
Restrictions on the hardware and software architecture may be necessary in
order to achieve timing predictability. The timing behaviour of a common
blackboard architecture [EHRLR80], for example, is hardly predictable,
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since calculations can be performed event-based without idle times in be-
tween. And even if predictions are possible on such architectures, the
worst-case scenario is typically far from the average-case.
The high diﬀerence between the average-case and the worst-case (shown in
Figure 7.3) mainly results from missing discretisation and synchronisation
of component execution. In order to be time predictable, acyclic tasks and
interrupt service routines require deﬁned and veriﬁed constraints on their
arrival times.
An additional aspect of accuracy is the variance of system artefacts. As the
worst-case timing behaviour depends on system parameters, the descrip-
tion of constraints on and between those parameters is needed in order to
reduce overestimation (e.g. there can be either 5 standard or 3 high preci-
sion radar sensors on a system, but not 5 high precision radar sensors).
The run-time environment (RTE) of a software component architecture,
for example, manages the communication among the application's compo-
nents. Therefore, its timing behaviour depends on the amount of handled
components, the communication and data types of the exchanged data. All
these parameters need to be taken into account by the timing veriﬁcation
methods in order to accurately predict the worst-case times.
7.2.5 Automotive Characteristics
Finally, there are two central automotive characteristics that shall be sup-
ported by TOAD-A: the supplier management and the distributed compu-
tation.
Supplier Management
Due to the distributed development with many suppliers, composable soft-
ware architectures and formally-deﬁned interfaces are needed. With these
concepts, logically separated and stakeholder speciﬁc system and software
parts can be developed separately. But in order to achieve this, standard-
isation is required in the entire automotive industry. Hence, we follow the
AUTOSAR approach as closely as possible.
In addition to standard functional interfaces, our approach requires all
software components (supplier or OEM developed) to have veriﬁable tim-
ing properties that do not require additional implementation knowledge.
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Hence, a standardised facility for timing meta information is to be added
to the existing interfaces.
Distributed Computation
The typical automotive network architecture consists of around 80 ECU
nodes. The functional distribution on this network is currently deﬁned
several years before the start of production. Timing veriﬁcation however,
may ﬁgure out bottle necks during the development that require a veriﬁed
redeployment of functionality. Hence, TOAD-T shall support the virtual
deployment of functionality.
7.3 TOAD-A
Figure 7.1: The basic elements of the TOAD-A architecture
According to Chapter 2, software component architectures like AUTOSAR
are seen as most ﬂexible and adequate to meet the requirements of an au-
tomotive system development. As it centres around the reuse of software
components on potentially distributed hardware platforms by using formal
interface deﬁnitions, this architecture shall be considered as a basis for
TOAD-A.
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However, in order to use the advantages of software component architec-
tures in the timing veriﬁcation domain, this thesis uses an extended deﬁ-
nition of a component:
A component is the aggregation of an interface description, de-
ﬁned semantics (functional information) and metadata (non-
functional and system parameter dependency information).
TOAD-A (cf. Figure 7.1) is an abstract architecture that deﬁnes typical
elements of a distributed real-time system as well as basic timing properties.
This allows the TOAD architecture to be adapted by other architectures
like Cadena [HDD+03] or AUTOSAR [AUT07].
Based on [BMR+96], an architecture can be characterised by four main
views (logical, process, physical, development) which are discussed with
regard to TOAD-A in the following sections.
7.3.1 Logical View
The logical view (cf. Figure 7.2 a)) of a TOAD application is deﬁned by a
set of components and resource elements. The resource elements are typed
data interfaces that can be deployed on the same ECU or via bus network
on multiple ECUs. By connecting the components with these data objects,
a data interface is generated for each connected component in the code.
7.3.2 Process View
One of the most relevant views from the perspective of timing veriﬁca-
tion is the process view. This view deﬁnes the execution order (sequential,
concurrent or preemptive execution) of functions, components and commu-
nication events.
These aspects are reﬂected by the parameters of the task (component or-
der), OS/RTE (task and message control) and ECU (hardware platform)
elements in TOAD-A. A task executes components in a sequential order
according to given precedence constraints.
These are simple one-to-one relationships of the type component 1 before
component 2. As depicted in Figure 7.2 b), components 1 and 2 follow a
precedence constraint which is indicated by an arrow.
The task scheduling algorithm in use is not limited in general by TOAD-A.
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Figure 7.2: The logical and physical view for a TOAD application.
Hence, the adaptation of diﬀerent concepts and operating systems is gen-
erally possible. However, as predictability comes mainly with synchronous
or synchronised tasks, the prototype instance of TOAD-A uses the most
common ﬁxed priority preemptive scheduling algorithm.
A function-based synchronisation (e.g. start a particular task as soon as
a particular other task has ﬁnished) can be achieved with the deﬁnition of
preceding components within a task.
Although asynchronous tasks usually reduce predictability, they cannot be
assumed to be non existing. They necessarily occur triggered by acyclic
hardware events or remote requests which cannot be synchronised in time.
As stated earlier, acyclic tasks need deﬁned and veriﬁed constraints on
their arrival times in order for the entire system to be predictable.
We favour the deﬁnition of minimum task inter-arrival times instead of sta-
tistical arrival times or arrival curves (cf. Section 5.4.6) in the industrial
context. Statistical arrival times tend to be misunderstood or even misused
by industrial practitioners as they invite for the deﬁnition of constraints
without a sound basis. This is due to the fact that these statistics are
usually derived from tests and the quality of these tests then deﬁnes the
quality of the timing analysis. A safe and sound timing veriﬁcation can
thus not be guaranteed.
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Arrival curves promise more ﬂexibility than minimum inter-arrival times
while deﬁning ﬁxed (and hopefully veriﬁed) upper arrival bounds compared
to statistical arrival times. In contrast to statistical arrival times, they can
be veriﬁed during execution using window watchdogs. But the deﬁnition
of arrival curves in the industrial context would most likely be based on
tests as well, which would basically mean that they are statistical arrival
times undercover. Furthermore, each and every deviation from ﬁxed task
periods leads to higher worst-case response times or reduced available re-
sources (e.g. a maximum of 3 executions within 30ms compared to ﬁxed
10ms periods are depicted in Figure 7.3).
Minimum task inter-arrival times are simple to understand, veriﬁable dur-
ing execution and can be enforced by hardware and software for systems
that need such a high level of safety.
As asynchronous tasks should not be instantiated with levity, TOAD-A
Figure 7.3: Synchronised task execution compared with unsynchronised ex-
ecution using statistical frequency.
does not allow to deploy functional components within them. This limits
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the circle of potential developers for asynchronous tasks to a selected group
of software architects and hardware-related developers. This is one of sev-
eral social and process-oriented means presented in this thesis that allows
for an early development focus on predictability.
The special group of asynchronous task developers will split polling (asyn-
chronous) and processing activities (synchronous) depending on timing and
application requirements.
The specialists in such a group will also cover more hardware knowledge
in order to be able to decide on the use of special hardware mechanisms
like hardware interrupt schedulers as proposed in [RD05] or sporadic task
servers (cf. [Mar17]). This way, asynchronous tasks could be shifted com-
pletely into hardware or at least their WCET could be vastly reduced.
TOAD-A incorporates transparent data exchange between components on
diﬀerent ECUs. On the process level, communication messages are avail-
able as soon as a component execution is ﬁnished and the respective inter-
face variable is used by another component on a diﬀerent ECU. Also the
message protocol is not predeﬁned. We will use the CAN protocol as an
example as it is very common in the automotive industry.
7.3.3 Physical View
The physical view of a TOAD-A instance is displayed in Figure 7.2 b).
The example shows only a single ECU although multiple ECUs are possible.
The ECUs are containers for other hardware elements like micro processors
or communication controllers.
Concurrent and Parallel Processing
The software components (as seen in the process view) are executed on
a dedicated micro controller. A single software component is restricted
to serial execution. Concurrency has to be achieved via separate software
components in diﬀerent tasks. Parallel execution can be achieved via sep-
arate or even the same software components running on diﬀerent micro
controllers or cores at once.
This is again due to the fact that most developers have diﬃculties in avoid-
ing race-conditions and keeping predictability when using function-level
parallelism. Nevertheless, experts in the ﬁeld of parallel computing are
able to provide speciﬁc basic software libraries if needed. In this case,
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these experts will have to provide tools for the calculation of WCET and
response times in TOAD-T (cf. Section 8) when using these libraries.
Additional Hardware
As it can be seen in Figure 7.1 a TOAD ECU may have a micro controller
and a communication controller. However, most ECUs contain interfaces
to diﬀerent hardware like radars for the ACC system or GPS for a naviga-
tion system. These hardware components can be deﬁned in TOAD-A by
inheriting from the generic hardware or other existing hardware classes.
7.3.4 Development View
The Run-Time Environment
The run-time environment (RTE) handles the communication among the
components so that they do not need to be aware of the physical location of
the components they have interfaces with. Furthermore, the RTE triggers
the execution of the tasks and components and thus deﬁnes the execution
order within the tasks.
The RTE can be understood as an operating system abstraction which
schedules the software component level and connects the deﬁned data in-
terfaces of all components.
The Enhanced Component Repository
A central aspect of the TOAD approach is the enhanced component repos-
itory as shown in Figure 7.4 on the right hand side. This repository func-
tions as a central interface and data exchange hub for the entire TOAD
development.
Any software component information is formally described in the repository
via interfaces, metadata (e.g. timing information) and semantics descrip-
tion (i.e. source code). Hence, the repository also forms the basis for an
easy reuse of its components.
The component interface description is deﬁned by using the elements of
the architecture deﬁnition in Figure 7.1. The timing is ﬁrst deﬁned as a
diﬀerent function for each software element (called timing_deﬁnition in
Figure 7.1). Thus, the repository allows the deﬁnition of diﬀerent schedul-
ing algorithms for tasks or diﬀerent WCET analysis methods for software
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Figure 7.4: A common software component architecture (left) and an en-
hanced component repository (right).
components.
The semantic description is the least restricted information in the com-
ponent repository. In general, this is a reference to the source code that
implements the deﬁned function interfaces. But many diﬀerent semantic
descriptions are possible and have been integrated into the repository. For
example, feature models have been incorporated, that can be used to deﬁne
the parameter dependencies which can be reused in the timing veriﬁcation
of highly variant systems.
The deﬁnition of additional meta-information or semantics descriptions can
be accessed by the TOAD-T tools that implement methods of timing ver-
iﬁcation. The description of task properties, for example, can be accessed
by task scheduling analysis algorithms.
In this regard, the enhanced component repository is an infrastructure for
a variety of component information. The TOAD-T tool-chain uses this
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information as an input for analyses and writes back the results to the
repository for the potential use by other analysis methods.
Component Interfaces
According to the TOAD-A speciﬁcation, every component implements
three functions that are used for component initialisation, execution and
destruction. These functions are called precycle, cycle and postcycle (cf.
Figure 7.1). This basic functional interface is followed independently from
the used programming language or code creation process (generated or
manual implementation).
The interface functions for accessing interface variables and parameters can
be generated. The respective code generator has been implemented for C
and C++ code.
This interface knowledge is directly used for the timing veriﬁcation. For ex-
ample, the interface functions cannot be executed in the same task period.
Hence, the WCET of the task executing a component equals the maximum
of the WCETs of precylce, cycle and postcycle.
7.3.5 Diﬀerences to Existing Architectures
TOAD-A is based on a software component architecture that fulﬁls the
requirements of ﬂexibility (e.g. by parameterisable components) and
reusability (by formal component interface deﬁnitions). Furthermore, it
is well suited for the requirements of supplier management as the exchange
of component information using the enhanced component repository deliv-
ers necessary information for a component integration without sharing too
much intellectual property with the OEM.
In addition to common software component architectures, the component
repository of TOAD-A contains additional meta-information as well as se-
mantic information that is to be used by the timing veriﬁcation but may
also be used for other kinds of analyses. However, TOAD-A deﬁnes only
generic and basic concepts that are required for all TOAD-A instances.
Based on these generic concepts, speciﬁc instances of hardware, scheduling
algorithms or communication protocols have to be selected by the user of
TOAD-A. Their timing behaviour is then deﬁned using meta-information
and analysis tools that interpret this meta-information.
In comparison to AADL, TOAD-A deﬁnes a concrete software component
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architecture that limits the amount of potential interactions to the for-
mally deﬁned interfaces. The timing veriﬁcation that is built on top of
this software architecture can thus rely on the interface deﬁnition. This is
especially true, if the RTE interface functions are generated the way it has
been done for C and C++.
TOAD-A allows the incorporation of diﬀerent software architecture styles
into its components. Data-ﬂow1 or event-based2 concepts can be realised
using the TOAD concepts. Other software architecture styles such as the
data-centric blackboard architecture however cannot be implemented on
top of TOAD-A. But this is intentional, as such architectures are less time-
deterministic and thus irrelevant for our approach.
7.4 Implementation of TOAD-A
7.4.1 TOAD-A RTE
The basis for a TOAD-A implementation is the TOAD-A RTE which is ba-
sically an abstraction of a speciﬁc operating system, like for example OSEK
[ISO05]. Depicted on top of Figure 7.1, the RTE, like an OS, forms the
interface between components running in tasks and the micro-controller.
The RTE executes the components in tasks depending on their deﬁned
period while preserving the deﬁned precedence constraints. In addition,
before and after the cyclic execution of components, the interface com-
munication is handled by the RTE. According to the component's data
resource usage, send and receive commands are used to update the respec-
tive interfaces to their most recent values. This includes the communication
via bus networks.
The RTE could be implemented as an interpreter like a JAVA virtual ma-
chine. Such an RTE would read the TOAD conﬁguration during execution
and translate the timing and interface deﬁnitions into scheduling and com-
munication commands. But due to resource limitations on most embedded
devices, the generation of platform-speciﬁc code is typically the method of
choice.
With the exception of the communication, TOAD-A does not deﬁne any
other standard services like NVM (Non-volatile memory)-handling or diag-
1A TOAD system can be restricted to execute like a data-ﬂow system.
2TOAD is mainly a time synchronous architecture but also allows the limited use of
asynchronous tasks.
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nosis. Those functions can be implemented as TOAD software components
as they are not speciﬁcally relevant for the timing veriﬁcation.
7.4.2 Adaptation of TOAD-A
The most eﬃcient way of implementing TOAD-A is the adaptation of ex-
isting, similarly structured implementations. In this case, existing archi-
tecture concepts need to be mapped on TOAD-A elements and missing
concepts need to be added to the implementation. As this is the most
likely way that TOAD will be rolled out in the industry, this section shows
an example for such an adaptation.
For that matter, the existing ANTS (Agent NeTwork System) architecture,
which was proposed by Görzig in [Gör03], and its run-time environment
(RTE) were adapted to the TOAD-A architecture. By doing so, TOAD-A
directly supports two platforms: the OSEK/C166 and Linux/PC.
As depicted in Figure 7.5, most ANTS elements (for the OSEK/C166 plat-
Figure 7.5: The mapping from the ANTS architecture running on the
ST10/C166 platform (on the bottom) to TOAD-A (on top).
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form) can be mapped to corresponding TOAD-A elements. The diﬀerences
can typically be achieved by TOAD-A concepts similarly:
• The TOAD-RTE forms the OS-abstraction and thus triggers the task
execution itself instead of using OS-speciﬁc tasks.
• The ANTS PU-chain concept (process unit chain) is covered by the
TOAD component precedence constraints.
• The ANTS conﬁguration deﬁnes sets of active and inactive compo-
nents. Such sets form diﬀerent application-modes (e.g. normal mode
and diagnostic mode) and are resembled by diﬀerent TOAD-A RTE
conﬁgurations.
• The ANTS administrator is a speciﬁc ANTS component that triggers
conﬁguration changes. TOAD-A requires such changes to be per-
formed on the software architecture level by experts with knowledge
of the respective timing behaviour impact. In such cases, the RTE
has to be adapted and the changes need to be reﬂected by TOAD-T
tools for timing veriﬁcation.
7.4.3 AUTOSAR
AUTOSAR [AUT07] is an automotive standard which resembles many
commonalities with TOAD-A. Likewise with ANTS, AUTOSAR can be
adapted to the TOAD-A architecture.
AUTOSAR is, like ANTS, very similar to the TOAD architecture. How-
ever, some diﬀerences can be found in the interface description and the
execution concept. The AUTOSAR interface description is limited to the
signal type and thus forms a subset of the TOAD-A interface description
which allows complex data types (as shown by the mapping onto ANTS).
The AUTOSAR execution and communication concept allows components
to be executed periodically using a sender-receiver mode or event triggered
using a client-server mode. Although the client-server concept can be im-
plemented on top of TOAD-A's sender-receiver communication model, the
worst-case timing behaviour would be equal to that of the sender-receiver
model.
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7.5 Developing TOAD-A Components
TOAD-A components are implemented on top of code frames that are gen-
erated from the component deﬁnition. Today, generators are implemented
for ANSI-C or C++ ﬁles that contain the function prototypes for the pre-
cycle, cycle and postcycle functions as well as the get and set functionalities
for each resource and attribute object.
The developer of a software component adds his functionality to the cycle
functions where he makes use of the generated get and set functions.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the TOAD-A architecture and its core elements (run-time
environment (RTE), enhanced component repository, etc.) were intro-
duced.
As shown in this chapter, TOAD-A is based on a software component ar-
chitecture that can be easily adapted to existing software architectures.
Instances of TOAD-A are as ﬂexible in use as possible (e.g. by using
RTE generators and component speciﬁcations) but are also restricted to
timing predictable software architecture concepts, so that the component
developers have a limited impact on their application's worst-case timing
behaviour.
The enhanced component repository allows TOAD-A components to be
deﬁned and implemented in distributed development scenarios while keep-
ing necessary timing behaviour information transparent at all times. The
explicit speciﬁcation of component and interface parameters allows the def-
inition of highly variant software components and applications. The central
storage of all parameters and interfaces allows the later access of timing
veriﬁcation tools and thus the veriﬁcation of highly variant systems.
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8 Tools and Methods (TOAD-T)
8.1 Introduction and Deﬁnition
All tools and methods to be used by the TOAD approach are comprised
within the TOAD tool suite (TOAD-T). What all the tools have in common
is that they make use of the TOAD-A architecture and its component
repository. The tools can be categorised into development tools (cf. Section
8.2) and timing veriﬁcation tools (cf. Sections 8.4 to 8.8).
In the following sections, the words component and software component
are used synonymously.
8.2 Development Tools
The main goal of the TOAD approach is an industrially applicable software
development and timing veriﬁcation process. In a ﬁrst step the develop-
ment process itself is automated, so that the timing veriﬁcation can be
performed as an extension to an existing tool chain.
Based on the speciﬁcation of TOAD-A (Chapter 7), two tools are imple-
mented for the development of TOAD applications: TOAD-CD (compo-
nent deﬁnition) and TOAD-AD (for application deﬁnition).
8.2.1 TOAD-CD
TOAD-CD is a graphical user interface (GUI) for the component speciﬁca-
tion. This is done by deﬁning the components' type, their communication
interfaces and their parameters according to the TOAD-A architecture.
For example, the EBA system (cf. Chapter 4) requires an entity ACC of
the Component type. As depicted in Figure 8.1, this ACC component
references an Obstacle resource object containing the obstacle information
from the radar.
Data objects types such as the Obstacle resource are deﬁned in TOAD-CD
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Figure 8.1: The component interface deﬁnition using the TOAD-CD tool.
similarly to functional components. Their basic type is the InterfaceRe-
source as deﬁned in TOAD-A. The resource types may contain parameters
that are resource types themselves and thus allow the creation of complex
type systems.
The Radar resource object (cf. Figure8.2) contains several parameters that
represent the radar sensor information structure. A constant user-deﬁnable
parameter is, for example, the resolution of the radar lobe.
Every component or resource that is described in TOAD-CD is stored in
the enhanced component repository (cf. Section 8.2.3) so that they can be
used for the component implementation and application development as
well as their timing veriﬁcation.
The necessary components and some example resource objects for the use
in the EBA system are depicted in Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.2.
8.2.2 TOAD-AD
The TOAD-AD tool allows a GUI-assisted deﬁnition of TOAD applications
on the basis of TOAD-A elements and the software components speciﬁed
using TOAD-CD. A screenshot of the data ﬂow deﬁnition is depicted in
Figure 8.4 on the left hand side.
The connection between the functional entities (indicated by the FE suﬃx)
is established through the usage of data objects of deﬁned complex types.
The process view (Figure 8.4 on the right hand side) allows the assignment
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Figure 8.2: The partial resource object speciﬁcation for the EBA system.
of the software components to tasks that are executed on deﬁned processing
nodes (ECUs). The tool also allows the setting of initial values for each
system parameter (for components, ECUs, tasks, etc.).
TOAD-AD stores the application information in an XML ﬁle that contains
the formal component deﬁnitions, the component's deployment and the
data ﬂow between the components.
Based on this description, the timing veriﬁcation can be performed for the
thus deﬁned application.
8.2.3 The Enhanced Component Repository
The enhanced component repository (see also Section 7.3.4) is no tool it-
self, but a central data store for the communication between the diﬀerent
TOAD tools (veriﬁcation methods, TOAD-CD, TOAD-AD). Additionally,
it is a means for communication between TOAD developers (e.g. OEM
and supplier). As mentioned in Section 7.3.4, the repository stores every
component's relevant information (interface, semantics and metadata).
The storage structure of the architecture speciﬁcation is derived from the
TOAD-A deﬁnition. The metadata contains parameter speciﬁcations that
are used for example for the timing veriﬁcation. Semantics information is
currently given by a reference to the source code which is a necessary source
for a timing veriﬁcation. Furthermore, references to design speciﬁcations
such as timed automata can be given here (cf. Section 8.3).
The repository information is currently used by the following tools:
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Figure 8.3: The component speciﬁcation for the EBA system.
Code Generation
After the deﬁnition of software components using TOAD-CD, source code
frames are generated as described in Chapter 7.
Application Development
The application development uses the repository as a system library and
allows a model-based system development down to the software component
level.
Timing Veriﬁcation
The repository stores the timing-relevant information of each element of
the system. Software components gain WCET values or WCET estima-
tion methods for each interface function, task properties include deadlines,
priorities, etc. and communication controller properties are for example
bit rates of a bus.
The timing analysis and veriﬁcation of a concrete application can be per-
formed solely based on the application description and the repository in-
formation.
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Figure 8.4: The data ﬂow (left) and process view (right) of the EBA sys-
tem in the TOAD-AD tool. As the simulation component is
deactivated in the given conﬁguration, it is not visible in the
data ﬂow view.
The next sections deal with the calculation of timing properties that are
typically part of a system's timing requirements (e.g. end-to-end time).
8.3 Integrated Timing Veriﬁcation using Timed
Automata
The development tools and concepts mentioned so far are used to develop
TOAD applications. Timing veriﬁcation can be thought of as a bottom-
up (e.g. WCET veriﬁcation, task WCRT calculation, etc.) or a top-down
approach (e.g. end-to-end deﬁnition, system timing budgeting, etc.). We
recommend at least a top-down start as it results in earlier warnings in
the case of problems and the consideration of timing issues in the entire
development process.
Our integrated timing veriﬁcation approach requires some central facility
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for timing veriﬁcation and a consistent model that represents the interplay
between diﬀerent system elements.
As our approach is to be capable of safeguarding highly safety critical
systems with regard to timing, the formal veriﬁcation capabilities of timed
automata (cf. Section 5.4.8) makes them an interesting basis for the central
representation of TOAD applications. In order to evaluate the feasibility
of an integrated timing veriﬁcation using timed automata, we performed a
case study on the EBA system (cf. Section 4) that was presented in detail
in [MNL06].
As mentioned before, the EBA system is a distributed system running
Figure 8.5: Basic models of the Radar a), ACC b), EBA c) and Brake d).
on three separate ECUs (ACC, EBA and Brake; cf. Figure 8.5). The
communication is performed via a CAN bus, that is represented by a bus
and a transceiver automata (cf. Figure 8.6).
The following timing properties were deﬁned to be veriﬁed on the modelled
EBA system:
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Figure 8.6: The CAN transceiver as adopted from [KH04].
• Is the emergency brake activated after an emergency situation has
been sensed for a maximum time of 30ms?
• Is the system deadlock-free?
• Do ECU tasks consume less time than their period lengths (deadline)?
Using a time base of 1µs per tick, these properties are speciﬁed by the
following UPPAAL TCTL formulas:
1. Radar.Close > (EBA.EmergencyBrake and CloseTimer <= 30000)
2. A[](not deadlock)
3. A[](ECU.TaskFinished imply ECU.Timer <= Period)
The veriﬁcation results given by UPPAAL look as follows:
1. A[](not deadlock) [satisﬁed]
2. A[](ACC.TaskFinished imply (ACCTimer <= 5000)) [not satisﬁed]
3. A[](EBA.TaskFinished imply (EBATimer <= 10000)) [satisﬁed]
4. A[](Brake.TaskFinished imply (BrakeTimer <= 5000)) [satisﬁed]
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5. Radar.Close > (Brake.EmergencyBrake and (CloseTimer <= 30000))
[satisﬁed]
As property 2 is not satisﬁed, the tool reveals a counter example that in-
dicates the reason for the property violation. The given trace shows a
response time of 5344 µs instead of the allowed 5000 µs, which is in turn
a result of incorrect CAN priorities.
By changing these priorities in favour of the ACC, every property can be
satisﬁed by the given system.
After the ﬁrst step of system speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation, the model com-
ponents, such as the ECUs, are to be reﬁned. This leads to the addition
of more functional details to the system. In a typical automotive devel-
opment, this task can be performed by distributed development teams for
the diﬀerent ECUs.
Reﬁnement can be achieved in various ways. It is possible to add locations,
transitions, variables and new concurrent processes1. Figure 8.7 shows a
possible reﬁnement of the basic radar model (Figure 8.5 a)).
New locations and transitions were added to describe the inﬂuence of the
Figure 8.7: The reﬁned radar model.
obstacle distance (NoObstacle, Distant, Close) on the detection speed. In
the presented model the radar accesses a distance variable, which is pro-
vided by a new environment simulator model. This simulator changes the
speed of two simulated cars to calculate a distance change in a predeﬁned
1For example, an environment simulator for the component only.
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range.
The timing properties of the basic and reﬁned model are supposed be iden-
tical as the newly introduced locations together represent the former De-
tectWaves location, and the union of the new locations fulﬁls the formerly
given invariant. However, the correctness of the transformation still has
to be veriﬁed formally. In addition to the already mentioned reﬁnements,
a radar calculated distance value is now passed to the reﬁned ACC. The
reﬁned ACC calculates the relative speed, which is sent to the reﬁned EBA.
There, the decision of whether or not an emergency braking is required is
taken. This decision does not only depend on the relative speed (higher
speeds lead to earlier emergency braking) but also on the distance to the
obstacle. The result is sent to the bus so that a previously activated emer-
gency brake might also be stopped. In contrast to the basic version, the
reﬁned brake actually retards the speed in the case of an emergency braking
so that functional properties with regard to the distance between obstacle
and car can be veriﬁed.
However, if one tries to verify the properties which we have already proved
to be true for the basic model, the veriﬁer tool fails, as the memory limit
of a 4 GB RAM machine is exceeded. Here, we reach the limit of the
UPPAAL application with our example. Nevertheless, some local proper-
ties could still be shown using larger computation resources. However, the
main point of our example is that the use of a formal tool does have its
advantages when employed in the early phase of a design process. As we
have seen above, a design ﬂaw was discovered early on and eliminated. On
the other hand, the use of basic level models is limited. Model abstrac-
tions might reach a point where they are too general to deliver meaningful
results.
Our analysis showed, for example, that the use of the presented CAN model
is necessary on every abstraction level. A simpler and more abstracted com-
munication model, e.g. without arbitration, leads to highly overestimated
time bounds, especially for the safety-relevant components that are treated
with higher priority by the arbitration process. If we use a model without
arbitration, i.e. choosing the winning transceiver randomly, it is not pos-
sible to prove the Worst-Case deadline compliance anymore.
The most important part of the reﬁnement process is the need to keep the
already veriﬁed properties valid. That is, one would have to check that
the reﬁned model is related in some way to the abstract one in order to
allow certain results from the veriﬁcation of one model to carry over to the
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other one. There exist several approaches to relate a reﬁned model to its
abstract one; see for example [Cer92, GSSL94, HK95, TAKB96].
For our purpose, the most intuitive one is probably the following: Let A be
the abstract version of the reﬁned timed automata B, then the behaviour
of B should be mimicked by A, that is, every step of A can be done by B
as well, for B is supposed to be a more detailed description of the more
generic design A. We say that B simulates A. This idea of reﬁnement is
captured in the following two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1 (Simulation Relation - Transition Systems). A transition
system (S,Σ,⇒S) where S is the set of states, Σ is the ﬁnite set of actions
and⇒ the set of transitions is simulated by a transition system (T,Γ,⇒T ),
if a relation R ⊆ S × T exists such that for all (s, t) ∈ R we have s⇒aS s′
implies ∃t′ ∈ T such that t⇒aT t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R. The relation R is called
a simulation relation.
Deﬁnition 2 (Simulation Relation - Timed Automata). A timed automa-
ton A is simulated by a timed automaton B, denoted by A ≤ B, if the
transition system M(A) is simulated by M(B) with a simulation relation
R such that for every initial state s0 in M(A) there exists an initial state
t0 in M(B) such that (s0, t0) ∈ R.
The language L(A) of an automaton A is the set of all execution se-
quences of A. Note that simulation is more strict than language inclusion,
that is, A ≤ B implies L(A) ⊆ L(B). However, the converse does not hold.
Indeed, the language inclusion problem for timed automata is undecidable
(cf. [AD94]), whereas the simulation relation (and also the bisimulation
relation [Cer92]) can be decided in EXPTIME (cf. [TAKB96]). The au-
thors of [TAKB96] have implemented a simulation checking procedure in
the COSPAN veriﬁer, that is, given a relation between two automata we
can check if it is a simulation relation. However, giving the simulation rela-
tion in each design step is probably not very practicable. A fully automatic
check would be more reasonable.
However, as we have seen with a rather small example that uses no variant
mechanisms at all, this approach is not capable to handle complex automo-
tive system. Hence, the timing veriﬁcation using a timed automata model
on all scopes will prevent us from the goal of an integrated timing analysis
for industrial applications. Hence, scope-speciﬁc methods (categorised into
87
CHAPTER 8 Tools and Methods (TOAD-T)
WCET analysis, WCRT analysis and end-to-end analysis) will be evaluated
in the following sections.
8.4 Static WCET Analysis
As introduced in Section 5.2, the WCET represents the single, uninter-
rupted execution time of a software function. Unlike most industrial WCET
veriﬁcation attempts known by the author, our approach is to cover all soft-
ware functions from platform- over RTE- to the software component-level.
This section will introduce the WCET analyses for TOAD-A applications
and consider variations of the standard WCET analysis approach, in order
to increase the analysis performance depending on the degree of variability.
8.4.1 Platform Analysis
Platform services like drivers, error management or NVM-handling that
are executed independently from the application make contributions to the
response time of the system. Therefore, interrupt service routines (ISRs),
system tasks and context switches require separate WCET analyses.
ISR Overhead
ISRs are asynchronous tasks with priorities typically higher then those of
the synchronous tasks. These scheduling properties usually require the
ISRs to be simple and straightforward, thus reducing the execution time
jitter (i.e. the diﬀerence between BCET and WCET). Their WCETs can
usually be calculated with low eﬀort using tools like aiT. A case study by
the author (cf. [MGL06b]) revealed that generally the ISRs do not require
sophisticated AIS annotations (AbsInt Speciﬁcations, cf. [FHT03]). Hence,
for each platform (i.e. hardware and software platform) a single WCET
value is calculated and stored in the TOAD repository.
Context Switch Overhead
A more complex impact on a platform's WCET occurs due to context
switches that occur on every task preemption. The WCET of a potential
context results from a possible worst-case task context consisting of cache
and register content. Note that the worst-case context does not necessarily
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imply ﬁlled pipelines or empty caches (cf. timing anomalies in [RWT+06]).
This problem was addressed by [Sch02] and can be incorporated in the
analysis tools for the respective platforms. Due to the fact that our eval-
uation platform (C166/ST10) supports single cycle context switching, the
resulting constant overhead is regarded accordingly in the WCRT analysis.
Operating System Library Calls
The platform-dependent operating system (OS) typically provides library
functionality that can be used by application software running on the
OS. As TOAD-A prevents direct access from application components to
platform-dependent functions, OS library calls are analysed in the context
of their use by TOAD-A RTE functions. This way, the context speciﬁc
WCET will most likely bear a lower overestimation (cf. Figure 8.8).
Figure 8.8: The separation of WCET analysis on the RTE and component
level.
8.4.2 RTE Analysis
Although it is possible to analyse a complete set of components that is exe-
cuted by the RTE, a separate analysis of each component and the RTE has
several beneﬁts. First, independent analyses shall be possible by diﬀerent
development parties. Second, component developers shall not need func-
tional or timing knowledge beyond their own component. Furthermore,
the separate calculation of WCETs for independent software components
is usually faster and can even be more precise than a combined analysis
(cf. [MGL06b]). Finally, independent WCET analyses for software compo-
nents are also made easy by the TOAD-A architecture due to the deﬁned
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interfaces and parameters.
Diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the RTE lead to diﬀerent WCET values. Each
additional software component to be executed by the RTE, for example,
leads to additional call overhead on the RTE. Thus, the RTE's WCET is
only bounded for a given conﬁguration.
The estimation of an RTE's WCET requires at least six loop annotations.
The given maximum loop-bounds depend, for example, on the number of
components and the maximum amount of data references by each com-
ponent. Hence, these loop-bounds can be automatically derived from the
component repository.
The case study revealed that aiT is not able to calculate the loop-bound
automatically for a given conﬁguration. Hence, it is not able to calculate
context-dependent loop-bounds. For example, if there are two components
and one of them references two data entities and the second references just a
single data entity, aiT assumes the same maximum amount of iterations for
registering two data entities for both components as it is not able to distin-
guish the execution contexts. Therefore, the overestimation increases with
the diﬀerence between the average and the maximum amount of interface
references used by a component. Our approach reduces this overestimation
by using conﬁguration knowledge from the TOAD repository.
Reducing the overestimation and additionally improving the RTE-WCET
estimation's performance is a method that we call analytical analysis. That
is, aiT and AIS annotations are used to analyse the WCET for a number
of loop-bound combinations. From the mapping li,j → WCET (li,j), where
li,j is the loop-bound for loop i in conﬁguration j, we approximate an up-
per bound algebraic equation for the WCET calculation as described in
[MGL06a]. For the TOAD-RTE, these equations are the following:
tCore = tCoreO + k · (tCoreC + tChainO) +
∑
i∈l
tChainC + tCi (8.1)
tCi = 2 · (tDataO +mi · tDataC) (8.2)
According to these formulas, the WCET of the RTE-core routine (tCore)
results from a core routine oﬀset (tCoreO) and the number of executed
component chains2 k. The component chains are executed in a loop with
an iteration WCET (tCoreC). Every component chain executes the com-
2The component chain is an ANTS concept that has been taken over in the adaptation.
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ponents in a loop which results in an additional oﬀset (tChainO) and an
iteration time tChainC per component.
Each data entity of a component is locked before and unlocked after an
execution cycle. That leads to an oﬀset (tDataO) and a loop iteration time
for each data entity (tDataC).
All values tCoreO, tCoreC , tChainO, tChainC , tDataO and tDataC can be cal-
culated using aiT for a given micro-processor as constant coeﬃcients in
CPU cycles. The only variable values are k, the number of component
chains, and mi, the number of data entities for each of the l components.
These variables can be derived automatically from the TOAD-A repository.
When performing this kind of analytical analysis using aiT on a speciﬁc
generated conﬁguration, it is important that no values that are volatile in
the TOAD conﬁguration are ﬁxed constants in the generated code or oth-
erwise available to the aiT analysis. Complex ﬂow dependencies (e.g. by
nested loops) and variable dependencies (dependencies that are estimated
by aiT) have to be considered in the analytical analysis for other TOAD-A
derived architectures.
Figure 8.9: Timing overestimation due to software execution variants and
the proposed solution using variant descriptions.
8.4.3 Software Component Analysis
The interface routines (precycle, cycle, postcycle) are to be analysed for
each component separately. The inﬂuence of variant parameters on timing
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analyses, as we have seen for the RTE, is also a source of WCET overestima-
tion for most TOAD components. loop-bounds that cannot be determined
by aiT are often indicators for variation points. In such cases, the loops
are often bound by volatile variables that resemble a variant interface for
external use.
The overestimation by static WCET analysis can only be assumed by com-
parison with timing measurements. A part of this overestimation can be
attributed to variant parameters as depicted in Figure 8.9. In Section 8.5
we will see several examples for the degree of variant-related overestima-
tion.
The identiﬁed variables can be further divided into system variables or
mode variables:
• System variables are constant variables during the system's lifetime.
They often represent the hardware variant of the embedding system.
• Mode variables can be changed during the execution of an application.
I.e. by pre- or post-cycle functions or by other software components
via the RTE. Mode variables (typically interface variables or param-
eters) represent system execution states or modes that potentially
deﬁne mode-speciﬁc infeasible paths.
In the best case, the component developer knows all execution variants or
has a formal variant description. The TOAD approach eases the knowl-
edge of variants since every component is developed with regard to a de-
ﬁned interface and parameter speciﬁcation. Thus, variant conﬁgurations
that should only depend on interface variables or component parameters
are easily identiﬁable.
A WCET analysis case study on a powertrain system revealed that de-
velopers also use internal modes in order to reduce the execution time.
Diﬀerent modes were used in the form of component-level time slicing. In
our example, we could see that the four time slices used by the developer
were unbalanced and thus ineﬃcient for the entire system. This ﬁnding
further strengthens our belief that component developers should not be
responsible for timing analysis or optimisation in general.
Using the TOAD approach, we can even argue that such potentially erro-
neous concepts are not necessary at all:
• Component-level time slicing is often used out of fear for dependen-
cies within the same task that prevent an easy redeployment. One
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of the central TOAD concepts is the transparency of interface and
parameter dependencies that eases the redeployment of components.
• Time slices are also used to pass intermediate results to other com-
ponents in a given time slice. Such constructs indicate suboptimal
component design, as intermediate results that are needed by other
components indicate functional bounds suitable for a component split
up.
However, there are further code constructs that lead to WCET overestima-
tions than mode parameters. This appeared in our analyses with complex
control-ﬂow dependencies such as nested loops where the inner loop-bound
depends on the outer loop-bound.
aiT cannot use relative control-ﬂow annotations on loops (e.g. loop2 iter-
ates half as often as loop1) and thus requires memory annotations instead
(e.g. instruction A is half as often reached as instruction B). What seems
to be just inconvenient for a user, prevents the automated use of such
annotations in component architectures. This is due to the fact that the
memory addresses are likely to change when components are redeployed in
diﬀerent systems.
Two solutions to this problem are possible: either the annotation lan-
guage of aiT is extended or the analyses are performed using the analytical
method that was introduced in Section 8.4.2.
However, analytical analyses cannot always be used. Especially for highly
complex components with many non-linear dependencies the analytical
method tends to be error-prone.
That is why we came up with a second method that is able to cope with
more complex dependencies than the analytical method. As Integer Lin-
ear Programs (ILP) are used to describe the program ﬂow dependencies
by aiT, dataﬂow dependencies can be found in the ILP similar to the de-
pendencies described by the algebraic equations of the analytical method.
Hence, the aiT-generated ILPs can be analysed and parameterised for the
variant timing estimation.
An initial ILP can be found by using aiT on the component under analysis
with the respective annotations. The variability information is to be found
manually in one or multiple ILP constraints of the form ax1 + bx2 <= cx3.
These constraints are found by analysing the diﬀerence between the result-
ing ILPs of diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The diﬀerences are then parameterised
so that the ILP can be solved for diﬀerent conﬁgurations.
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Parameter Performance ([s] Error-
Method Complexity on our example) Prone
Fixed Values no variability highest (0) low
Analytical low high (10−7) high
ILP Analytic medium medium (17) medium
AIS Parametric high low (54) low
Table 8.1: Time determination method comparison.
The analysis of our example showed the general applicability of this
method, but also revealed potential overestimations in some special cases
(but no underestimation). These cases can only be identiﬁed by manual
reasoning on the pipeline behaviour. Conﬁgurations leading to such cases
have to be estimated using aiT instead.
In [MGL06a], the author showed that this method works well with nested
loops on the C166 processor. Other microprocessor architectures may in-
crease the eﬀort for safe ILP analyses with low overestimation.
Finally, the existing methods (ﬁxed value and AIS parametric) are com-
pared with the newly presented methods (analytical and ILP analytic). As
the selection of a suitable method depends on several parameters, the main
decision criteria are displayed in Table 8.1. An analysis method is assumed
to be error-prone when the manual eﬀort and the necessary considerations
(like cache and pipeline behaviour) are high. Hence, the parameterisation
of AIS annotations (AIS parametric) and the ﬁxed values are just slightly
error-prone, as they form the typical case of an aiT analysis and form the
basis for the newly introduced methods.
If high analysis performance is required and high parameter complexity is
present, the newly introduced methods should be used. The example of the
RTE analysis shows the successful application of the analytical method. As
the RTE is used in every TOAD application, the necessary eﬀort to ensure
the correctness of the derived equations is easily justiﬁed.
Finally, all four methods for WCET veriﬁcation are available for compo-
nent developers: Fixed Values (there are no parameter dependencies or the
dependencies can be set to ﬁxed values), Analytical (dependencies are lin-
ear and simple), ILP Analytic (dependencies are more complex) and AIS
Parametric (dependencies are complex and can be described using AIS an-
notations).
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Since our analysis, further research on parametric timing analyses has been
going on, for example, in [EA11]. In his work, Altmeyer derives the exe-
cution variants directly within the analysis tool by searching for variables
that are read before they are written. This approach is less error-prone
than the presented ILP analytic method since no user interaction is re-
quired. However, Altmeyer's approach cannot take external information
on parameter dependencies into account and thus, reduces only a part of
the overestimation. Furthermore, the approach is currently restricted to
small portions of code (due to the parametric LP solver).
8.4.4 Improving the Loop-Bound Detection Rate
Figure 8.10: Automatic loop-bound estimation using the abstract interpre-
tation on source code level.
Our case study using aiT has shown that the highest manual eﬀort is
needed for the loop-bound detection and annotation. These eﬀorts have
to be repeated on each new version of the software in order to ensure that
the loop-bound values are still correct. As high manual eﬀort is typically
linked to potential human errors, complex loop conditions might not be
evaluated safely.
In order to achieve industrial acceptance of timing veriﬁcation and increase
the soundness of its results, an improved automatic loop-bound detection
is required. We propose a method based on a static source code analysis
using abstract interpretation that has been implemented and tested on our
example application. As depicted in Figure 8.10, we analyse the source
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code with our own parser to instrument the loops automatically with a
counter. Performing this instrumentation leads to the following changes to
the existing loops:
counterL1 = 0;//add a unique counter variable
for(...;...;...)
{
...//existing loop body
++counterL1;//increment the counter on each iteration
}
The code analysis using PolySpace Veriﬁer (cf. [The07]) as an abstract
interpretation engine provided value ranges for the newly introduced loop
counter variables. Thus, the upper bound of the counter variable as identi-
ﬁed by that analysis engine equals the loop-bound. A transformation into
equivalent AIS annotations completes the automated tool chain for the
loop-bound detection. Using our prototype implementation, we were able
to ﬁnd 47 out of 51 loop-bounds that had not been found by aiT which is
an increase in precision of 92 percent.
The precision of our loop-bound detection method now depends on the
precision of the abstract interpretation engine for a given implementation
and tool setup.
8.5 Variant-Aware WCET Analysis
In the previous sections, we considered the impact of parameters on the
WCET veriﬁcation in general and solutions for the integration with our
approach. In this section we go further by incorporating external explicit
variant constraint deﬁnitions into the WCET estimation.
8.5.1 Deﬁnition
Highly variant systems are characterized by an amount of variants that
render the validation and veriﬁcation of each single variant instance im-
possible. Hence, sophisticated methods for testing and analysis have to be
applied to the entire ECU which includes all possible software variants.
The implementation of the software variants ranges from the use of EEPROM
(Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory) parameters to
self-parameterization by detection of the hardware environment (similar to
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plug-and-play).
When applying static WCET analyses to highly variant systems, conser-
vative assumptions can lead to signiﬁcant overestimations [MGL06b].
Variants can be seen as system level constraints. For example, engines
using a turbo charger require diﬀerent handling of airﬂow and pressure
control than engines without turbo chargers. However, due to system level
constraints the combination of diﬀerent airﬂow and pressure control func-
tionalities is not possible. This mutual exclusion (cf. Figure 8.11 b)) is
often not taken into account by the WCET analysis. This is mainly due
to the fact that system level constraints are set by external variables that
are not visible to the analysis. A further reason for WCET overestimation
arises from the necessity of context approximations by the WCET analysis.
As it is practically impossible to trace each and every reachable program
context, system-wide dependencies are prone to be neglected by analysis
optimizations. Here, we will present a variant-aware timing analysis, that
Figure 8.11: a) Variant constraint model b) Variant algorithm with infea-
sible WCET path.
derives a) a reduced but sound WCET bound and b) the corresponding
worst-case variant that leads to this bound. The analysis consists of three
steps. We ﬁrst determine the variant dependent control-ﬂow structures
(loops and conditionals) and the type of dependency. Then we derive a
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Figure 8.12: The original aiT toolchain and the approach's extensions (in
the dashed box).
set of candidates for the worst-case variant. In the last step, we extend
the computation of the worst-case execution path from the original tim-
ing analysis to derive the WCET bound and the worst-case variant at once.
In the next section we will present the original timing analysis on which
we base our approach. The formal setting of the variant-aware timing
analysis is given in Section 8.5.3 and Section 8.5.4 presents the analysis in
detail. Evaluations are then given in Sections 8.5.5 to 8.5.7.
8.5.2 The aiT Framework
We build our variant-aware timing analysis on top of the aiT-Framework
as depicted in Figure 8.12. It consists of a set of diﬀerent tools that can
be subdivided into three main parts: CFG Reconstruction, Static Analyses
and Path Analyses.
The CFG reconstruction builds the control-ﬂow graph (CFG), the in-
ternal representation, out of the binary executable [WGR+09]. This CFG
consists of the so-called basic blocks. A basic block is a sequence of instruc-
tions such that the basic block is always entered at the ﬁrst and left at the
last instruction. To make sophisticated interprocedural analysis techniques
applicable, loop structures have to be transformed into tail-recursive rou-
tines. Additionally, user annotations, such as upper bounds on the number
of loop iterations which the analysis cannot automatically derive, are pro-
cessed during this step.
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The static analysis part consists of three diﬀerent analyses: loop analysis,
value analysis, and a combined cache and pipeline analysis. The value
analysis determines the eﬀective addresses of memory accesses and also
supports the loop analysis to ﬁnd upper bounds on the number of loop
iterations [MAWF98]. For this purpose, the analysis derives intervals for
all variables at each program point.
The loop analysis collects invariants for all potential loop counters. This
means it computes for all the variables changed within a loop, how much
they change during one iteration. Then it evaluates the loop exits, requests
start and end values for these potential loop counters from the value anal-
ysis and thus derives upper bounds on the number of loop iterations.
The cache and pipeline analysis performs the so-called low-level analysis.
It simulates the processor's behavior in an abstract fashion to determine an
upper bound on the execution time of each basic block [FMWA99, LTH02].
1
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n5
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n6
n3
n1 = 1;
n1 = n2 + n3;
n2 + n5 = n4 + n6;
n4 = n5;
n4 <= bloopn2;
n3 + n6 = 1;
max :
∑
i
(∑
∀j:nj enters Bi cinj
)
Figure 8.13: Control-ﬂow graph and the corresponding ﬂow constraints.
The path analysis combines the timing information of each basic block
and all loop-bounds, then searches for the longest path within the exe-
cutable. In this fashion, it computes an upper bound on a task's execution
time. Searching for the longest path is done by using a technique called
implicit path enumeration (IPET) [LM95]: the control ﬂow graph and the
loop-bounds are transformed into ﬂow constraints. The upper bounds for
the execution times of the basic blocks as computed in the cache and
pipeline analysis are used as weights. Figure 8.13 provides an example.
The variables ni, also called traversal counts, denote how often a speciﬁc
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edge is traversed. The ﬁrst and the last basic block are left, respectively
entered, exactly once (n1 = 1 and n3 + n6 = 1). For all other basic blocks,
the sum of the traversal counts entering equals the sum leaving. The loop
body (basic block 4) is executed at most bloop times as often as the loop
is entered (n4 <= bloopn2). The constant cj denotes the cost of the ba-
sic block j. The maximum sum over the costs of a basic block times the
traversal counts entering it determines the ﬁnal WCET bound.
8.5.3 Variant Constraint Speciﬁcation
A common language for the description of variants is the feature model
[CE00]. This modeling language describes abstract features of a product
and the feature relationships as a tree. The abstract features are either
mandatory (necessary in all products), optional (optionally available) or
alternative (exactly one of a given set). These feature types form a basic
constraint language that can be enhanced by more elaborate constraints.
A feature is anything that a customer can experience as a functional
entity. Hence, an engine is a mandatory feature, whereas the engine type
is an alternative decision. A sunroof is usually an optional feature, that
can only be chosen if the car is not a convertible. Obviously, there are lots
of similar constraints in the software that controls all these functionalities.
While feature models are usually seen as marketing decision models, fur-
Figure 8.14: An example feature model.
ther use-cases beyond customer features can be imagined. We see them in
software internal constraint speciﬁcations like operating mode relationships
or task internal time-slicing dependencies. The decision space of a feature
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model in current real-life systems may easily reach up to several million
valid combinations. We now provide a formal deﬁnition of a variant.
Deﬁnition 3 (Variant). Given a set of features F, a variant is a mapping
from features to boolean values, depending on whether or not the feature is
selected:
V : F→ B
where B is the set of boolean values true and false. If a variant obeys all
constraints C determined by the variant model, the variant is said to be
valid. The set of all variants is given by V and the set of all valid variants
by Vv ⊆ V.
Note that we do not need to consider mandatory, optional or alternative
features separately as such requirements can be considered to be modeled
by constraints contained in C. For the sake of simplicity, we represent a
variant V as a set of features that evaluate to true: f ∈ V ⇔ V (f) = T
and f /∈ V ⇔ V (f) = F . Given the example in Figure 8.14, we have the
following set of features F and set of constraints C:
F = {car0, car1, engine0, engine1, cycle0, cycle1,
default, ambulance, taxi, police}
C ={(car0⊗ car1), (engine0⊗ engine1), (cycle0⊗ cycle1),
¬(car0 ∧ engine1),¬(car1 ∧ engine0),¬(car0 ∧ taxi),
¬(car1 ∧ police),¬(car1 ∧ ambulance)
(∃!x ∈ {default, taxi, police, ambulance} : x)}.
For instance, V = {car1, engine1, taxi, cycle0} is a valid variant. Note
that within this small example there are already 210 variants from which
only 10 are valid.
Timing analysis may derive a variant-depending timing bound. Given
a variant V , the speciﬁc information about all identiﬁers can be encoded
to be considered by the timing analysis. The resulting time bound is then
only valid for this variant V . In such a case, we write WCET(V ). If
no information about a speciﬁc variant or a set of variants is taken into
account, we write ŴCET for the variant independent time bound. Note
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that ∀V ∈ V : ŴCET ≥WCET(V ). The problem of variant-aware timing
analysis can then be seen as follows
Find Vˆ ∈ Vv s.t. ∀V ′ ∈ Vv : WCET(Vˆ ) ≥WCET(V ′)
This variant Vˆ is the so-called worst-case variant and provides a precise
global bound for the analysed software. Determining this variant by ex-
haustively deriving all WCET(V ) is computationally infeasible due to the
high number of diﬀerent variants and the complexity of the timing analysis.
Hence, we ﬁrst reduce the search space and then aim for an approximate
solution.
8.5.4 Variant-Aware WCET Analysis Approach
Our approach for a variant-aware static WCET analysis (cf. the dashed
box in Figure 8.12) consists of the following steps:
• Impact Analysis: Identify code to feature dependencies that deliver
major impacts on the WCET.
• Variant Reduction: Take the identiﬁed features and search the feature
model for further dependencies (feature to feature dependencies). All
independent features can be removed.
• Constraint Generation/Result Linking: The remaining feature de-
pendencies (i.e. variants) are transformed into ILP control-ﬂow con-
straints. Hence, a variant-enriched ILP can be generated which is
then used to estimate WCET (Vˆ ).
Impact Analysis
Two diﬀerent control-ﬂow structures may inﬂuence the timing behavior
depending on the chosen variant: loops and conditionals. In case of con-
ditionals, the taken branch may depend on whether or not a feature is
selected. In case of loops, the loop iteration bound may be determined
by the feature selection. To analyse these dependencies, we ﬁrst need to
identify the feature-dependent control-ﬂow structures and in a second step
analyse how these structures are inﬂuenced. The set of identiﬁed condi-
tionals is denoted as CO and the set of loops as LO. Note that for the
sake of simplicity, we restrict the description of the approach to for- and
while-loops as well as to simple if -statements. Other statements can be
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seen as extensions to our basic structures. For example, switch-cases can
be seen as combinations of multiple if-else structures.
We represent the variant-dependencies in the following way:
Cond : CO→ (F⇀ B)
A conditional c is assigned a partial mapping of features to boolean values.
(Cond(c))(f) evaluates to boolean value b, iﬀ conditional c always evaluates
to b in case feature f is selected.
Loop : LO→ (F⇀ N)
A loop l is assigned a partial mapping of features to integers. (Loop(l))(f) =
n means that loop l is bounded by n if feature f is selected.
More complex dependencies between features and conditionals are pos-
sible. Consider a conditional that evaluates to true, iﬀ two out of three
features are selected. Such cases do not ﬁt into this notion. The domain
of the partial mapping (F⇀ B) for such a conditional would be empty.
Listing 8.1: Variant Depending Code Fragment
. . .
11 : const char c lu t ch [ 2 ] =
12 : /∗ car0 car1 ∗/
13 : { 10 , 5 } ; /∗ c lu t ch l i n e ∗/
. . . [ Block1 ] . . .
37 : f o r ( i =0;
38 : i<c lu t ch [ c_car_type ] ;
39 : ++i )
40 : {
41 : i f ( c_purpose==TAXI ) { . . . [ Block2 ] . . . }
. . . [ Block3 ] . . .
94 : }
. . . [ Block4 ] . . .
As a short example, let us consider the feature model in Figure 8.14 and
the code snippet from Listing 8.1. In the example (stripped down from
existing code) we notice that the dependency between the feature model
and code variables is not always given directly. Hence, these relationships
have to be established via naming rules or manual mapping. In the above
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case, for example, the preﬁx 'c' indicates a variant conﬁguration parameter
(c_engine, c_car_type and c_purpose). There are several possible ways to
detect the basic structures in the code. We decided for pattern matching as
the following step of constraint generation does not rely on a complete set of
variant dependencies. Undetected dependencies on loops and conditionals
will lead to missing constraints and thus to an overapproximation of the
result (but never to an underapproximation). The impact analysis ﬁrst
ﬁnds the loop in line L37 and the conditional in line L41 and then evaluates
both expressions: Loop(L37) = {(car0, 10), (car1, 5)} and Cond(L41) =
{(taxi, true)}.
Variant Reduction
Given the functions Cond and Loop, we can perform the variant reduction
in order to reduce the search space for our worst case variant.
Removing Timing-Irrelevant Features We partition the set of features F
into timing-relevant Fr and timing-irrelevant F¬r. A feature f is timing-
relevant if there is at least one loop l or conditional c such that Cond(c)(f)
or Loop(l)(f) is deﬁned. In our example, Fr = {car0, car1, taxi}. Note
that we also remove all constraints from the set C that contain at least one
timing-irrelevant feature: Cr = {(car0⊗ car1),¬(car0 ∧ taxi)}. Since the
set of constraints only limits the possible variants, removing constraints
may only lead to an overapproximation and is thus sound.
Deﬁnition 4 (Reduced Variant). A variant is called reduced, iﬀ it only
deﬁnes values for timing-relevant features Fr:
VR : Fr → B
The set of all reduced variants is denoted as Vr.
The set of reduced variants for our example is
Vr = {{}, {car0}, {car1}, {taxi}, {car0, car1},
{car0, taxi}, {car1, taxi}, {car0, car1, taxi}}.
The set Vr,v =
{{car0}, {car1}, {car1, taxi}} gives all valid reduced vari-
ants. All other variants do not comply with Cr.
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Dominating Features In order to reduce the set of possible worst-case
variants even further, we need to identify dominant features with respect
to timing.
Deﬁnition 5 (Feature Domination). A feature f is said to dominate fea-
ture f ′ (f w f ′), iﬀ
∀c ∈ CO : (Cond(c))(f) = (Cond(c))(f ′)
and
∀l ∈ LO : (Loop(l))(f) ≥ (Loop(l))(f ′)
In our example, engine0 w engine1 since the loop-bound of the loop
in line 38 is higher in case engine0 is selected (while all other loops and
conditionals remain unchanged).
Using the feature domination, we can safely exclude some variants from
the search space for the worst-case variant. Hence, we lift the domination
relation to variants.
Deﬁnition 6 (Variant Domination). A variant V is said to dominate vari-
ant V ′ with V 6= V ′, iﬀ
∀f ′ ∈ V ′ : f ′ ∈ V ∨ (∃f ∈ V : f w f ′)
In such a case, we write V w V ′
Assuming that a variant V is dominated by another variant V ′, we know
that if V leads to the highest WCET-bound then also V ′ does. In our
example variant {car0} dominates {car1}, but not {car1, taxi}.
Variant Search Space The variant search space S ⊆ Vr,v is a subset of
the set of all reduced variants. In addition, we can exclude all dominated
variants from the search space.
∀V ∈ S : @V ′ ∈ S : V ′ 6= V ∧ V ′ w V
For the given example, the resulting search space is given by
S =
{{car0}{car1, taxi}}.
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Constraint Generation / Result Linking
In the last step, we extend the IPET model to derive the worst-case variant.
In order to derive the worst-case path, we introduce within the ILP
one variable Vi for each remaining variant from the search space S and one
variable fj for each timing relevant feature from the set Fr. Constraint (8.3)
ensures that at most one variant is selected:∑
i
Vi = 1 (8.3)
The set of constraints (8.4) links the remaining variants (from the search
space S) to their active features:
∀fj : fj =
∑
Vi∈V f
Vi (8.4)
where V f is the set of variables representing variants where feature f is
selected. We now need to link the remaining variants and features to the
IPET model. For a feature-dependent loop l ∈ LO, we add a constraint
which bounds loop l by (Loop(l))(f), in case feature f is selected:
∀l ∈ LO : ∀f ∈ Dom(Loop(l)) :
nloop−body(l) ≤ (Loop(l))(f) · nloop−entry(l) + (1− f) · Cbig (8.5)
Constant Cbig ∈ N is a big integer used to `deactivate' constraint (8.5) if the
corresponding feature is not selected. Given that Cbig is chosen big enough,
the constraint does not inﬂuence the ﬁnal result. In the same manner,
we add a constraint for each feature-dependent conditional c ∈ CO. Let
(Cond(c))(f) evaluate to b. If feature f is active, traversal count for the
¬b edge (denoted as n¬b) is set to 0.
∀c ∈ CO : ∀f ∈ Dom(Cond(l)) :
n¬(Cond(c))(f) ≤ (1− f) · Cbig (8.6)
Again Cbig ∈ N is used to 'deactivate` the constraint, in case f is not
selected.
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Figure 8.15 depicts the control-ﬂow graph and the corresponding con-
straints for the code fragment from Listing 8.1.
B1
for
n1
if
n2
B2
n3,T
B3
n6
n4
n5,F
B4
n7
n1 = 1;
n1 + n6 = n2 + n7;
n2 = n3 + n5;
n3 = n4;
n6 = n4 + n5;
v1 + v2 = 1
fcar0 = v1
fcar1 = v2
ftaxi = v2
n5 ≤ ftaxi · Cbig
n2 ≤ 10 · n1 + (1− fcar0)Cbig
n2 ≤ 5 · n1 + (1− fcar1)Cbig
max :
∑
i
(∑
∀j:nj enters Bi cinj
)
Figure 8.15: Control-ﬂow graph and the corresponding ﬂow constraints.
The solution to the ILP determines the worst-case variant vˆ and an upper
bound on the execution time valid for this variant WCET (vˆ).
Correctness
Each static WCET analysis can only estimate the actual worst-case exe-
cution time. It is, however, crucial that the actual execution time is never
underestimated. The constraints introduced in Section 8.5.4 model restric-
tions on the control-ﬂow graph and thus reduce the WCET bound. We
now need to argue that this reduction is sound, i.e. that the WCET bound
is still a safe approximation.
The allowed combinations of features (and thus of loop-bounds and con-
ditionals) depend on the set of variants Vr,v. Although the set of reduced
and valid variants is much smaller than the set of variants V, Vr,v rep-
resents an overapproximation of the Vv with respect to timing. By con-
struction, concentrating only on timing-relevant features does not inﬂuence
the WCET analysis. In step three, we also reduce the set of constraints
Cr. This, however, may only lead to variants falsely considered valid (less
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constraints lead to more valid combinations). Hence, we approximate the
set of variants considered in the ﬁnal ILP on the safe side only.
The constraints link loops LO and conditionals CO to features Fr, which
again are linked to reduced and valid variants Vr,v. Both sets LO and CO
only contain control-ﬂow structures for which it was possible to determine
a feature dependency. Loops and conditionals for which we were unable to
determine a dependency remain unchanged and are not inﬂuenced by our
newly generated constraints. Again, we approximate only on the safe side
and may only deliver an overapproximation, but no underapproximation.
Note that the derived worst-case variant Vˆ is only valid with respect to
the timing analysis. It may happen that the actual worst-case execution
time occurs for variant V 6= Vˆ . However, the bounds computed by our
analysis are still valid, i.e., WCET (Vˆ ) ≥WCET (V ) holds for all variants
V , where WCET (V ) denotes the execution time bound and not the actual
worst-case execution time.
8.5.5 Evaluation Project 1 - Automatic Gear Shifting (AG)
The introduced variant-aware WCET analysis was applied to several func-
tions of the Daimler Trucks automatic gear shifting system (AG). The
existing AG feature model was previously used for documentation- and
test-case-generation purposes. An existing feature model should be the
typical use case for the introduced approach so that no further eﬀort is
necessary for the description of the variant constraints. The used feature
modeling tool is called pure::variants [PS17] which is currently being rolled
out in several Daimler projects.
The entire feature model consists of 72 features that lead to an estimated
amount of 6.4 million valid variants, according to the modeling tool. A
stepwise analysis of all single valid variants is thus not reasonable, which
makes the AG a more than appropriate use case for our approach. For
comparability reasons, we apply the variant-aware WCET analysis to three
separate AG functions (i.e. ecomain, preparation and target_range).
Impact Analysis
The input for the impact analysis is a simple mapping between features and
variable names (in the C-code). In our case, this manual work is rather
simple as the variant-related code structures can be found in central pa-
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rameterization header ﬁles where similar names are used for features and
variables. This way, 60 out of 72 features are mapped to one or (less often)
multiple variables. The remaining 12 features are either structural model
elements or features without direct code impact. The automatic impact
analysis applied to the entire software identiﬁes 14 out of 122 loop coun-
ters that are variant-dependent (11 percent) while 499 of 3658 conditions
are variant-dependent (14 percent). Hence, if we assume a similar dis-
tribution for the other control-ﬂow statements (i.e. do-while, switch etc.),
approximately every 10th control-ﬂow decision depends on constant system
constraints.
Variant Reduction
Our implementation of the variant reduction removes all features that are
directly or indirectly irrelevant to the analysed source code. Applying the
reduction introduced in Section 8.5.4, only 7 features are directly relevant in
the case of the function preparation and 10 features in the cases of ecomain
and target_range. Additionally, we implemented a dependency analysis
that checks if two features exhibit a transitive dependency. Assuming that,
for example, only the features amount of forward gears and amount of
backward gears are used in the code, the additional feature gear box is
required to identify the constraints of their transitive relationship.
The analysis reveals that 55 features are required to describe the depen-
dencies among the 7 original features in case of the function preparation.
Respectively, 58 features are required for ecomain and target_range. We
see that between 19% and 26% of the features of our feature model can
be discarded from the analysis which might improve performance but may
also result in a decrease of analysis precision. Note, that a loss of precision
only implies a higher amount of remaining overestimation while we always
keep sound results.
Constraint Generation and Solution
The feature model, the dependent loops and conditions are then trans-
formed into single ILPs per analysed function. The size of these ILPs ranges
from 43 (preparation) to 61 (target_range) constraints. Before these ILPs
can be solved, they are linked to the intermediate aiT result ILP.
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Analyzing the function preparation without variant constraints reveals
a WCET of 201µs. Adding the variant constraints leads to a WCET of
193µs, a reduction of almost 4 percent. In addition, the ILP solution also
provides a worst-case variant which is the so-called Unimog truck using a
particular engine and gear box. A portion of the 4 percent reduction can be
traced back to the fact that many loops iterate over the amount of forward
and backward gears. The gearboxes are available with up to 16 forward
and 8 backward gears. However, a gearbox that exhibits both features at
the same time is not supported by the software. Hence, a gearbox with 16
forward and 4 backward gears was automatically identiﬁed as the worst-
case.
The function target_range was analysed in a similar way. A variant-
unaware WCET of 258µs can be seen as highly overestimated when com-
pared to the 129µs variant-aware WCET. This is a total of 50 percent.
Furthermore, the result analysis reveals a diﬀerent 'worst-case truck' than
before. The function's loops still iterate on the amount of gears, but the
particular truck (with a maximum of 6 forward gears) requires special lin-
earization functions to be called within each loop iteration which leads to
the found worst-case.
Finally, also ecomain revealed an improvement of more than 3 percent.
The main reason here can be seen in the extensive use of mode variables
that trigger diﬀerent functions in four separate execution cycles. The re-
sult allows us to identify the worst-case cycle and thus, to improve the
distribution of functions within these cycles to gain a real WCET beneﬁt.
Generally, we can see a very diverse range of potential reduction (3 to
50 precent) in the overestimation of WCET caused by software variability.
An explanation for this result is the range of variant impact on the source
code and thus the WCET itself. With the three use cases, our approach
has proven to safely calculate reduced WCET estimates and to additionally
deliver worst-case variants that were previously unknown.
8.5.6 Evaluation Project 2 - Model-Based Automatic Gear Shifting
(MAGIC)
A second project was chosen in order to verify the previous ﬁndings and to
evaluate the potential of the variant-aware timing analysis on model-based
developments. Again, a feature model already existed for the project.
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Feature Model Analysis
A ﬁrst analysis of the existing feature model for the MAGIC project re-
vealed that it is incomplete in several dimensions. Due to its current use
as a generator for a small set of ﬁxed conﬁguration variants, the model
contains only a basic set of features (i.e. gear box and engine types) but
no implications that are relevant on source code level such as the amount
of supported gears. Furthermore, the constraints are very basic as well,
as they describe simple relationships, for example, diﬀerent engines cannot
be present at the same time. Dependencies between engines and gearboxes
are not available as in example project 1.
The given feature model can be seen as an overapproximation of the ac-
tual variant space. Hence, the chances of reducing variant related WCET
overestimation are reduced by this model. Fortunately, evaluation projects
1 and 2 target the same truck model range with the same gear boxes and
engine types. Hence, we were able to combine the two models in order to
retrieve actual feature dependencies.
Nevertheless, there may be constraints and dependencies present, that we
do not see due to the limitation of the feature model.
Variant Impact
The computed impact based on the two feature models is limited to the
number of available forward and backward gears as gear boxes or engines
are never explicitly referenced in the code. But as the majority of the loops
in the code iterate on the amount of gears and as we expect loops to have a
major impact on the variant-dependent WCET overestimation, we assume
that the detected impact is suﬃcient enough for our evaluation.
To our surprise, all calculating functions were designed to be independent
of the actual amount of gears. I.e. each loop that iterates on gears iterated
on the maximum amount of possible gears, which again is 16.
Even for purely backward-gear loops (maximum amount of 4), 16 itera-
tions are performed. Hence, 75 % of such loops' actual WCET is wasted
by design.
The variant-aware WCET analysis only achieves improvements if the worst-
case variant's WCET is actually smaller than the variant-independent
WCET: ∀V ∈ V : ŴCET > WCET(V ). With the example at hand,
this does not seem to be the case. Every variant has the same set of feasi-
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ble paths that are partially executed on empty data.
For our analysis, we added variant constraints in the ILP that simulate an
optimised code. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 8.2.
Evaluation project 2 shows that the variant-aware WCET analysis cannot
only reduce static WCET veriﬁcation's overestimation, but also help to
identify low performance in the code, in the case that variant impacted
loops or conditions do not reﬂect this variance.
Function Impacted Original Optimised Optimisation
Loops WCET WCET [%]
AutomaticGearEstimation 3 2,42 2,41 0,04
LimitationEstimation 4 0,42 0,31 26,45
TargetConditions 2 2,21 2,21 0,00
SignalPreprocessing 2 0,55 0,54 1,42
Table 8.2: Optimisations by variant-aware design.
8.5.7 Evaluation Project 3 - Stop Start
With the Stop Start project a third project has been evaluated with the
variant-aware WCET analysis approach. The project already uses feature
models for the project's parameterisation in order to adapt it to diﬀerent
car models and powertrains. Static WCET analysis however, is not applied
in the project so far. Hence, we picked two main Stop Start functions for
a dedicated WCET analysis, the Starter Coordinator and the Automatic
Start.
Feature Model Analysis
Compared to evaluation project 2, the Stop Start feature model is very
detailed. Furthermore, it explicitly describes the links between features
and code parameters with the so called family model, allowing the complete
variant-aware WCET analysis approach to be automated.
Impact Analysis
The impact analysis revealed that the two analysed functions bear distinct
sets of variant-relevant parameters as referenced by the family model. Out
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of the set of referenced variables, almost one third from the Starter Co-
ordinator are WCET-relevant whereas only ﬁve percent from Automatic
Start are WCET-relevant. Again, we can see a diverse impact of software
variants onto diﬀerent functions.
Constraint Generation and Solution
When formulating the variant constraints using AIS annotations we found
an issue with the timing veriﬁcation. After deﬁning constraints for partic-
ular variant conﬁgurations we found that the resulting WCET was some-
times higher than the WCET of the unconstrained software, which is coun-
terintuitive.
We identiﬁed the root cause for this issue in the variant parameters of the
code that are deﬁned as constants with default values (e.g. const int a =
0) instead of volatile constants.
As most users will not realise that these variables need to be speciﬁed as
volatile, either in the code or at least in AIS annotations, aiT will calculate
the WCET for the particular code-given default variant, which in our case
is not even a valid variant conﬁguration and leads to an underestimated
WCET.
Now, in order to prevent this issue, aiT could raise a warning as soon as
it detects a particular amount of infeasible paths due to constants. But as
this is not a guarantee to identify all such issues, the software development
process should enforce the deﬁnition of variant parameters in the code as
volatile. Such rules are best enforced and veriﬁed by integrated timing
veriﬁcation processes.
Applying the variant-aware WCET analysis to the two analysed functions
leads to a reduction of 2.3 percent for the Automatic Start (from 12.49µs
to 12.2µs) and 4.8 percent for the Starter Coordinator (from 37.26µs to
35.48µs).
Summarising the results of all three evaluation projects, we can claim that
the variant-aware WCET analysis approach helps to safely reduce WCETs
in variant-rich software. This is done by reducing the previously unknown
overestimation (projects 1 and 3) or by reducing the actual WCET in the
design phase of the software (project 2).
The reduced overestimation is typically in the range of 2 to 5 percent which
is seen as relevant for the safe estimation of WCETs. Similarly relevant
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is the fact that potential underestimations were identiﬁed and ﬁxed using
our approach.
8.6 Static WCRT Analysis
8.6.1 Deﬁnition
The Worst-Case Response Time (WCRT) or Schedulability Analysis (cf.
Chapter 5.3) is a wide ranged ﬁeld of analyses as it covers every timing
behaviour of resource allocating processes that are expected to respond in
a given time. For the TOAD approach, such entities can be components,
tasks, communication messages or complete systems.
Hence, the response time analysis can be further categorised following these
concepts.
Figure 8.16: The component and task response times in a TOAD
application
Task Response Time (TRT)
As depicted in Figure 8.16, the task response time denotes the duration
between a task release and a task ﬁnish. Thus, preemptions of other tasks
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and interrupts are taken into account.
As mentioned in Section 8.4, the task-switching overhead due to preemp-
tions is also taken into account by the TRT, but its safe determination is
potentially diﬃcult due to cache-related preemption delays.
Component Response Time (CRT)
The name component response time is used within this thesis to describe
the duration between a component's release within a task and the compo-
nent's termination time. The TOAD speciﬁc concept of CRTs will later be
used to reduce the overestimation of message response times (cf. Section
8.6.3) and end-to-end times (cf. Section 8.8).
Message Response Time (MRT)
The message response time denotes the duration between the queuing of a
message and the end of the message transmission.
8.6.2 TOAD Task Scheduling and Scheduling Analysis
Although the scheduling concept of TOAD is conﬁgurable, the basic
scheduling is the static, preemptive, ﬁxed priority scheduling (cf. [Tin94]).
The research ﬁeld of task scheduling is already very mature and delivers
methods for optimal priority assignments ([LSD89, Tin00], schedulability
analysis3 and response time analysis. The following basic form of response
time formula can be seen as a de facto standard:
Ri = Ci + Ii (8.7)
where Ri is the response time of task i, Ci the WCET of task i and Ii
the preemption time due to other tasks and ISRs. The preemption time is
computed as follows:
Ii =
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
⌈
Ri
Tj
⌉
Cj (8.8)
where the function hp(i) returns the set of priorities that are higher than
i.
3Decides whether a task set is schedulable at all.
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The formula for the preemption time is derived from the fact that within
the response time (Ri) the higher prioritised tasks j can preempt the exe-
cution
⌈
Ri
Tj
⌉
times with a WCET of Cj , where Tj is the period of task j.
However, due to the shared use of resources in TOAD, the priority inheri-
tance protocol (cf. [LRL90]) is used in order to prevent priority inversion
(cf. [Ree98]). This protocol adds an additional blocking time due to the
resource usage of lower prioritised tasks as follows:
Ri = Bi + Ci +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
⌈
Ri
Tj
⌉
Cj (8.9)
where Bi is the resource blocking time, given by:
Bi = max∀k∈lp(i),∀s∈locksk,i
(tk,s) (8.10)
As only one resource lock can block the execution of the analysed task at a
given time, the maximum blocking time (tk,s) of all possible resource locks
represents the Worst-Case. The possible blocking time due to locks can
only originate from lower prioritised tasks (k) that have a higher ceiling
priority than the priority of the analysed task (these locks are returned by
locksk,i).
Using these formulas, the typical TOAD applications can be analysed given
the necessary information from the TOAD repository. In our example sys-
tem, not all information is available. As it is quite often the case, the min-
imum task inter-arrival times for interrupt service routines are not known
and have to be either assumed (which is unsafe) or artiﬁcially controlled
by the RTE using polling (cf. Section 7.3.2).
Component Response Time Analysis
TOAD components are executed in sequential order within the tasks. Thus,
the CRTs depend on the components' position in this sequence.
To calculate the CRT, the TRT analysis can be used with the sum of the
WCETs of the component under analysis and all preceding components.
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8.6.3 Distributed and Concurrent Systems
As introduced in Section 5.3.5, synchronous (e.g. TDMA) and asyn-
chronous (e.g. CSMA) message passing are the two major scheduling
strategies that can be seen in network communication. However, since the
analysis of TDMA protocols can be done in a straight forward way (due
to the synchronised system times) and CSMA protocols are more broadly
used in today's automotive systems, they will be analysed in more detail.
Automotive Distributed Systems
In contrast to common real-time systems, automotive systems are typically
distributed. As introduced in Section 2.5, a modern car contains up to 80
ECUs that are highly interdependent (cf. Figure 8.17).
The most commonly used network protocols in the automotive domain
are CAN [ISO93], LIN [SR00, LIN07], MOST [MOS06] and increasingly
FlexRay [Fle07]. The MOST protocol will not be analysed further as its
application domain is in multi-media and thus not in the hard real-time
domain.
The LIN protocol is inherently time-deterministic by its master-slave
TDMA approach (cf. [RW03]). This results in a schedule that directly
reveals the WCRT by its speciﬁcation. The same applies to the static part
of the FlexRay protocol. However, a user-deﬁnable dynamic part addi-
tionally oﬀers a less time-deterministic event-triggered communication. As
FlexRay is assumed to be the future standard bus, its impact on the TOAD
approach will be discussed in the following section.
Nonetheless, the currently most often used and rarely time-deterministic
CAN protocol can also be used in hard real-time environments. Hence, it's
message response time veriﬁcation will be discussed in Section 8.6.3.
FlexRay Integration
The time-triggered FlexRay communication protocol synchronises the clocks
of the communication nodes to allow the application of a static communica-
tion schedule. Hence, every message gains a ﬁxed time slot in a system-wide
communication period. The ﬁxed communication times make the WCRT
analyses redundant, as no interference can delay a communication.
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Figure 8.17: Distribution of ECUs in a modern car. Source: Daimler AG
Timing-oriented approaches like TOAD are particularly suited for time-
triggered communication protocols, as in such systems all messages have
known worst-case release times (corresponding to the component response
times). These times are furthermore spread within the message-generating
task which is particularly helpful for optimised schedules. A FlexRay sched-
ule can be automatically generated by specialised tools like TTX-Plan by
TTTech (cf. [TTT08]) according to given communication requirements.
Within our approach, this process can be fully integrated and automated
in the development process.
The dynamic part of a FlexRay frame can be used if acyclic messages are
to be generated. A standard TOAD software component however, will not
generate acyclic messages as asynchronous tasks have no access to data
resources4.
Analysis of CAN Message Response Times
The CAN protocol uses the Carrier Sense Multiple Access paradigm. Thus,
an arbitration process is used to decide which message is to be sent. Hence,
the following formula estimates the worst-case message response time Ri
as presented in [TB94, THW94, TBW95]:
Ri = Ji +Qi + Ci (8.11)
4This behaviour was explicitly chosen to ensure timing predictability in TOAD appli-
cations.
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where Ji is the queuing jitter5 of message i, Qi is the queuing delay of
message i and Ci is message i's transmission time.
While the queuing jitter is a known value and the transmission time can
be derived from the bus bit-rate and the message length, the queuing delay
Qi requires the analysis of the arbitration protocol.
As an active message transmission cannot be interrupted, the blocking time
Bi equals the longest transmission time of messages with lower priorities
(lp()).
Bi = max
k∈lp(m)
(Ck) (8.12)
Within the arbitration process, the messages that have higher priorities
(messages j) are transmitted ﬁrst and thus can delay the start of the trans-
mission of message i
⌈
Qi+Jj+τbit
Tj
⌉
times. τbit represents the transmission
time of a single bit and is used as a maximum diﬀerence in the arbitration
start time. Thus the following formula is used to calculate the complete
queuing delay for message i:
Qi = Bi +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
⌈
Qi + Jj + τbit
Tj
⌉
Cj (8.13)
However, since the message itself can delay the transmission of higher pri-
oritised messages the hp(i) term has to be extended to hep(i) which returns
the messages of higher and equal priorities (hence the message itself). This
ﬂaw in the original formula was published 13 years after the ﬁrst publi-
cation in 1994 (cf. [DBBL07]) and thus shows that even the established
analyses do not necessarily lead to a veriﬁcation if wrong assumptions are
made. Hence the formula used in the example TOAD implementation is
given as follows:
Qi = Bi +
∑
∀j∈hep(i)
⌈
Qi + Jj + τbit
Tj
⌉
Cj (8.14)
If an error detection and correction mechanism is used, an additional error
term is be added to the formula.
Concluding the analytical MRT calculations, the timing behaviour of CAN
messages can be similarly described as the Worst-Case task response time
5The queuing jitter represents the maximum variation in queuing time.
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calculation. Parameters that can be derived from the TOAD repository
have to be ﬁlled into the WCRT formula and calculated using a ﬁxed-point
iteration. Due to the fact that the formula is non linear, the system timing
optimisation cannot use operations research optimisation algorithms such
as simplex solvers.
In contrast to typical task scheduling, CAN-message scheduling can result
in sets of messages that have ﬁnite response times as well as sets of messages
that cannot be guaranteed to be delivered at all. If a message of the latter
set is part of an end-to-end path, the end-to-end time is also unbounded.
This can be a valid result for non-safety or non-real-time systems.
Reducing Message Response Time Pessimism
The calculation of the queuing delay Qi currently assumes that every mes-
sage can occur simultaneously. In order to reduce the queuing delay, we
can release messages at deﬁned times. With the TOAD approach we know
the Worst-Case CRT which is the time, that a result is deﬁnitely available
for release. So even without a time-triggered operating system, we can
optimise message response times by using basic alarms.
In the concept of real-time calculus (cf. Section 5.3.4) we adapt the request
function by tightening the message release jitter and spreading the message
release times.
Considering a system with just two messages, each having a length of 135
Figure 8.18: CAN messages that cannot interfere with each other are
known by the TOAD approach.
bits as an example. When the messages are released in a 10ms task with a
Worst-Case CRT of 4ms (ID 2) and 5ms (ID1) the message response times
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are on average twice as high if the TOAD knowledge is not applied in the
analysis (cf. Figure 8.18 and Table 8.3).
Bitrate MessageID TOAD MRT [ms] Common MRT [ms]
1 MBit 1 0.135 0.27
2 0.135 0.27
128 kBit 1 1.11 2.11
2 1.055 2.11
Table 8.3: An example for possible MRT optimisation resulting from the
TOAD approach.
The adapted response time algorithm is as follows:
1. Determine the set of independent messages for each message (by using
the existing MRT-analysis algorithm).
2. Calculate the response time for each message but exclude the inde-
pendent messages from the calculation.
3. Refresh the sets of independent messages according to the calculated
response times (add new independent messages).
4. Return to step 2 until the sets of independent messages do not change
on refresh.
The worst-case result (no improvement) occurs if the algorithm stops with
an empty set of independent messages. In that case, the result equals that
of the standard algorithm.
8.6.4 Implementation
Some of the algorithms mentioned so far are already implemented in ex-
isting tools (e.g. [HHJ+05] and [HGP+06]). But due to the fact that
the existing tools are too inﬂexible for adaptation within our approach,
scheduling and response-time analyses were implemented anew.
The current implementation does not calculate speciﬁc preemption over-
heads as the currently supported target (C166) has a constant preemption
overhead. Furthermore, the C166 implementation of the TOAD-RTE does
not implement polling for ISRs and thus uses measurements as basis for
assumptions on minimum ISR inter-arrival times.
121
CHAPTER 8 Tools and Methods (TOAD-T)
8.7 Variant-Aware WCRT Analysis
8.7.1 Deﬁnition
As shown in Section 8.5, the awareness of variants in the design, implemen-
tation and analysis can improve timing performance and reduce WCET
overestimation. As a result of the variant-aware WCET analysis, compo-
nent and task WCETs are estimated for a speciﬁc variant conﬁguration, the
so called Worst-Case variant. Using these WCET estimates in the WCRT
calculation is safe but bears potential overestimation as well. As with the
WCET estimation, the variant conﬁguration cannot change during task
execution. If two components' variant-aware WCET calculation results in
diﬀerent Worst-Case variant conﬁgurations, we know that only one of them
can occur at a time.
Hence, it is necessary to take the variant conﬁgurations into account in the
task response time analysis as well.
8.7.2 Calculating Variant-Aware Response Times
The diﬃculty of the Variant-Aware Response Time Analysis Approach is
that it cannot be performed independently of the WCET calculation. Con-
sider the following standard response time formula:
Ri = Ci +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
⌈
Ri
Tj
⌉
Cj .
In addition to the non-linearity given by the de operator, Ci and Cj now
depend on the variant model. And their value may in turn depend on the
amount of task preemptions:
m =
⌈
Ri
Tj
⌉
.
Thus, in order to solve the WCRT equation, the typical ﬁxed-point iteration
has to be adapted to work on changing ILPs, where the basic step is given
as follows:
Rn+1i = C
n
i +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
mjC
n
j .
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A safe, but potentially overestimated start value for R0i is the variant un-
aware WCET of task i (Ci). In contrast to the calculation with constant
WCET values, each Rn+1i iteration is calculated as an ILP optimization
problem with the goal of maximizing Ci +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)mjCj for the nj de-
rived in the previous step. The ILP calculation now takes into account
the weights of all basic blocks of all relevant task-functions including the
constraints given in the feature model.
8.7.3 Evaluation
As we have no suitable project with variant-dependent tasks at hand, we
chose to simulate such a system by taking the industrial examples from
Section 8.5 and placing them virtually in diﬀerent task contexts. Choosing
the task parameters of period and priority leads to diﬀerent possible values
of m. Thus, for a combination of two tasks, each containing a single func-
tion, we are able to directly calculate the WCRT for diﬀerent values of m.
The results are depicted in table 8.4. The reduction of the overestimation
m WCRT Variant WCRT Overestimation
1 0,4528 0,45255 0,0552%
2 0,647 0,6465 0,0773%
10 2,2006 2,1981 0,1136%
100 19,6786 19,6536 0,1270%
Table 8.4: Overestimation reduction by variant-aware WCRT analysis.
for our particular example is just in the range of 0.1 %. This shows the
basic feasibility of the variant-aware response time analysis but should not
be taken as an indicator of potential savings in other projects. The poten-
tial savings can be close to 100% on artiﬁcial examples. Hence, further real
world examples are necessary in order to gain insight into more realistic
expectations.
An evaluation of the estimated Worst-Case variant conﬁgurations shows
further interesting insights in that they indicate a potential reason for the
lower than expected additional savings. According to Table 8.5 both tasks
bear a high similarity in the chosen worst-vase variant for their WCET.
Hence, one would expect the similarities to prevail in the combined worst-
case variant for task response times. However, the result is diﬀerent in the
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main aspects like vehicle line, engine and gear-box. Nevertheless, when it
comes to the timing results, the chosen conﬁguration is still very close to
the original conﬁguration.
Feature Task A Task B WCRT Combination
Line Unimog Unimog Actros
Engine OM 904 OM 904 OM 501
Gear Box UG 100 Split UG 100 G241
# FW Gears 16 8 16
# BW Gears 4 8 4
Application Basic Basic Basic
Table 8.5: Worst-Case conﬁgurations estimated by the variant-aware
WCET (Task A,B) and combined WCRT calculation.
8.8 End-To-End Timing Analysis
As deﬁned in Section 5.3.6, the end-to-end timing is typically the actual
goal of a timing veriﬁcation. The end-to-end timing represents the Worst-
Case duration from sensor inputs to one or multiple actuator outputs.
In TOAD applications sensors and actuators can be deﬁned with the use of
special interfaces. A particular write-only interface is used for sensors while
a particular read-only interface is used for actuators. Thus, an end-to-end
algorithm can automatically identify these components by their type.
The potential Worst-Case end-to-end routes can then be estimated in the
longest route from a sensor to an actuator. Cyclic (sub-)routes should be
prevented by design, but sometimes cannot be prevented. In these cases,
special cycle-bound annotations are required for the end-to-end estimation.
As soon as a route is identiﬁed or was manually deﬁned, the analysis of
the Worst-Case end-to-end is straightforward: Every response time on the
route is summed up together with the synchronisation overhead resulting
from the respective synchronisation mechanisms (e.g. [Sun97]).
As received messages and tasks are not synchronised in our implementation,
a sent communication message that is read by a task on a diﬀerent ECU
is assumed to arrive shortly after the task has started its execution in the
worst case. Hence, the new input can only be processed in the following
task cycle.
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The EBA example in Figure 8.19 shows two possible routes (indicated by
Figure 8.19: Finding end-to-end routes in TOAD applications by deﬁnition
of sensors and actuators.
dark and light arrows). An obstacle that is sensed by the radar unit results
in a torque adaptation using either the powertrain or the brake.
8.9 Optimisation
As shown in the previous sections, it is possible to determine many diﬀerent
timing properties for a given TOAD application.
Due to the fact that the timing properties often depend on parameters
that can be changed by the software architect or the developer, several
optimisations can be performed. For example:
1. Find the cheapest hardware platform to run the current application
according to the timing speciﬁcation.
2. Find the optimal deployment of an application's components on a
given platform, so it can meet the timing speciﬁcation.
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3. Find the maximum amount of input sensors that can be handled by
the application on a given platform.
All these optimisation goals can be found by changing the available param-
eters manually or by transforming the analysis system into an optimisation
problem. In contrast to existing timing optimisation approaches (e.g. Sym-
TA/S [HHJ+05]), the TOAD approach is the only approach known to the
author that is capable of taking all system parameters into account, down
to the software component level.
8.10 Conclusion
This chapter introduced tools and methods for the automation of the
TOAD development process and its integrated timing veriﬁcation on the
diﬀerent TOAD architecture levels. Several novel WCET analysis meth-
ods were introduced. The parametric WCET analysis, for example, al-
lows high performance analyses that are especially helpful for automatic
optimisations. The variant-aware WCET analysis takes external variant
constraints into account and thereby reduces overestimations of current
WCET analysis methods by up to 50% of the original WCET.
The automatic WCET analysis was further improved by a loop-bound de-
tection on source code level, that showed a 92% loop-bound detection in-
crease on our example application. The safe estimation of WCETs was
widely improved, as manual and error-prone work could be reduced largely.
All response time analysis methods receive their inputs from other analysis
scopes within the TOAD repository. Thus, all analyses are automated and
integrated within the TOAD tool set so that they can be used transpar-
ently by software component developers that do not require speciﬁc timing
veriﬁcation knowledge.
We were also able to show that the results on the diﬀerent scopes can be
used to reduce the actual worst-case behaviour. For example, CAN mes-
sages are released with regard to their component's worst-case response
time. Thus, creating independent messages that improve the overall worst-
case message response time.
The ﬁnal discussion on system optimisations shows the further potential of
our integrated analysis approach.
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9 The TOAD Development Process
(TOAD-P)
9.1 Introduction and Deﬁnition
Our integrated approach to timing veriﬁcation provides means to discover
timing-related issues early in the development. But in order to realise such
beneﬁts, a development process is required that enforces the use of our
approach. Such a process describes the creation, ﬂow and use of timing
related information at diﬀerent development stages, performed by diﬀerent
roles.
The TOAD-P process speciﬁcally aims at the distributed automotive soft-
ware development process (cf. Section 2.4).
The following should be answered by the TOAD process:
• When and by whom are timing properties speciﬁed in the context of
a distributed development?
• Which forms of veriﬁcation can be performed at which development
stage?
• How are timing veriﬁcation results exchanged between diﬀerent de-
velopment parties?
• If the timing veriﬁcation fails at some point, what are the possible
consequences?
We take the process deﬁnition from Section 2.3:
A development process deﬁnes the activities, methods and pro-
cedures that are necessary for the development and veriﬁcation
of a (software) system.
Translation from [Bal98].
As a ﬁrst step, we need to analyse the existing activities, methods and pro-
cedures in order to identify the process interfaces for the TOAD approach.
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9.2 On Existing Processes
Development processes for embedded real-time systems are not as diver-
gent as, for example, the hardware architectures they use. Commonly,
these processes are following the steps of requirements engineering, speci-
ﬁcation, implementation and testing on diﬀerent system levels.
The embedded systems development is typically subdivided into system,
hardware and software development domains (cf. Section 2.4 with dedi-
cated development teams for each domain [SZ03]).
All these domains deﬁne their own architectures in order to structure their
technical (sub-)system as well as the work packages required to implement
their (sub-)system. Thus, these architectures form the basis for the dis-
tributed development. And the interfaces they deﬁne form the basis for
information exchange between the diﬀerent development parties.
The TOAD architecture deﬁnes concepts on the system, hardware and
software level that are used by the respective developers and stored in a
common central repository, so that every development party has access to
all required information.
9.3 The TOAD-P Process
Figure 9.1: The TOAD-P process.
The TOAD-P process (Figure 9.1) is strongly related to the TOAD-A
architecture as the formal architecture element deﬁnitions are used for the
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communication between developers of the diﬀerent development stages.
All process steps beginning with the system engineering produce work prod-
ucts that are stored in the repository. This way, a system veriﬁcation can
be performed in each step of the development. But only the implementa-
tion phase generates veriﬁcation results (namely the WCET calculations)
that are propagated back to the repository.
9.3.1 Requirements Analysis and Speciﬁcation
Unfortunately, one of the most important steps in the timing veriﬁcation
process cannot be enforced by a tool-chain: The speciﬁcation of timing
requirements can only be enforced by the requirement speciﬁcation process
and the respective review processes.
Generally, each requirement that states that something shall happen on
the system level, requires the deﬁnition of a time until it shall happen.
That sounds easy. But several reviews by the author revealed that even
functional safety requirements, that are required to contain fault tolerant
time intervals (cf. [ISO11]), do not always do so.
The early deﬁnition of an upper limit of the end-to-end response time
usually requires elaborative estimations or costly customer-oriented exper-
iments if human reaction time plays a crucial role. However, when it comes
to safety, these issues should not prevent the estimation of the required re-
sponse times.
As soon as the required response times are deﬁned, budgeting is to be
applied along the execution paths through the system (which is deﬁned
during the System Engineering phase, see Section 9.3.2). Existing timing
information from reused system parts helps doing so with high accuracy.
Using the TOAD approach, such information is easily accessible for suc-
ceeding projects.
In the case of the EBA (cf. Chapter 4), for example, the existing ACC
functionality was only enhanced so that it uses the brakes in addition to
the engine in order to reduce the vehicle speed. Thus, the ACC's previous
timing behaviour is known and is used in the budgeting process.
The brake control requirement, for example, is deﬁned as follows:
The EBA shall prevent accidents at speeds between 30 and
130km/h, relative speeds of up to -60km/h to a vehicle in front
and a minimum obstacle detection distance of 80m.
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As a result of this requirement, the worst-case time to collision is 4.8s at
a speed of 130km/h. Assuming a worst-case deceleration of 4m/s2 a time
of 4.2s is required after full activation of the brakes. Hence, a required
worst-case response time of the system of 0.6s can be estimated.
If the system is able to react faster than that, even higher vehicle speeds or
lower obstacle detection distances are possible. Nevertheless, the minimum
boundaries of the system's capability need to be deﬁned very early in the
development in order to ensure safety but also to ensure the sales potential
of the ﬁnal product. For example, maximum speeds of 80km/h may help
with safe assumptions but may not be useful for most customers.
If, on the other hand, the system is not able to achieve the deﬁned timing
requirements, the following timing veriﬁcation process is able to identify
this issue as early as possible. Furthermore, it will help to identify root
causes for the timing violations and thus help to ﬁnd suitable solutions.
9.3.2 System Engineering
The system engineering is supported by TOAD-T tools which are used for
the system's architecture deﬁnition. The system architect develops the ar-
chitecture based on the top-level requirements and the existing platforms
and components in mind in order to maximise reuse. Again, it is supported
by the TOAD repository that contains the existing components and their
timing behaviour descriptions.
For new hardware or software components, the system architect has to
deﬁne the functional requirements, interfaces, variant dependencies and
timing behaviour assumptions. After a successful automatic veriﬁcation of
the timing requirements on the newly deﬁned system architecture, the tim-
ing assumptions can be transferred into timing requirements on component
level.
However, if the timing veriﬁcation fails, the system architect has to iden-
tify possible solutions. Assuming possible software optimisations in this
early stage is usually considered too optimistic. And it also does not leave
room for potential additional functions that may be introduced during the
development. Hence, we expect changes of the hardware platform in such
situations. These changes are also assisted by the TOAD approach. Here,
the same functional architecture can be simulated with regards to timing
on diﬀerent hardware platforms in order to ﬁnd the best ﬁtting one.
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9.3.3 Software Component Speciﬁcation
Figure 9.2: The TOAD process of software component speciﬁcation.
While the system architect already deﬁnes software components in order
to derive software requirements, the software architect will further reﬁne
those components based on the high level software requirements, existing
software components and structural requirements like coupling and cohe-
sion.
The EBA example is split up, for example, into the functions of object
detection, control decision and actuation (brake and powertrain). Software
components are derived, for example, from the object detection function
(e.g. radar control and obstacle tracker).
The software component deﬁnition includes the deﬁnition of software com-
ponent requirements, interfaces, variant constraints and timing behaviour.
As a central repository is used for the architecture deﬁnition, the changes
made by the software architect are directly reﬂected on the system level.
Furthermore, the software architect can be a supplier who is thus able to
communicate his interface requirements to the OEM, a process that is often
performed but usually not explicitly deﬁned.
As soon as the software component level is completely deﬁned according
to the high level software requirements, the system level timing veriﬁca-
tion can be performed automatically once again. However, if we cannot
verify the timing behaviour in this step, the software architect will have to
consult with the system architect in order to ﬁnd a proper solution. This
quick step back to the system level is usually not considered by existing
processes but can save an entire development cycle.
On the software component level, the most crucial components can be im-
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plemented as prototypes in order to test the functional assumptions and
to have early estimates for their timing behaviour. For the EBA system
we developed the EBA software component as a prototype and simulated
diﬀerent driving scenarios with the prototype. As depicted in Figure 9.3,
the emergency brake assist engages at a speed of 130km/h and a distance
to the obstacle in front of 40m. However, independent of speciﬁc scenarios,
our system is veriﬁed to safely react in all scenarios in the boundaries of
the deﬁned requirements.
Figure 9.3: The EBA controlling a car, driving at 130km/h while approach-
ing a car in front driving at 70km/h.
9.3.4 Software Component Implementation
The implementation part of the development starts with the automatic
generation of a code or model frame based on the repository's existing def-
initions (cf. Figure 9.4).
Then, the component's functionality is either implemented by hand-coding
or modelling. If the interface needs to be changed during implementation,
the software architect has to be informed so that the changes can be per-
formed on the component speciﬁcation and new code or model frames can
be generated. Our code generator supports round-trip engineering, i.e. we
can adapt the generated interface during code implementation.
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Figure 9.4: The Software Component Implementation process.
For the implementation, we recommend that the following coding rules are
enforced in order to achieve predictable execution and to ease the static
timing veriﬁcation:
• Functions shall not call themselves, either directly or indirectly
(MISRA-C 2012, Rule 17.2, [AS13]).
• The goto statement should not be used (MISRA-C 2012, Rule 15.1,
[AS13]).
• A for loop shall be well-formed (MISRA-C 2012, Rule 14.2, [AS13])
• Use veriﬁable loop-bounds for all loops meant to be terminating (JPL
Rule 2.3, [Lab09]).
The developer performs the WCET analysis by selecting one or multiple
analysis methods as presented in Sections 8.4 and 8.5. If the developer is
not able to perform this task, this will be noticed as soon as there is code
in the repository and the WCET veriﬁcation is missing. In such cases, he
will be supported by WCET veriﬁcation experts.
In every implementation step, the developer is able to perform a system
veriﬁcation based on his current implementation. This can also be auto-
mated by using nightly builds. Hence, the entire development group has
constant transparency on the current timing behaviour.
9.4 Supplier Management
With the use of the TOAD repository, all tasks of the system development
and timing veriﬁcation can be distributed while the necessary result infor-
mation is centrally available. The development and veriﬁcation progress
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is transparent between diﬀerent roles in the process so that issues can be
identiﬁed early.
With the repository and the TOAD process, the supplier has the additional
ability to formally request speciﬁcation interface or timing requirement
changes is which unambiguous and saves development time.
9.5 Conclusion
We believe that the timing veriﬁcation, which aﬀects all engineering steps of
a system development, can only be performed properly if the development
process ensures that each development group has clear timing requirements
and is able to verify these requirements for their contribution to the entire
system.
We achieve that goal within TOAD-P mainly by transparency given by the
TOAD repository which helps us furthermore in reusing existing compo-
nents and thus in early and precise timing estimation.
TOAD-P allows OEMs and suppliers to work on diﬀerent levels of the sys-
tem development while having a formal exchange of the speciﬁcation and
keeping a high level of transparency when it comes to timing veriﬁcation.
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10 Results
10.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we want to evaluate our general achievements (see Section
10.2.1) as well as the achievement of the goals that we deﬁned in Chapter
3 (see the following Sections).
These achievements consider the entire approach consisting of TOAD-A,
TOAD-T and TOAD-P. While these achievements are rather in the ﬁeld
of Software Engineering, Section 10.3 shows technical improvements of the
static timing veriﬁcation that were discovered during the application and
implementation of our approach.
10.2 Evaluation
In Chapter 3, we formulated our main goal as a timing veriﬁcation process
that is industrially applicable and considers automotive speciﬁc require-
ments. We will now argue that we have developed an integrated timing
veriﬁcation process (Section 10.2.1), that is industrially applicable (Section
10.2.2) and considers automotive requirements (Section 10.2.3).
10.2.1 Integrated Timing Veriﬁcation Process
We understand the integrated timing veriﬁcation as a development process
that regards timing veriﬁcation in every engineering step. I.e. timing re-
quirements are speciﬁed during the requirement analysis phase and reﬁned
during speciﬁcation and implementation, in order to allow a system level
timing veriﬁcation.
Central to our solution is our TOAD-A architecture (cf. Chapter 7) that
allows a generalised formal speciﬁcation of our system that can be stored
in a central repository. This repository, in turn, allows a transparent de-
velopment which is the basis for an actual and monitored application of
the timing veriﬁcation in each development step.
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The TOAD-T tools highly automate the timing veriﬁcation process wher-
ever possible so that all developers can contribute independent of their
technical background. The tools also reduce the overestimation of static
timing estimations and thus help to increase the acceptance of our ap-
proach.
Finally, we deﬁned the integrated timing veriﬁcation process (cf. Chapter
9) and thus shown the beneﬁts of our integration with regard to trans-
parency, reusability and distributed development.
10.2.2 Industrial Applicability
The industrial applicability of the TOAD approach is mainly achieved by
the TOAD-P process that enables the integration of static timing veriﬁ-
cation into existing development processes. TOAD-P's transparency and
ability to assist all developers improves the acceptance of our approach
compared to other approaches. Furthermore, the TOAD approach im-
proves the communication in distributed development projects and thus
reduces development costs.
The underlying TOAD-A architecture can be adapted to existing architec-
tures, but it mainly targets software component architectures as shown in
Chapter 7 with the adaptation of the ANTS architecture.
The automation, optimised timing and reduced overestimation achieved
by the TOAD-T tools further drive the industrial applicability of the ap-
proach. And ﬁnally, the EBA example shows the general applicability of
the integrated approach to industrial development projects.
10.2.3 Consideration of Automotive Requirements
The TOAD approach focuses on automotive speciﬁc aspects like scalability,
distributed development and variant handling. It is furthermore intended
for the use with distributed automotive network architectures.
TOAD-A is a scalable component architecture that also forms the basis for
variant handling (via component speciﬁcation) and distributed develop-
ment (via exchangeable interface speciﬁcations and the central repository).
The state-of-the-art in timing analysis (cf. Chapter 5) indicates that vari-
ant rich systems have not played a big role in timing veriﬁcation research
so far. With our variant-aware WCET analysis we have shown that the
WCET overestimation induced by highly variant systems on production
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code can be up to 50 percent which can be regained with our approach.
10.2.4 Comparison with State-of-the-Art Approaches
The previously mentioned results help us to compare our TOAD approach
with the state-of-the-art approaches as depicted in Table 10.1. Here, we
use the table from Section 5.4 and add the TOAD approach.
Approach Integrated Industrial Automotive
Process Applicability Requirements
AADL, EAST-EEA, O + −
Meta-H
AUTOSAR − + O
Geodesic − O −
SaveCCM O − +
SymTA/S − + O
TDL/Giotto − O −
Timed Automata O − −
TOAD + + +
Table 10.1: Comparison of the current state-of-the art approaches.
10.3 Technical Improvements
10.3.1 Parametric Timing Analysis
The parametric timing analysis has been found to be a key technique for
the timing analysis of highly parametric automotive embedded real-time
systems. We introduced two novel methods, the Analytical and ILP Ana-
lytic method and thus allow the developers to pick one out of four possible
parametric timing analysis methods suitable for diﬀerent parameter com-
plexities (cf. Table 10.2). These methods were applied, for example, to the
run-time environment of the TOAD-A architecture. There, the Analytical
timing analysis method was applied. As a result, the WCET estimation
can be performed by solving the algebraic equation below.
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Degree of Calculation Speed Error-
Method Variability (example calculation) Prone
Fixed Values no variability zero (0 s) low
Manual Analytic low high (10−7 s) high
ILP Analytic medium medium (17 s) medium
AIS Parametric high low (54 s) low
Table 10.2: Time determination method comparison.
tCore = tCoreO + k · (tCoreC + tChainO) +
∑
i∈l
tChainC + tCi (10.1)
tCi = 2 · (tDataO +mi · tDataC) (10.2)
The parameters of this WCET formula are derived for particular platforms
using commercial static WCET analysis tools (in our case for a C166 tar-
get).
10.3.2 Variant-Aware Timing Analysis
With our variant-aware timing analysis we are able to reduce the over-
estimation induced by infeasible execution paths resulting from variant
constraints. The approach uses existing variant modelling constraints in
the form of feature models. These constraints are transformed and linked
into ILP constraints for the WCET analysis.
In three diﬀerent case studies we were able to show that the WCET over-
estimation can be reduced by up to 50 percent. In one case study we could
even show that not only overestimation can be reduced but also the actual
execution time. This is due to the fact that the algorithm itself did not
consider existing variant dependencies.
We extended these ﬁndings in the domain of WCET analyses to the variant-
aware WCRT analysis which can reduce the timing estimates even further.
Due to the lack of case study subjects we could only show an improvement
of 0.1% for the one case that we analysed.
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Figure 10.1: Automatic loop-bound estimation using abstract interpreta-
tion on the source code level.
10.3.3 Improved Loop-Bound Detection
As introduced in Section 8.4.4 and depicted in Figure 10.1, we developed a
loop-bound detection method on the source code level. With our prototype
tool chain, we were able to ﬁnd 47 out of 51 loop-bounds that had not been
found by aiT for our industrial example. Hence, we were able to increase
the precision by 92 percent.
The introduced method lacks the support for hardware-dependent loop
conditions by design and requires a proper setup of the source code anal-
ysis. Both aspects are treated by the TOAD approach as the application
components have to be implemented hardware-independent and the source
code analysis setup can be automated using the component interface spec-
iﬁcation.
As the manual loop-bound detection is an error-prone task, the integrated
and automated estimation of upper loop-bounds also increases the safety
of the WCET veriﬁcation.
10.3.4 Improved Message Response Times
In Section 8.6.3, we introduced a beneﬁt of integrated timing analysis that
estimates execution and response times on all system levels. Here, we
reduced the message response time pessimism through knowledge of the
minimum message release intervals of CAN messages.
Minimum message release intervals are enforced by queueing the messages
with timers at their worst-case component response time (CRT). Hence,
we know a set of independent messages for each message (cf. Figure 10.2).
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Figure 10.2: CAN messages that cannot interfere with each other are
known by the TOAD approach.
A simple example of two messages, each having a length of 135 bit, shows
the beneﬁt of this approach. When the messages are released in a 10ms
task with a Worst-Case CRT of 4ms (ID 2) and 5ms (ID1) the message
response times are twice as high in the case that the TOAD approach is
not applied (cf. Table 10.3).
Bitrate MessageID TOAD MRT [ms] Common MRT [ms]
1 MBit 1 0.135 0.27
2 0.135 0.27
128 kBit 1 1.11 2.11
2 1.055 2.11
Table 10.3: An example for possible MRT optimisation resulting from the
TOAD approach.
The adapted response time algorithm is as follows:
1. Determine the set of independent messages for each message (by using
the existing MRT-analysis algorithm).
2. Calculate the response time for each message but exclude the inde-
pendent messages from the calculation.
3. Refresh the sets of independent messages according to the calculated
response times (add new independent messages).
4. Return to step 2 until the sets of independent messages do not change
on refresh.
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The worst-case result (no improvement) occurs if the algorithm stops with
an empty set of independent messages. In that case, the result equals that
of the standard algorithm.
10.3.5 Application of Timed Automata for Complex and Distributed
Systems
In Section 8.3 we studied the applicability of model-checking using timed
automata in the context of integrated timing veriﬁcation. Furthermore, we
modelled the EBA to study the industrial applicability. The results can be
summed up as follows:
• The timing veriﬁcation using timed automata can be performed if
rather small, less complex systems are used (examples are given).
The state explosion problem circumvents an application in more com-
plex systems, as they occurred by reﬁnement of high level models in
our example. Thus, we introduced a method for the reﬁnement of
timed automata using simulation relations that allows the shifting of
veriﬁcation limitations.
• The integrated veriﬁcation using the timed automata approach has
the beneﬁt of possible functional property veriﬁcation in addition to
the pure timing veriﬁcation.
• Successful veriﬁcations are valid for the modelled timed automata.
But the transformation into source code as well the execution on a
given hardware have to be veriﬁed in addition.
Considering these ﬁndings, we realised that timed automata cannot not be
used in the near future for the veriﬁcation of today's complex and highly
variant automotive systems.
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11 Conclusion
11.1 Summary
The Timing Oriented Application Development (TOAD) approach deals
with several yet unsolved problems in the timing veriﬁcation domain for
embedded and distributed real-time systems. Motivated by several safety-
relevant and time-critical functions (e.g. air-bag, ABS or ESP), but mainly
by the upcoming autonomous driving which has no human fall-back, we
present our approach as a solution for a safe timing veriﬁcation of complex,
variant-rich and distributed real-time systems.
In contrast to existing approaches, the TOAD approach focuses on the
aspect of integration in that it considers all relevant timing properties
throughout the entire system development process. Thus, the current lack
of proper timing veriﬁcation, which we see also originating from a lack of
deﬁned system-wide responsibilities, is addressed and also covered by the
TOAD process.
Our approach is based on a reference software architecture called TOAD-
A and a set of new analysis and veriﬁcation methods consolidated in the
TOAD-T tool suite.
Most importantly, the TOAD approach increases the acceptance of timing
veriﬁcation as
• TOAD-A limits the use of asynchronous execution on the application
level and thus ensures veriﬁability in early stages.
• TOAD-A automates the development process and ensures trans-
parency on all development levels.
• TOAD-T reduces the WCET and WCRT overestimation in complex
and highly variant systems.
• TOAD-T reduces the calculation time and allows a system level tim-
ing veriﬁcation in each development step.
• TOAD-P deﬁnes roles and process steps that enforce timing relevant
activities from an early consideration of timing aspects in the require-
ments down to a programming style that reduces timing veriﬁcation
eﬀorts.
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• TOAD-P improves the transparency in the internal as well as external
communication in distributed development settings.
Finally, the TOAD approach shows that integrated timing veriﬁcation can
be applied even for complex real-time systems like the EBA example that
is used throughout this thesis.
11.2 Limitations of the Approach and Future Work
By deﬁnition, our approach is limited to embedded real-time systems. Al-
though the approach can be extended for the use with less deterministic ar-
chitectures (event-based architectures, IP-networks, etc.), the results may
not be veriﬁable safely.
The basis for our approach is a complete system description using TOAD-
A. Mixed systems (TOAD-A together with other software architectures)
have not been considered, as they require application speciﬁc adaptations
of the TOAD-T tools.
The same is the case if other processor architectures or network protocols
are to be applied. While most adaptations are relatively easy (e.g. a dif-
ferent aiT hardware target for WCET veriﬁcation or a diﬀerent message
WCRT calculation), others may require more eﬀort (e.g. calculation of
task preemption overhead for complex processor architectures) or are not
feasible at all (e.g. analytical WCET analysis for complex processor archi-
tectures).
In typical industrial scenarios, we expect that the introduction of the
TOAD process will most often be performed gradually with the need for
some kind of adaptation.
The complete description of timing properties in the TOAD approach is
currently used for the veriﬁcation of timing properties. In the future, we
can imagine that this system is also used for optimisations such as ﬁnding
cheap or lightweight hardware platforms for a given system with certain
time bounds.
A next big step would also be the adaptation of TOAD-A to AUTOSAR
architectures in order to dramatically widen the ﬁeld of potential develop-
ment projects.
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Glossary
AADL Architecture Analysis and Design Language,
50
ACET Average-Case Execution Time, 3
ANTS Agent NeTwork System, 75
AUTOSAR AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture, 67
BCET Best-Case Execution Time, 3
CAN Controller Area Network, 37
CRT Component Response Time, 115
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access, 49
CTL Computation Tree Logic, 55
E2ERT End-to-End Response Time, 3
EE Electric/Electronic, 26
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-
Only Memory, 96
ERTS Embedded Real-Time System, 7
LET Logical Execution Time, 54
LIN Local Interconnect Network, 117
MRT Message Response Time, 115
NVM Non-Volatile Memory, 74
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer, 18
OS Operating System, 27
RTE Run-Time Environment, 75
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Glossary
TCTL Timed Computation Tree Logic, 55
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access, 48
TOAD Timing Oriented Application Development,
59
TRT Task Response Time, 114
WCET Worst-Case Execution Time, 2, 3
WCRT Worst-Case Response Time, 3
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